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Study Background 
Agriculture in India as a whole has made remarkable progress over the past three decades. The average 
annual growth recorded in agriculture and allied sectors (forestry, and fishing) during the post reform 
years 1992-93 to 1999-2000 was 3.9 percent compared to 3.6 percent in the period 1980-81 and 1991-92 
(at 1993-94 prices). Even if growth in food grains, the most dominant segment of crop agriculture, 
decelerated from 2.9 percent to 2 percent in the post reform period (while population growth rate is 2.1 
percent, according to the population census of 2001), there has been a high growth maintained in wheat 
(3.6 %) and even rice (2.2 %) leading perhaps to the problem of excess stock of food grains (nearly 44 
million tons). Robust growth in food grains production, despite below-normal rainfall in some regions, 
characterized 1999-2000, yielding a record food grains output of 208.9 million tons (GoI 2001). During 
the last 10 years (1990-2000), food grains area has ranged from 123 million hectares to 130 million 
hectares, the inter-year variation being influenced by weather conditions.  
Despite these achievements, the productivity of a large part of irrigation systems remains severely 
constrained by inadequacy of some or all inputs. Such low-productivity areas are characterized by 
persistent rural poverty. The distribution of the benefits from irrigation development is thus largely 
skewed and unequal. While the determinants of low productivity are numerous and complex, they are to a 
large extent associated with poor performance of many of the established irrigation systems, which causes 
low, inequitable, and unreliable water supplies in those areas
1.  
The overall goal of irrigation development in India has been the improvement of national food 
security, rural and agricultural development and economic growth. Starting from the First Plan period, 
huge investments in canal irrigation have been made to achieve these objectives and important results 
were no doubt obtained. Irrigation has become the ‘prime engine’ in agricultural production and 
significant strides have been made in poverty reduction. Yet, entrenched pockets of poverty persist in 
many states, which raises serious questions about intervention strategies in the face of systemic poverty. 
Though the importance of irrigation is well recognized by several studies, irrigation-poverty linkages 
have not been studied in a greater depth. 
However, over a period of time it is increasingly felt that investments in irrigation systems alone 
were not enough; the management of systems was crucial too. It became apparent that the operation and 
maintenance of the irrigation system and allocation of available water largely determine irrigation 
performance and  the extent to which the objectives of irrigation development are being met. Research 
has shown that in India, irrigation performance of large and medium scale irrigation projects in general, 
has been poor. Historically, these systems have been managed by the state with little participation of the 
users. Irrigation administration has become highly centralized and supply-oriented at the discretion of 
government agencies. In order to improve irrigation performance in India, irrigation sector reforms have 
been taken up since the last decade, decentralizing management and devolving power to the users 
concerned. The effects of these changes on the efficiency and equity of water use are not yet clear: 
especially with regard to poverty, the linkages between irrigation performance, management reform and 
poverty alleviation have hardly been assessed. 
                                                 
1 Low-productivity regions are located largely in the tail- end areas of government-managed irrigation systems in most parts of 
India. However, the level of poor performance varies from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh to the Krishna Delta System in Andhra 
Pradesh and Vishweshwaraiah Canal System in Karnataka.    2
Objective 
The overall goal of the proposed study is to promote and catalyze equitable economic growth in rural 
areas through pro-poor irrigation interventions in the participating DMCs (including Bangladesh, the 
People’s Republic of China [PRC], India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Vietnam). The immediate objective is 
to determine what can realistically be done to improve the returns to poor farmers in the low-productivity 
irrigated areas within the context of improving the overall performance and sustainability of the 
established irrigation schemes. 
This report synthesizes the findings of  a two-year study in India focusing on the states of Andhra 
Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh as part of a six-country research project led by the International Water 
Management Institute (IWMI) and supported by the Asian Development Bank. The central research 
issues in this context are “whether and to what extent irrigation development and past irrigation 
management practices have contributed towards achieving the broader goal of socio-economic upliftment 
of rural communities, and if it has not, then, what are the causes of under-achievements and how have 
these affected the lives of the poor in rural agricultural communities.” 
In order to ensure comparability of results and findings across six countries and diverse contexts 
within countries, the following hypotheses were framed at the inception of the project: 
 
1.  Command areas of specific canal reaches receiving less irrigation water per ha have lower 
productivity and a higher incidence of poverty. 
2.  Under existing conditions, small, marginal and poor farmers receive less benefits from irrigation 
than large and non-poor farmers. 
3.  The greater the degree of O&M (Operations and Maintenance) cost recovery the better the 
performance of irrigation management. 
4.  Effective implementation of PIM/IMT (Participatory Irrigation Management/Irrigation Management 
Transfer) leads to improved irrigation system performance, which in turn reduces poverty. 
5.  An absence of clearly defined water allocation and distribution procedures, and absence of effective 
and clear water rights (formal and informal) adversely affects the poor more than the non-poor. 
6.  There is scope for improving performance of irrigation systems under existing conditions, with 
effective and improved institutional arrangements. 
Elaborate framework for research was developed and the conceptualization and work plan was 
developed for the six-country study by IWMI
2. The national partners were advised to follow the 
guidelines with some modifications as suitable to specific country contexts. These were further refined 
through a series of workshops at national level and a regional workshop. 
The focus of the study was on selected representative low productivity irrigated areas with an 
emphasis on identifying and assessing a set of appropriate economic, financial, institutional governance 
and technical interventions at field and system levels and framework as far as they affect the poor’s 
access to water resources. 
The study employs both qualitative as well as quantitative methods of analyses though the emphasis is on 
in depth quantitative analysis. 
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PART  I 
Poverty and Irrigation in India 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
In spite of a substantial natural endowment of water resources in India, their utilization has remained un-
even. The country as a whole is likely to reach a state of water crisis before 2025, with significant water 
scarcity being experienced already in some regions of the country. The economy is no longer 
predominantly dependent on agriculture, yet, about two-thirds of the population living in rural areas do 
depend on it for their livelihood. Irrigated agriculture in this context has become the ‘prime engine’ of 
agricultural production. Paradoxically, food grains surplus co-exists with chronic and absolute poverty. 
Significant strides have been made in poverty reduction both in rural and urban areas. However, 
entrenched pockets of poverty persist in many states which raises serious questions about intervention 
strategies in the face of systemic poverty. 
This part of the report is in the nature of a literature survey to establish the present state of 
knowledge on the impact of irrigation/management on poverty, with a specific focus on irrigated 
commands of major and medium irrigation projects in India. This forms the first foundation component of 
the study. 
The literature review examines previous studies on impacts of irrigation/management on poverty, 
and linkages between irrigation and poverty in the background of a wider canvas. While doing so, a 
discussion on water-related institutions, policies, regulations, water charges and recovery, water related 
laws are not included  as they form a substantial part of the second foundation component of the studies 
on institutional arrangements for irrigation management in India. 
The literature survey is based on published and mimeographed materials collected from several 
libraries and state governments and government of India offices. Interactions with a number of 
government officials and researchers helped us in organizing the report and synthesising diverse aspects 
in a coherent fashion. 
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1.2. HISTORICAL  AND  CONTEXTUAL FRAME 
The early history of the Indian economy, ever since the colonial rule roughly through the first half of the 
post-independence period, was punctuated with recurring famines, droughts and floods. ‘Vagaries of 
monsoon’ was the explaining phrase for fluctuations in GDP. From 1970 onwards the scenario changed 
as the Indian economy was no longer prominently driven by fluctuations in agricultural GDP. Bad rainfall 
years in 1987-88 and 1991-92 did not negatively affect the GDP unlike the earlier drought years (1957-
58, 1965-67, 1972-73 and 1979-80). This trend to a great measure was a result of the extensive irrigation 
infrastructure created in the country through massive investments, and also because of the dwindling 
influence of agriculture itself on the GDP. The share of agriculture which stood at 55 percent of the GDP 
in 1950, had dropped to 26 percent in 1999. The GDP growth rate of 3.5 percent per annum before 1973-
74  improved to 5 percent per annum thereafter indicating better economic performance in the latter half 
of the post-independence era. However, this does not undermine the crucial importance of agriculture in 
the Indian economy. Though lagging behind some of the Asian ‘Tigers’, India has made impressive 
strides in the agricultural sector and achieved self-sufficiency in food grains production. Agriculture is 
still the mainstay of  60.23 percent of the population living in rural areas and it will continue to be so. 
Fully 46.66 percentof the rural population is self-employed in agriculture and allied activities and 13.5 
percent are agricultural laborers. However, there is inter state variation among the rural poor: 38.5 percent 
come under self-employed in agriculture followed by 23.32 percent agricultural laborers (Pant and Kakali 
2001). Thus agriculture still contributes to the lion’s share of total employment in India. Dandekar(1981), 
holds the view that the growing disparity between agriculture and non-agriculture sectors in per capita 
GDP arises primarily from the structural features of the Indian economy. Despite this disparity the 
population does not move from agriculture to non-agriculture.  “Agriculture is the parking lot for the 
poor” in India (Dandekar 1994).   
Growth and equity are well-recognized objectives of national policy as reflected in the Five Year 
Plan documents and policy statements. However, one of the most hotly debated issues in the Indian 
context has been whether the growth process has actually benefited the poor (Panda 2000). The 
theoretical and empirical explorations in development studies have long engaged the attention of 
academia on the distributional aspects of economic growth. This was sought to be understood in terms of 
the inter-relationship between economic growth, income inequality, poverty and welfare among the 
various regions and the constituent socio-economic groups at the national and international levels. 
Abundant literature on poverty-related aspects thus sprang up both at macro and micro levels. The 
literature on poverty-related issues can be broadly classified into four overlapping time periods: i) the 
initial decades of independence up to 1968, ii)the  green revolution period up to 1980’s, iii) the pre-
economic reform decade of 1980-1990 and iv) the post economic reform period from 1991 onwards. 
Contextual developments in the country, to an extent also, prompt segregation into these four periods 
during which the literature on poverty-related issues had continued to evolve. In the initial period, studies 
on inequality and poverty had a major focus on the aspects of measurement. Rich statistics have been 
accumulated on income and consumption ever since the National Sample Survey (NSS)  started collecting 
data. Several of the studies were based on NSS data during that period but had to make necessary 
adjustments for estimation. Social scientists joined the fray by measuring poverty based on per capita 
calorie requirements. On the socio-economic front the thrust in the initial years was on institutional and 
agrarian reforms as well as expansion of the agrarian base. The principles of ‘Democratic Socialism’ saw   5
greater degrees of state intervention for the welfare of the people. The zamindari (landlord-tenant) system 
and the intermediary tenures, which existed during that time covering 40 percent of the cultivated area 
were abolished. Tenancy Laws were enacted in several states providing security of tenure to the tenant.  
Roughly two million agricultural co-operatives came into existence and the credit provided by them 
increased from 8 percent of total borrowings of cultivators in 1950 to 30 percent by the mid-1960’s 
(Radhakrishna 1993). 
However, during this period the underlying trend of growth remained modest and was based more 
on area expansion than on improvement of yield. While the gross irrigated area increased from 22.6 
million hectares (m ha) in 1950-51 to 32.7 m ha in 1966-67, the fertilizer consumption per hectare – an 
indicative index of technological change – was only 7 kg per hectare in 1966-67 (Rao 1996). By this time 
several studies on poverty attempted to determe the number of people below the poverty line (BPL) based 
on income or consumption. Ahluwalia (1978) examined the trends in the incidence of poverty for 14 
different years for the time period 1956-57 to 1973-74 for India as a whole and for individual states. He 
adopted both Sen’s poverty index (Ps) and the traditional head count method in his analysis. Though a 
significant time trend was not visible, he found a statistically inverse relationship between rural poverty 
and agricultural performance for India as a whole. The same relationship was also observed in different 
states. 
The next period up to 1980 was broadly the phase of the ‘green revolution’, which started in 1965 
and continued through the early 90’s. Following Kuznet’s findings that income equality takes an inverted 
‘U’ shape as the economy grows, some scholars claimed that the poor hardly gained from the ‘green 
revolution’, while many others found evidence of the “trickle down” phenomenon. Evidence on the 
distributional changes accompanying growth is mixed, but historical evidence for a number of countries 
shows only gradual change over fairly long periods. In India, the income gini coefficient remained almost 
constant from 1951 through 1992, with a mean of 32.6 and standard deviation of 2.0 (Li et al. 1998). The 
sectoral composition of growth also makes a difference for poverty reduction. Ravallion and Datt (1996) 
provide evidence for India that faster agricultural growth is strongly and unconditionally associated with 
both urban and rural poverty reduction. 
Lipton and Longhurst (1989) cite the example of Indian Punjab to illustrate the dramatic 
transformations that have occurred with the widespread adoption of green revolution technologies. They 
opine that modern varieties do reach small farmers, reduce risk, raise employment and restrain food 
prices. Yet, the benefit in terms of poverty reduction appears to be modest. They observe that the poor are 
increasingly land-poor and dependent on wage labor. They argue that the benefits to the poor as 
consumers, (low food prices) are captured largely by their employers, who can pay lower wages. The 
green revolution phase was signified by desperate attempts to make a breakthrough in domestic food 
production. With the spread of high- yielding varieties, agricultural production showed a dramatic upward 
trend from 24 million tons in 1950 to 31 million tons in 1966, 43 million tons in 1972 and further 54 
million tons in 1979.  The gross irrigated area increased from 33 m ha in 1967 to 52 m ha in 1984 and 
over the same period, fertilizer consumption increased from 7 kg / ha to 45 kg / ha. 
Rural poverty in India declined from 56.44 percent in 1973-74 to 53.07 percent in 1977-78. In the 
70’s, strategies for poverty eradication were part of a larger belief in the importance of ‘growth with 
redistribution’. The production cum technology approach was supplemented by several interventions by 
the government to provide food and employment security to the poor.  However, they remained as modest 
relief measures. In spite of wide ranging interventions and the green revolution, the poor appear to have   6
continued under considerable economic pressure. The per capita annual availability of food grains 
remained at 161 Kg during 1976-80 like in 1956-60 (Rao 1996). Although technology made an important 
difference for poverty reduction it was not the only contributing factor. Institutional change, sometimes 
responding to technological change and sometimes to government policy or social pressures, was also 
important. (Bussolo and O’Connor 2002). 
From the early 1980s’ phase of fiscal belt-tightening and interventions, the policy moved away 
from redistribution and basic needs towards structural adjustments and market-oriented economies.   
Poverty as such was given a relatively low priority during the 1980s (Gita Sen 1999). There is ample 
evidence to show that the rate of decline of poverty was higher in the 1980’s than in  the 1970’s. This can 
be attributed to higher growth in agricultural production, slower growth in food grain prices and the 
presence of safety nets. The safety nets are in the form of drought and flood relief programs (during the 
years of natural calamities) and the public distribution system (PDS) for basic commodities during the 
1980’s. The GDP growth rate increased to 5 percent in the 1980s when an expansionary fiscal policy was 
adopted together with limited trade liberalization.  However, this could not be sustained for long and  led 
to a major balance of payments crisis in 1991. The crisis during 1991 arose out of excessive public 
spending and large and inefficient public sector functioning during the 1980s. Gaurav Datt (1999) 
estimates a mixed picture of moderate decline in urban poverty rates, but relatively unchanging levels of 
rural poverty after the economic reforms from 1991 onwards, which he surmises was because of  a 
differential growth in average living standards in urban and rural areas. After 1993-94 not many studies 
on poverty are available. However, the latest official statistics shows that rural poverty is coming down 
compared to urban poverty in states like Andhra Pradesh. Detailed literature review on poverty and 
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1.2A.  RURAL POVERTY IN INDIA 
Poverty is an age-old phenomenon in the Indian sub-continent.  Evidences on Poverty in India in the late 
18
th century and 19
th century vividly portray the then existing socio-economic environment and the 
mercenary impact of alien rule in accentuating the poverty of the masses.  However, rigorous estimates on 
poverty started after independence.  “It took 20 years for the national poverty rate to fall below – and stay 
below – its value in the early 1950s” (Revallion and Datt 1996). However, the absolute number of poor in 
the country still remains high accompanied by glaring regional imbalances. 
A quick review of literature on rural poverty in general cannot be avoided here for, aspects of 
irrigation, agriculture and poverty are significantly embedded in the researches on rural poverty in India. 
 
i) Early decades of independence upto 1968 
There are two literature surveys on rural poverty related to the time periods of early decades of 
independence upto 1968 and the other upto 1980s. The first one  is on poverty, income distribution and 
development (Sastry 1980) and the second on rural poverty (Thakur 1985). In the introduction, Sastry 
traces the debate on development, economic growth, income distribution and inequality in different 
countries and sets the stage for the literature survey on income and expenditure inequality in India.  In the 
absence of official figures on income distribution in the early stages, several organizations and individual 
scholars tried to arrive at the pattern of distribution on a wider base.  Some of them were based on 
consumer expenditure (from National Sample Survey (NSS) data) and others defined size distribution of 
personal incomes based on some simple hypotheses on saving behavior. 
Absolute poverty adopting an objective boundary line called the BPL (below poverty line)   
became the frame of reference for several empirical studies measuring poverty.  The BPL is defined in 
terms of per capita household consumer expenditure. Some of the important studies in this context often 
quoted are by Minhas (1970), Tiwari (1968), Ojha (1970), Dandekar and Rath (1971), Bardhan (1979).  
Minhas was criticized for underestimating the poor falling below the poverty line by excluding the 
expenditure on health and education.  Dandekar and Rath’s study became controversial because of the 
revisions they made to NSS Consumer expenditure data of 1967-1988, and also for their use of national 
income deflator for the conversion of current price data into 1960-61 prices.  Dandekar (1981) pointed out 
that their study of 1971 used the classification of the household on the basis of per capita monthly 
expenditure for calculating incidence of poverty, and not per capita caloric availability which was linked 
to the assessment of under nutrition. Ever since 1970s India has been predominantly concerned with 
income poverty. This began with the working group (GOI 1962) of economists set up by the Government 
of India to decide the extent of poverty in the country. It set the trend for defining and measuring poverty 
by using either income or consumption. 
A brief annotated reference of some of the important studies pertinent to the period 1950s to 
1980s is given in table. 1.2.1. The literature survey shows that the concern of researchers was more on 
‘measurement’ and ‘methodologies’ for estimating poverty. While measuring poverty in the early 
decades, the regional variations were not taken into account by researchers in estimating prices of food 
items and other requirements. 
   8
In the 1950s and 1960s development was viewed as linked to high rates of growth in aggregate 
and per capita incomes by national leadership as well as aid-giving agencies. While attempting 
reformatory measures like abolition of Zamindari system, tenancy legislations, etc., during the First Five -
Year Plan period, agriculture got a clear policy direction which to an extent benefited the poor. However, 
‘trickle down’ theory fortified the approach of aggregate growth.  The assumption was that reduction of 
poverty could only be tackled after a certain level of attainment of GDP (Graffin 1976).   9
Table 1.2.1 Rural Poverty: Literature trends upto 1980. 
 
Study topic (author/year)  Study objective: key research 
issues/questions explored 
Hypothesis tested  Summary of findings/conclusions  List of recommendations 
Early decades of Independence upto 1968 
Poverty and economic development (Sen 
1975); Poverty in India: then and now 
1870-1970 (Dantawala 1973); The writings 
of Dadabhai Naoroji, Karl Marx, RC Dutt, 
GU Joshi, AO Hume and Digby; see Indian 
economic through: Nineteenth century 
perspectives (Ganguly 1977), towards a 
reinterpretation of nineteenth century Indian 
economic history (Morris 1968) 
    The debate on Indian poverty in the 
19
th century brought out the socio-
economic conditions of the time and 
mercenary impact of alien rule in 
accentuating the poverty of the 
masses. 
 
Study Group 1962 – Fixation of per capita 
consumption in India 
    The study group recommended Rs. 
20/- per month at 1960-61 prices 
(excluding expenditure on health 
and education) as per capita 
consumption. This was adopted as 
the poverty line. 
 
The inequality of Indian incomes (Lydall 
1960) 
Estimation of distribution of 
income for the year 1955-56 
Assumed that Pareto Law of 
distribution applies to India like 
most other countries. 
The exercise was conducted by 
linking income tax data with 
consumer expenditure figures from 
NSS data. 
By comparing the pre- and 
post- fractile shares of In 
income tax in India with UK 
concludes that the final 
distribution of real income is a 
good deal more unequal in 
India.  
A note on the derivation of size distribution 
of personal household income from a given 
size distribution of consumer expenditure 
(Iyengar & Mukeherjee 1961) 
Estimation of distribution of 
household income for the years 
1951-52, 1943-54,1956-57 
  Used NSS data ad data from RBI for 
estimations. The conclusion was that 
the top 10% and bottom 50% of 
population increased their share in 
total income. Inference was that the 
position of middle income group 
worsened. 
 
RBI study (1963)  Analysis of income structure in 
three groups of household with 
different income structure 
Unrelated data from different 
sources used to build a 
meaningful pattern. Relied on 
integrating NSS and RBI data 
Contrary to general impression, the 
degree of inequality in income 
distribution in India was not found 
to be higher than in some advanced 
countries. 
It was at variance with other 
empirical studies conducted 
before. Criticized for lack of 
concept, incorrect use of NSS 
data, methodological errors, 
(the equity of Indian incomes 
in India, Ranadive 1965)    10
Patterns of income distribution and 
savings (Lokanathan 1967) 
Size distribution of income for the 
country as a whole was estimated. Study 
income distribution was conducted in 
1960 and study on savings in 1962 and 
both were put together 
  Results of the two studies showed that 
upto 1% of the rural households had a per 
capita income which was 12 times the per 
capita income of the poorest 5% of the 
households. A similar pattern was 
observed for urban areas also. 
 
 
Pattern of income distribution in 
India 1953-54 to 1959-60 (Ranadive 
1968) 
Study on trends in income distribution  Kuznet’s hypothesis  1. The income structure in India is 
comparable to that in other under- 
developed countries. Greater income 
inequality observed in India also 
compared to developed countries. 
2. Ten years of planning had no impact 
on the income tax structure narrowing 
inequalities. 
 
Distribution of Income: Trends since 
Planning (Ranadive 1971) mimeo as 
quoted in (Sastry 1980) 
Estimation of various measures of 
inequality for income and consumption 
expenditure 
Measures of inequality 
covered were (i) the concen-
tration ratio (ii) standard 
deviation of logarithms 
(iii) Co-efficient of variation  
and iv) share of lower and 
higher deciles 
The study covered income and 
expenditure separately both for rural and 
urban areas separately. 
 
A configuration of Indian Poverty. 
Inequality and levels of living (Ojha 
1970) 
Poverty Estimations  Adopting calorie norm of Rs. 
2,250 per capita, the study 
assumes 66% of the calories 
obtained from food grains, 
cereals and pulses in urban 
areas and 80% in rural areas. 
The study looks at both rural and urban 
poverty for the year 1960-61 and at rural 
poverty for the year 1967-68. 
Concludes that 70% of the rural 
population for the year 1967-68 
were below the level of 
minimum food grain 
consumption. The study 
excluded expenditure on health, 
education and housing. 
Poverty in India (Dandekar 1971) 
and Nilakanth Rath . 
Estimation of poverty, review of 
developments and future projections and 
policies. 
  Used NSS data without corrections. 
Asserts that the growth of economy was 
slow and small gains of development 
were monopolized by richer sections. 
Cautioned at the possible widening gulf 
between rich and poor. 
It was estimated that in 1960-
61, about 33.12% of rural 
population and 48.64% of 
urban population lived on diets 
inadequate in terms of calories. 
Rich have to bear the burden if 
solutions to poverty are viewed 
from the framework of private 
property. 
On the minimum level of living of 
rural (Bardhan 1970). 
Estimation of poverty    Time series profile of the rural and 
urban poor showed a sharp rise in 
incidence of poverty over time. 
The findings were in contrast to 
those of Minhas,. Main 
objection to the study was for 
using agricultural labor 
consumer price index for 
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Rural poverty land distribution and 
development (Minhas B S 1974) 
Estimation of poverty.    Based on figures recommended by 1962 
study group. Estimated that the poor 
decreased from 173 million in 1956-57 
to 154 million in 1967-68. He took 
lower figure of Rs. 200 per annum 
(BPL) for rural population. 
Expenditure on health, 
education were not taken into 
account and hence the 
estimates were criticized as 
under estimates. 
Inequality and poverty in rural India 
(Bhatty 1974). 
Incidence of poverty among different 
rural occupational groups. 
Adopting both Sen’s poverty 
index and also the head 
count quantified incidence of 
poverty at different levels of 
per capita monthly income at 
1968-69 prices. The study 
used survey data of National 
Council of Applied 
Economic Research. 
Shows that the incidence of poverty is 
severe among agricultural laborers and 
least among non-agricultural work force 
in villages. 
Estimates of population figures 
of BPL were lower like 
Vaidyanathan’s (1974), when 
compared to Dandekar & Rath 
(1971) Minhas (1970) and Ojha 
(1970). 
Poverty in rural India: A 
decomposition analysis (Padmaja 
Pal et. al 1986). 
Assessing incidence of poverty among 
different sections of population in rural 
India.  
Based on 28
th round NSS 
household budget data 
relating from  October 73 – 
June 74. 
The contributions of different categories 
to the overall poverty in rural areas were 
computed using head count ratio and as 
decomposable units as worked out by 
Chakravarthy (1984). 
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ii) The Green Revolution period upto 1980 
It was argued by Tyagi (1982) that, the estimates of poverty during 1960’s were ‘overestimates’ 
which got moderated over the years and they cannot be taken at their face value.  His analysis 
cautioned against the erroneous tendency to arrive at conclusions in establishing the relationship 
between the trends in rural poverty and agricultural growth in the country based on such figures.  
Contrary to what was deduced from NSS data by some experts, agricultural growth certainly had 
a positive impact on rural poverty.  The spectacular success of green revolution and the mounting 
evidence of its short-term and long-term impacts, which was clearly perceptible during that 
period, drove the policy makers to focus on technology-based strategies thereafter.  The 
production cum technology approach to agriculture supplemented by various policy measures like 
food and employment security to the poor, several targeted and area development programs 
improved the economic scenario of the country. Income poverty declined significantly between 
the mid-1970s and end 1980s, the period when India had a higher and stable trend rate of 
agricultural growth. Interestingly, green revolution could not however bring in higher growth 
rates of different crops except wheat and rice.  In fact, the growth rates were less in post-green 
revolution period (1966-85) than in the pre-green revolution times (1950-65) Hanumanth Rao 
et.al ,(1988) attribute this trend to the fact that green revolution was effective with only some high 
yielding crops confined to some areas and was unable to compensate for the slowing down trend 
in the expansion of area under crops. The green revolution has helped agricultural growth 
undoubtedly, but government initiatives were not commensurate with growth to distribute the 
benefits equitably.  Its impact was first felt in the states of Punjab, Haryana and Western Uttar 
Pradesh and later on gradually spread to the southern states of Andhra Pradesh and Tamilnadu. 
Researches on poverty continued during this period bringing in more refinements in 
measurement and tools.  Two of the important time series studies during this period were by 
Ahluwalia (1978) and Dutta (1980).  The paper by Ahluwalia establishing relationship between 
rural poverty and agricultural performance, triggered off several empirical researches on the 
subject.  Inverse relationships were observed in between the two variables, thereby asserting the 
‘trickle down’ mechanisms.  Based on the evidence from all over the country the findings of 
Ahluwalia’s study were as follows: 
 
a.  No discernable trend observed between 1956-57 and 1973-74. 
b.  Reduced incidence of poverty was associated with improved agricultural performance 
measured as an increase in the net domestic product in agriculture per head of rural 
population at 1960-61 prices and; 
c.  There was no underlying time trend in the incidence of rural poverty.   
 
Many other studies, which followed lent support to the hypothesis while several others 
expressed reservations (Khan and Griffin 1979, Griffin and Ghose 1979, Bardhan 1985). 
The data on net domestic product was taken in yet another study (Balakrishna 1981) for 
the period 1974-75 and 1977-78 for arriving at the poverty trend.  This study found that the 
incidence of poverty was on a decline even in terms of absolute numbers during that period. The 
results of this study were in question because data from different sources and for different base   13
years was utilized for the calculations (Thakur 1985).  This period also witnessed a great deal of 
interest among writers on estimates of poverty (Neelakanth Rath 1996) reminds us that “till 1962-
73, due to the absence of quantity data on various items of food consumed in the annual survey 
reports (NSS), and subsequently due to the quinquennial surveys, scholars as well as the planning 
commission devised ways of updating the poverty line for a particular year to any later year in 
order to read off from the available, total per capita expenditure data, the poverty line at current 
prices and the incidence of poverty in that year.” 
 
iii) Pre-reform decade (1980-1990) 
The Government of India appointed a Task Force to work out projections of minimum needs and 
effective consumption demands in 1979.  Their recommendations formed the basis for the 
Planning Commission for estimating incidence of poverty since the Sixth Five-Year Plan.   
Poverty lines were fixed at Rs. 49.09 per capita per month for rural areas and Rs. 56.64 for urban 
areas at 1973-74 prices.  Thus, firstly their estimates were based on uniform urban and rural 
poverty lines in spite of the presence of inter-state differentials in prices within urban and rural 
areas, and secondly on the uniform upward revision of NSSO data (Pant and Kakali 2001).  The 
task force recommended an intake norm of 2435 calories. However, the difficulty in adopting an 
all India norm was not only because of its inability to account for inter-state variations but also 
because of the innate variations across the states in the food habits. Hence, examination of 
consumer expenditure patterns statewise, to identify separately for each state to decide which 
consumer expenditure level satisfies a given nutritional level intake norm, was thought of as a 
preferred method of assessing poverty. Mundle (1983), suggested the use of multiple poverty 
lines along with head count, for over a period to decide BPL.  
Three different poverty measures were used frequently in the literature (Martin Ravallion 
& Gaurav Datt 1996).  They are: 
 
1.  The head count index to measure the incidence of poverty. 
2.  Poverty gap index to determine the depth of poverty as well as its incidence and 
3.  The squared poverty gap measuring the severity of poverty. 
 
Writing on the developments on the agricultural front Rao (1996), vividly portrayed the 
scenario of the decade and referred to two articles to reassert the economic view that dynamic 
agriculture brings in growth impulses in other rural sectors.  While the initial periods of 
independence witnessed distributive policies as marked by land reforms; the green revolution era 
though, opened up opportunities for human development by achieving self-sufficiency in food 
grains, could not better the prospects of the poor.  The period starting from 1980, however, could 
not offer much in terms of agricultural policy initiatives.  The dominant mood of policy makers 
was to achieve self-sufficiency in food grains at any cost.  As agriculture employs a large portion 
of the work force, all its policies borrowed a tinge of the anti-poverty programs (Desai 1993).  
However, the agricultural growth rate during 1980-90 was impressive than in any time after 
independence.  Three factors were found to be responsible for the trend: i) Expansion of area   14
under crops because of dynamic technologies ii) more impressive yield growth for not only food 
crops but also non-food crops indicating wider technology diffusion and iii) food grains output 
increased in several less developed and under-developed areas (Sawant and Achutan 1995). 
Further, private sector capital formation continued to be on an upward swing throughout the 
decade more than off-setting the decline in public sector capital formation (Mishra and Chand 
1995).  
One of the important conclusions in the context of inter-sectoral linkage and sectoral 
composition of economic growth, however, was that “the relative effects of growth within each 
sector, and its spill-over effects on the other sector reinforced the importance of rural economic 
growth to national poverty reduction”.  Both primary (agriculture) and tertiary (trade services, 
transport, etc) sector’s growth reduced the national poverty whereas growth in secondary sector 
(manufacturing) had no conspicuous impact (Ravillion and Datt 1996) and the decline of poverty 
from 53.07 percent  in 1977-78 to 39.03 percent in 1987-88 became possible because of the 
public distribution system. The inflow of food grains from rural areas was considerably checked 
because of food grains distribution, which was the single largest factor that contributed to the 
decline of poverty (Tendulkar and Jain 1995).  Thus, it will suffice to mention here that several 
tools were used in measuring poverty and several refinements were attempted to improve the data 
available.  Following are the type of parameters often used in poverty estimations i) head count 
ratio for incidence of poverty ii) Gini ratio for income inequality among population, iii) income 
gap ratio iv) Poverty gap ratio to understand depth of poverty, v) Sen’s index and vi) FGT index 
of poverty for assessing incidence, depth and severity of poverty. 
Robert Chambers (1988) was critical of the literature on poverty, which laid emphasis 
hitherto on numbers, NSS data, measurements and methods and called for a different approach to 
infuse a clear understanding of poverty issues from the poor themselves by adopting ‘role 
reversals’. 
“Yes, economic growth has the potential to reduce income poverty”, wrote Shiva Kumar 
(2002) “but equating growth with income poverty reduction is too simplistic. True, there is an 
association between economic growth and poverty reduction but this association is at best weak. 
In the latter half of the 1980s, for example, despite rapid economic growth, income poverty did 
not decline. Similarly all the states recorded significant declines in income poverty from the mid 
1970s to the end 1980s even though, the green revolution was limited in geographical coverage, 
and most states did not record any significant increase in agriculture value-added per head of 
rural population.”  
iv) Post economic reform period (1991 onwards) 
As pointed out earlier, the cumulative effect of excessive public spending in the previous 
decade though had brought down incidence of poverty, lead the country to an unprecedented 
economic crisis and large fiscal deficit.  Added to this India in 1990-91 was passing through a 
phase of political turmoil, exhausted foreign credit resources, and inefficient functioning of public 
sector undertakings.   
Immediate corrections were called for through economic reforms in 1991 which included 
fiscal, monetary and price reforms, opening-up economy to foreign investors, trade liberalization,   15
de-licensing and privatization.  These macro reforms had a salutary effect on the stand-still 
economy. 
Davendra Kumar and Kakali’s (2001) paper examined the impact of reforms on rural 
poverty and argued that the impact of reforms was not felt at the micro level. The paper examined 
the impact by using household income data from a survey of 33,230 rural households in 16 states.  
It was found that sharp increase of food grain and other prices as a result of input prices, the raise 
in the issue price of wheat and rice, and the decline of per capita expenditure on rural 
development programs were factors responsible for heightened poverty incidence during the first 
year of reforms.  The argument was that any reform affecting agriculture in India would have 
negative results and the rise in agricultural output would always have a positive impact in 
reducing rural poverty.  They concluded that providing irrigation facilities and other steps by the 
government to boost farm sector investments would go a long way in reducing rural poverty.  
According to the National Human Development Report (GOI 2002) “At National Level 
the incidence of poverty on the head count ratio declined from 44.48 percent in 1983 to 26.10 
percent in 1999-2000.  It was a decline of nearly 8.5 percentage points in the ten-year period 
between 1983 and 1993-94 followed by a further decline of nearly 19 percentage points in the 
period between 1993-94 and 1999-2000. While the proportion of poor in the rural areas declined 
from 45.65 percent in 1983 to 27.09 percent in 1999-2000, the decline in urban areas has been 
from 4.79 percent to 23.62 percent during the period”. Despite achieving a higher economic 
growth of 6 percent annually during 1990-98, the pace of poverty reduction slowed down in the 
nineties says the World Development Report 2000-2002.  However, the report said that more 
recently growth has accelerated and poverty has fallen.  The report like others highlighted the 
marked differences in poverty incidence within the country.  The report reiterated that poverty 
reduction would require faster growth which in turn required liberalization especially in 
agriculture, and better provision of physical and social infrastructure which is lacking in most 
deprived parts of India. 
In spite of the rich data base India has, the debate on accuracy of the figures, use of 
deflators, reconciling different sets of data available, etc continued to figure in the literature and 
research for refinements. The official estimate of BPL for India’s population in 1993-94 was 
placed at 35 percent. 
Analysing why some states in India fared better in reducing poverty, (Datt G and Martin 
Ravallion 1996), showed that there is no sign of trade-offs between growth and pro-poor 
distributional outcomes.  Sound growth in rural areas stemming from State Development 
spending and presence of good initial physical and human infrastructure was found to be the main 
factor in poverty reduction as exemplified by Punjab and Haryana.  The other approach was based 
on human resource development as typified by the Kerala experience.  The study found that no 
state had a right mix of both the elements. 
Ninan (2000) probed into the role of different factors on poverty levels using time series 
analysis of all India data and also cross-sectoral data for the two different points of time namely, 
pre-reform and post-reform period.  The study pointed out that policies accelerating agricultural 
growth, access to PDS, infrastructure development and measures to control inflation helped 
poverty reduction effectively. 
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The World Bank (2000) in their report on India summarized “In the mid 1990s growth 
increased sharply and human development indicators continued to improve. Yet, poverty rates, 
even in the urban areas, declined only marginally. The inconsistencies between the National 
Accounts and the National Sample Survey that are used to measure poverty suggest that this may 
be a statistical artefact”. The report attributes higher average inflation and more rapid increase in 
food prices in 1990s, and agricultural sector’s inability to raise in labor demand as plausible 
reasons for this slowdown. It also felt that the disparity in responding to reforms by different 
states was the fundamental element for the impasse. The report called for among other things an 
immediate reform in agriculture sector. The report asserts “the issue is not reforms and 
stabilization, which were clearly needed to correct an unsustainable situation, but incomplete and 
partial reforms.” Reworking on NSS data and other sources (Deaton & Dreze 2002) a new set of 
integrated poverty and inequality estimates were presented in a study for India and Indian states 
for the years 1987-88 and 1999-2000. It endorses the view that poverty declined in the 1990s, yet 
proceeded more or less on similar line with earlier trends (head-count ratio). However, regional 
imbalances as reflected by development indicators and growth rates continued during the period. 
The study found no support for the sweeping claims that the nineties have been a period of 
‘unprecedented improvement’ or ‘widespread impoverishment’. 
The issue of poverty in the government agenda was on a low priority during 1980s. By 
the 1990s  a new poverty agenda surfaced with the World Bank’s Development Report as a 
counterpart to the so called “Washington Consensus” on structural reforms (Gita Sen 1999).  By 
this the market-led growth itself was considered as primary and the role of state and focused anti-
poverty programs were felt as secondary. Now, the concept of poverty encompasses wider 
aspects of stakeholder participation, role of governance and livelihood concerns. Levels of 
income often fail to capture deprivations like – educational deprivation as can be seen in Madhya 
Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh though the rural poor are less; Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Andhra 
Pradesh though have lowest levels of child malnutrition, have lowest levels of per capita income. 
So also, income poverty levels cannot capture richness or poverty of human lives. It is not argued 
here that income does not count, it matters a lot in improving other factors associated with 
poverty alleviation. However, the need is to shift attention from income poverty to ‘poverty and 
inequality of opportunities’ – economic, social and political (Shiv Kumar 2002). Human 
Development Report and approaches of several aid-giving agencies on livelihoods broadened the 
concept of poverty beyond a narrow income definition to include dimensions of human 
deprivations that are critical to quality of life. The definition of poverty thus is multi-dimensional 
and includes access to social services, self-respect and autonomy. Participation is considered as 
central to poverty reduction, which encompasses elements of opportunity, empowerment and 
security (Maxwell et.al 2001).   17
 
Figure 1.2.1. Change in rural poverty, 1983-2000. 
 
 
Figure 1.2.2. Change in urban poverty, 1983-2000. 
 
Source: Planning Commission 
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1.2B. WATER AND LAND RESOURCES OF INDIA 
It is well known that the availability and the extent of natural resources of a country – especially 
land and water – contribute to agricultural growth which is by and large accepted as the “engine 
of growth” for the economies of several developing countries. India has abundant natural 
resources, which can be harnessed for a dynamic agricultural growth process in the country. 
Covering about 329 million hectares (mha) of area, India comprises different 
physiographic regions, namely i) the mountainous region of the Himalayas ii) the Indo-Gangetic 
Plains iii) the central highlands, the peninsular plateau and iv) the eastern and western coastal 
belts. In addition several islands also come under the territory of the country. India has a land 
frontier over 15,000 Km and a coastline stretching over 6,000 Km, and is the seventh largest and 
second most populated country in the world. The mountain ranges of Himalayas, Aravallis, 
Vindhyas, Sathpuras, Eastern and Western Ghats and the north-eastern ranges are the sources of 
its streams and rivers, which drain the waters received by rain and snowmelt across the country 
and joining the Bay of Bengal or the Arabian sea. The Himalayan mountains and the seas around 
the country influence its climate, which ranges from extreme heat to extreme cold. These climatic 
conditions in turn influence the distribution of water resources in the country. 
i) Water Resources 
Nature has bestowed bountiful water resources and sunshine in much of the landmass, 
which is flat and cultivable in the vast tracts of the Indo-Gangetic plains and costal areas. The 
land available for cultivation is estimated at 186 mha. There are 24 major rivers flowing in the 
country with many tributaries linking them. The river basins represent the key source of fresh 
water – both surface and ground water in the country. The mean annual total discharge of the 
rivers flowing in various parts of the country is estimated at 1879.45 Km
3 (GOI 1995). 
The contribution of snow and glacier melt from the Himalayas support the flows in the 
three main river systems of Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra, making average yield per unit area 
double than that of the peninsular river systems, which are dependent on rainfall. More than 50 
percent of the water resources of India are located in various tributaries of these three northern 
rivers. Most of the rivers in the south peninsular India like the Cauvery, the Narmada and the 
Mahanadi are fed through ground water discharges and are supplemented by monsoon rains thus 
having limited flows in non-monsoon months (Lal 2001). The long-term average rainfall figures 
of 117 cm in India are quite high, though they may vary in time and space (100 mm to 11,000 
mm). The southwest monsoon during June to September and the northeast monsoon during 
November to December bring forth rains to the country often accompanied by floods and cyclone 
disasters. 
Considering the rainfall, water availability and agro economic conditions, the Planning 
Commission’s approach paper to the Ninth Five-Year Plan suggested the following classification 
of regions in the country (Government of India 1999): 
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High productivity region: Well developed with irrigation facilities and moderate rainfall 
like the north-western region of Punjab, Harayana and western Uttar Pradesh or very high assured 
rainfall like the coastal plains. 
Water abundant low productivity region: Areas of low irrigation development and low 
productivity of agriculture, that have high rainfall and abundant surface and ground water (middle 
and lower Gangetic Plains, eastern Madhya Pradesh and north-eastern region).  
Water scarce low productivity region: Areas with moderate agricultural productivity and 
low surface and ground water availability (the peninsular India and eastern Rajasthan and 
Gujarat). 
Ecologically fragile regions: The Himalayan slopes and desert areas of Rajasthan. 
 
Except the Ganga – Brahmaputra – Meghna systems, which contribute to more than 60 
percent of India’s water resources, several of the small rivers dry up during summer months. 
Depleting forest cover, heavy silt concentration in rivers and reservoirs cause high flood peaks. 
Nearly 40 million hectares are flood prone, though not all vulnerable areas are flooded every 
year. On the other hand about one-third of the country is affected by recurring droughts, earlier 
150 districts had been identified as drought prone. As many as 71 districts in 9 states continue to 
suffer severe drought even after considerable irrigation development… drought has also 
aggravated regional imbalances in economic development (Government of India 1999). 
The National Commission on Integrated Water Resources Development Plan 
(NCIWRDP) worked out the basin-wise catchment area, its geographical coverage in different 
states and also the availability of water resources, basin-wise. However, the NCIWRDP 
recognised the limitations in arriving at 1,953 km
3/per year as the country water resource 
availability. In view of different estimates made by different commissions and committees from 
time to time and the disparities observed in the statistics, NCIWRDP suggested that the CWC 
should take up further refinement of the method of assessment of water resources and collection 
of ‘reliable’ data pertaining to flows and utilization (GOI 1999). The following table 1.2.2 shows 
the extent of catchment areas of different river basins and the corresponding water resource 
estimations.   20
Table 1.2.2:  River basins in India: catchment area, coverage and water availability. 
 
Water resource,(km
3/per year)  River Basin  Catchment 
area, km
2 
States covered in the basin 




1 2  3  4  5 





      
Ganga Sub-basin  862,769  Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, 
Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, West 
Bengal and Delhi UT 
525.02 525.02 
Brahmaputra sub-basin  197,316  Arunachal, Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland, 
Sikkim and West Bengal 
#537.24 *629.05 
Meghna (Barak) sub-basin  41,157  Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur, 
Mizoram and Tripura 
48.36 48.36 
Subernarekha 29,196  Bihar,  West Bengal and Orissa  12.37  12.37 
Brahmani-Baitarani 51,822  M.P., Bihar and Orissa  28.48  28.48 
Mahanadi 141,589  M.P.,  Maharashtra, Bihar and Orissa  66.88  66.88 
Godavari 312,812  Maharashtra, A.P., M.P., Orissa and 
Pondicherry 
110.54 110.54 
Krishna 258,948  Maharashtra,  A.P. and Karnataka  ##78.12  **69.81 
Pennar 55,213  A.P  and  Karnataka 6.32  6.32 
Cauvery  87,900  Tamilnadu, Karnataka, Kerala and 
Pondicherry 
21.36 21.36 
Tapi  65,145  M.P., Maharashtra and Gujarat  14.88  14.88 
Narmada  98,796  M.P., Maharashtra and Gujarat  45.64  45.64 
Mahi 34,842  Rajasthan,  Gujarat and M.P.  11.02  11.02 
Sabarmati 21,674  Rajasthan and Gujarat  3.81  3.81 
West flowing rivers of Kutch, 
Saurashtra & Luni 
334,390 Rajasthan,  Gujarat  and Daman and Diu  15.1  15.1 
West flowing rivers south of 
Tapi 
113,057 Karnataka,  Kerala, Goa, Tamilnadu, 
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Daman and Diu and 
Nagar Haveli 
200.94 200.94 
East flowing rivers between 
Mahanadi and Godavari 
49,570  A.P. and Orissa  17.08  17.08 
East flowing rivers between 
Godavari and Krishna 
12,289 Andhra  Pradesh  1.81  1.81 
East flowing rivers between 
Krishna and Pennar 
24,649 Andhra  Pradesh  3.63  3.63 
East flowing rivers between 
Pennar and Cauvery 
64,751 A.P.,  Karnataka  and Tamilnadu  9.98  9.98 
East flowing rivers south of 
Cauvery 
35,026  Tamilnadu and Pondicherry UT.  6.48  6.48 
Area of North Ladakh not 
draining into Indus 
28,478  Jammu and Kashmir  0  0 
Rivers draining into Bangladesh  10,031  Mizoram and Tripura  8.57  8.57 
Rivers draining into Myanmar  26,271  Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland  22.43  22.43 
Drainage areas of Andaman, 
Nicobar and Lakshadweep 
Islands 
8,280  Andaman, Nicobar and Lakshadweep  0  0 
# Average flow up to Jogighopa as estimated by Brahmaputra Board. 
* Includes additional contribution of 91.81 km
3 being flow of 9 tributaries joining Brahmaputra downsteam of Jogighopa site. 
# # Estimate of CWC based on run-off data at Vijaywada site. 
** Based on mean flow of the yield series accepted by KWDT Award. 
Source: Government of India, Report of the NCIWRDP (1999), New Delhi, Pg.25, 32. 
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India’s ground water resources are also vast and dispersed. The ground water resources 
complement the surface storages acting as regulating mechanisms for storing water in the wet 
season. It has been estimated by the NCIWRDP that as against annual availability of 1,953 km
3 
(inclusive of 432 km
3/year of ground water), approximately 690 km
3 of surface water and 396 
km
3 from ground water resources, totalling 1,086 km
3 can be utilized. The estimates of the 
commission are on a higher side compared to those in other studies. Lal (2001) writes that India 
“will reach a state of water stress before 2025 when its availability falls below 1000
 3 /yr”. 
According to Lal, the per capita availability of about 2,000 m
3 i.e., 2x10
3 liters of water per 
person per year currently estimated would drop down to 1,480 m
3 in the ensuing decade. 
ii) Soils and Crops 
The net cultivated area in the country varies from 180 to 200 mha in different years. The latest 
available land use pattern figures (GOI 1998) for the year 1994-95 show that 68.39 mha and 
11.24 mha of land out of the total reporting area of 284.32 mha was covered under forests and 
permanent pastures, respectively. The gross cropped area had increased from 131.89 mha in 
1950-51 to 188.15 mha in 1994-95. The cropping intensity, which was at 111.07 mha in 1950-51 
increased to 131.70 mha, with gross irrigated areas of 22.56 mha and 70.64 mha for the respective 
years. It is to be noted here that the increase in the gross cropped area was mainly on account of 
expansion of irrigation. The net irrigated area, however, was 53 mha in 1994-95. 
The soils in India are classified into eight groups and their distribution among the six 
important groups is as follows: 
 
Table 1.2.3.  Distribution of  soils. 
 
Soils Area  (mha)  States  Features 
Alluvial  142.5  Northern areas extending from 
Rajasthan to West Bengal. 
Generally suitable for irrigation. 
Black  60.3  Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Tamilnadu 
and Orissa. Also found in West Bengal, 
Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. 
Have high water retaining capacity. 
Some of them tend to become alkaline 
and saline after introduction of irrigation. 
Red 49.8  Tamilnadu,  Karnataka,  Andhra 
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, 
Orissa. 
Low in moisture, retaining capacity and 
good permeability. React well to 
irrigation. 
Desert 14.6  Western  Rajasthan  Sandy and poor in fertility. 
Laterites  12.1  In heavy rainfall areas of Kerala, 
Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, 
Assam, Bihar and Orissa. 
Have relatively low organic matter 
content, low primary minerals and an 
accumulation of sesquioxides. 
Forest  Soils  28.1  Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, 
Bihar, Maharashtra . 
Deposition of organic matter. 
 
The dominant food crop grown in India is rice. It is grown in areas below sea level to 
altitudes above 1,979 m. It is cultivated in irrigated as well as in rainfed irrigated conditions and 
also in shallow or deep water. Rice is grown mostly in Kharif and Rabi seasons. Higher yields are 
reported generally in the rabi season than in the kharif. An area of 22.84 percent of the gross 
cropped area was covered under rice during 1994-95. The second important food crop grown is 
Wheat. The cool winters and warm summers are conducive for a good wheat crop production.   22
The Indo-Gangetic plains – Punjab, Harayana, Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh  
are the areas where wheat is grown extensively. It is also grown in Bihar, West Bengal, Assam 
and Orissa and the north-eastern hill states. Rainfed wheat is mostly grown in Madhya Pradesh, 
Gujarat and Maharashtra. About 13.7 percent of the gross cropped area in the country was under 
wheat cultivation during 1994-95. Maize crop follows next, and its cultivation is taken up in both 
irrigated and rainfed conditions. It is grown mainly in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, 
Rajasthan, Punjab and Gujarat. Maize requires deep, well drained and fertile soils. The 
percentage share of maize crop in 1994-95 in the gross cropped area was 3.26. 
There are several other food crops grown in the country like Sorghum, Bajra, Ragi, 
Barley and other cereals and millets. India occupies the first place both in area and production of 
groundnut (Arachis hypogeae L.) in the world. About 4.24 percent of the gross cropped area in 
the country is covered by the groundnut crop with concentration in the states of Gujarat, Andhra 
Pradesh, Tamilnadu, Karnataka and Orissa. The crop grows best in sandy loams, loamy soils and 
in black soils with drainage throughout tropics and sub-tropics. Sugarcane (Saccharum 
officinarum) mostly grown in the irrigated areas of Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Tamilnadu and 
Andhra Pradesh covered 2.2 percent of the gross cropped area in the country during 1994-95. 
There are other crops like pulses, condiments and spices, potatoes, onions, oilseeds, cotton, jute, 
mesta, tobacco and vegetables grown in several parts of the country, each according to the 
suitability of soils and climatic conditions. The all India production and yields of some important 
crops is as follows: 
 






(in million tons) 
% total production 
(Kgs/hec) 
% coverage under 
irrigation 
Rice 42.84  76.98  1797  49.8 
Wheat 25.01  62.1  2483  85.2 
Coarse Cereals  30.88  29.03  940  10.4 
Maize 5.98  9.56  1595  20.5 
Oilseeds 25.96  22.11  851 25 
Groundnut 7.52  7.58 1007  19.9 
Cotton 9.04  12.86  242  34.2 
Sugarcane 4.5  281.1  67787  87.9 
Source: Compiled from GOI, Directorate of Economics & Statistics, (1998):Agricultural statistics at a 
glance, Ministry of Agriculture, New Delhi. 
iii) Irrigation development and food grains production 
Development of irrigation received top priority in India soon after independence in 1947 (GOI 
1972). The productive policy underlying irrigation development in the British period underwent a 
change and took a ‘protective’ approach after independence. Out of a total Rs. 446 crores outlay 
in the First Five-year Plan period Rs. 380 crores was spent on major and medium
* irrigation while 
                                                 
* For administrative purposes government classifies irrigation projects having cultivable command area 
(CCA) of more than 10,000 ha as ‘major’ and those with CCA less than 2,000 ha as ‘minor’. All the other 
projects with CCA in between are classified as ‘medium’. 
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Rs. 66 crores was spent on minor irrigation. In the Second Five-year Plan period this trend 
continued with an expenditure of Rs. 380 crores, Rs. 144 crores respectively in the outlay of Rs. 
524 crores. From protective criterion the policy moved to ‘benefit criterion’ during the Third 
Five-year plan where cost benefit assessment was required for new projects. The allocation of 
minor irrigation doubled. During the Second Five-year Plan and Third Five-year plan periods and 
the following three Annual Plans, irrigation programs were implemented in other states. The 
Annual period of 1966-1969 showed a clear shift towards minor irrigation. Out of Rs. 760 crores 
outlay, Rs. 434 crores were spent on major and medium irrigation and Rs. 326 crores on minor 
irrigation. The difference in the Third Five-year Plan approach was the emphasis on completion 
of the then existing irrigation schemes up to cultivators’ fields and tackling drainage and water 
logging, etc. The annual plan period 1966-1969 showed a clear-cut shift to minor irrigation, 
which continued during the Fourth Five-year Plan period. The Fifth Five-year Plan saw the 
establishment of Command Area Development (CAD) authorities and witnessed the 
implementation of the 20-point program set by the then Prime Minister, where top priority was 
given to the development of ‘irrigation potential’ and a pro-poor emphasis on marginal and small 
farm households (Kallur 1988). 
The coming to power of the Janata Party in 1978 terminated the Fifth Five-year Plan, one 
year earlier than its completion, and instead a ‘Rolling Plan’ was introduced. The Government 
spent Rs. 1,214 crores on major and medium irrigation and Rs. 237 crores on minor irrigation. In 
1980, the Congress-I regained power at the center and the ‘Rolling Plan’ came to an abrupt end in 
1980. In comparison with the preceding plans greater expenditure was incurred on the 
development of irrigation in the Sixth Five-year Plan. An amount of Rs. 9,318 crores was spent 
on irrigation with Rs. 7,516 crores on major and medium irrigation and Rs. 1,802 cores on minor 
irrigation. New project starts were restricted considerably and greater emphasis was laid on 
existing projects, as there were as many as 182 major and 312 medium ongoing projects at the 
end of the Seventh Five-year Plan period requiring an estimated amount of Rs. 39,044 crores at 
the 1990-91 price level for their completion. Till the end of the Eighth Five-year Plan (March 
1977) the country had spent Rs. 1,378,088.1 billion at constant prices and Rs. 500,851.3 billion at 
current prices levels on M & M (major  and minor) irrigation projects alone (Thakkar 1999). 
This pattern was continued during 1990-91 and 1991-92 Annual Plans and the Eighth 
Five-year Plan (1992-97). Rehabilitation and modernization of old irrigation schemes gained 
momentum. User participation in irrigation management received full attention along with other 
reforms. 
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The NCIWRDP report points the following magnitude and composition of investments through 
plan periods in irrigation and flood control sectors (GOI 1999). 
 
Table 1.2.5.Public Sector investments in irrigation.           (Rupees in crore at current price level). 
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* Public Sector outlays only 
Source: GOI Report of NCIWRDP (1999), Ministry of Water Resources, New Delhi. 
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The report (GOI 1999) also presents the extent of the irrigation potential created and utilized 
through major, medium and minor irrigation projects in India. 
 
Table 1.2.6. Irrigation and utilization. 
 
Plan  Major/Medium irrigation  Minor irrigation  Total irrigation  Gross irrigated 
area as per land 
use statistics 
  * Pot  * * Utl.  Pot  Utl.  Pot  Utl.   




12.20  10.98 14.06 14.06  26.26  25.04  25.64 
Second 
(1956-61) 




29.08 27.80  27.98 
Third 
(1961-66) 
16.57  15.17 17.00 17.00  33.57  32.17  30.90 
Annual 
(1966-69) 




37.10 35.75  35.48 
Fourth 
(1969-74) 




44.20 42.19  40.28 
Fifth 
(1974-78) 




52.02 48.46  46.08 
Annual 
(1978-80) 




56.61 52.64  49.21 
Sixth 
(1980-85) 




65.22 58.82  54.53 
Seventh 
(1985-90) 




76.53 68.59  61.85 
Annual 
(1990-92) 































* Pot : Potential created 
* * Utl: Utilisation achieved 
@ Component of ground water 
Source: GOI, Report of NCIWRDP, (1999), Ministry of Water Resources. 
 
 
Two marked developments in M & M irrigation projects occurred in the mid-1960s. First, was the 
heavy investments in irrigation projects, and second was the onset of a new agricultural strategy. 
The acceleration of irrigation projects also coincided with the change in evaluation criteria of M 
& M projects from rate of return method to Benefit-cost ratio method. Some saw this as dilution 
of criteria while others opined that dam building activity got accelerated with changed criteria 
(Thakkar 1999). 
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1.3.  POVERTY ALLEVIATION INITIATIVES IN INDIA – AN OVERVIEW 
The topic of ‘public interventions for poverty reduction’ is being extensively researched in India. 
Drawing from the early community development experiences of the pilot projects in Etawah 
(Uttar Pradesh) and Nilokheri and Faridabad (Haryana) , a Community Development Program 
was launched in 1952 during the very First Five-year Plan period and later by 1963 was extended 
through the National Extension Service (NES) to all over the country. In tune with the objective 
of overall growth, the planners designed several programs during successive Five-year Plan 
periods. The interests of stepping up food production in the country saw the beginning of an 
Intensive Agricultural District Development Program (IADP), which was modified as Intensive 
Agriculture Area Program (IAAP) and extended to cover more districts in course of time. 
Agricultural universities were established and the scientists were asked to work with farmers to 
bring about the green revolution, subsequently. However, the rising growth rate could not ensure 
poverty reduction. The Fourth Plan sought to seek growth with social justice to ease the mounting 
tensions in the rural areas as economic gains did not percolate down to the poor strata. Schemes 
for the development of small and marginal farmers were worked out and administered through 
Small Farmers’ Development Agency (SFDA) and (MFAL), respectively. Both the schemes were 
merged in 1974, and were brought under the single authority of the district collector. More 
schemes like the Drought Prone Area Program (DPAP), Desert Development Program (DDP) 
were also clubbed with these programs under the District Rural Development Agencies (DRDA) 
created to function under the control of the collector. The tirade against alleviation of poverty 
continued under the Fifth Five-year Plan period. Among the schemes initiated during 1974-79 
were, the National Scheme for Training Rural Youth for Self Employment (TRYSEM) and the 
Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA). The Sixth Plan (1980-85) 
clearly witnessed that planning had failed to mitigate the economic conditions of the poorest. It 
was found that small and marginal farmers, who constituted over 70 percent of landholders, held 
barely 24 percent of land The top 10 percent held about 51 percent of the assets while the lower 
40percent possessed only 2.1 percent (Tinsikar 1985). In spite of the land reforms started in 
1950s, regional imbalances in the country remained glaring, and hence, to correct the malady, the 
Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) was initiated in 1980 along with income-
generating schemes such as the National Rural Employment Program (NREP) and the Rural 
Landless Employment Guarantee Program (RLEGP). The Seventh Plan set out a very ambitious 
15-year perspective, to wipe out poverty and illiteracy in the country by 2000. 
Efforts to provide wage employment as a short-term strategy for poverty alleviation has 
been a major component of development planning in the country. The Jawahar Rozgar Yojana 
(JRY) introduced in 1989 was aimed at providing wage employment to the unemployed and 
under-employed rural poor. This was restructured as the Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana (JGSY) 
in 1999 on a cost sharing ratio of 75:25 between center and states. The program is implemented 
by the Gram Panchayats and works, which result in creation of durable, productive, community 
assets being taken up. The secondary, objective however, is generation of wage employment for 
the rural poor. During the same year the Swarnajayathi Gram Swarozgar Yojana was launched 
amalgamating the IRDP, DWCRA, TRYSEM, MES (Million Wells Scheme) etc., into a single 
self-employment program. The objective of the scheme is to promote micro enterprises and help   27
the rural poor self-help groups (SHG). This scheme covers all aspects of self-employment like 
organization of rural poor into SHG and their capacity building, training, planning of activity 
clusters, infrastructure development, financial assistance through banks and subsidy and 
marketing support. Like JGSY, another scheme Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY) 
was introduced in 2001 to provide rural employment and also food security along with creation of 
durable community, social and economic assets. 
 
The other anti-poverty programs that are currently being implemented are: 
 
Sl.  Name of the program  Focus 
1.  Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS)  Starting with 1778 identified backward panchayat samithis of 257 
districts in 1993, extended to 5448 panchayat samithis in 1997-98 
in the country, and restructured in 1999-2000 to make it a single 
wage employment program. 
2.  National Social Assistance Program (NSAP)  The program started in 1995 has three components: National Old 
Age Pension Scheme (NOAPS), National Family Benefit Scheme 
(NFBS) and National Maternity Benefit Scheme (NMBS). The 
scheme is to provide social assistance benefit to poor households 
effected by old age, death of primary bread earner, and maternity 
care. 
3.  Pradhan Mantri Gramodaya Yojana (PMGY)  PMGY introduced in 2000 focuses on village level development 
in five crucial areas – health, primary education, drinking water, 
housing and rural roads with the overall objective of improving 
the quality of life of people. 
4.  Indira Awas Yojana (IAY)  For construction of houses to be given to the poor, free of cost. 
5.  Samagra Awas Yojana (SAY)  Launched in 1999-2000 it is a comprehensive housing scheme on 
a pilot project basis in one block in each of the 25 districts in 24 
states and one in each union territory. The aim is to ensure 
integrated provision of shelter, sanitation and drinking water. 
6.  Food for Work Program (FWP)  Started in 2001, the program is extended. The aim is to augment 
food security through wage employment in the drought-affected 
rural areas. 
7.   Annapurna  The scheme came into effect from 2001. Addressed for the food 
security of senior citizens who are eligible and are not getting 
national old age pension. 
8.  Krishi Shramik Samajik Suraksha Yojana  From 2001, the scheme provides social security to agricultural 
laborers on hire and who are in the age group of 18-60 years. 
9. Siksha  Sahyog  Yojana  The  scheme is meant to provide educational allowance of Rs.
100/- per month to the children of parents below BPL. 
 
The IRDP program was aimed at making the beneficiary households economically viable through 
self-employment so that the households cross the poverty line. There are several micro and macro-
level impact studies—often throwing up contrasting findings (Dreze 1990). Four major review 
studies are important in this context, as they covered the entire country (Dev 1995). They were 
(Subbarao 1985) on the regional variations in impact of anti-poverty programs in the country and 
an appraisal study (Bandopadhyay 1988) on direct interventions through poverty alleviation 
programs. Both the studies extensively reviewed the literature on IRDP. Another study (Rath 
1985), which after review of several evaluation studies, concluded that wage employment 
programs will be more beneficial rather than the asset-creating and self-employment programs. 
Self-employment schemes, however, were preferred by Dantwala (1985). Dreze recommended a 
serious program of employment generation with legal backing.    28
In the federal context, poverty alleviation in India is a joint endeavour of the central and 
state governments. While most of the schemes are centrally sponsored and financed either fully or 
upto 75 percent by the center, implementation is the responsibility of the states. All the programs 
envisaged so far can be clubbed into four groups namely: 
 
i.  target group oriented programs like IRDP, NREP etc.,  
ii.  area development programs like DPAP, DDP etc and command area 
development (CAD) in the context of major and medium irrigation projects etc., 
iii.  infrastructure development programs like MNP and, 
iv. public distribution.  
 
The first group of programs were direct programs targeting the BPL families. The others 
were in the nature of general development programs aimed at ‘percolation’ of benefits to the 
poor. It was always expected that other sectors like infrastructure development and services will 
provide the necessary coordination with the poverty alleviation programs. But these expectations 
were never realized. Those states where not only employment opportunities were created, but also 
infrastructure facilities were available, fared better. However, only those  households closer to the 
poverty line and which presumably had some assets to start with could cross the poverty line. 
Some dents were made where public distribution system effectively operated for poverty 
reduction. In those states where investments were made in the earlier employment generation 
schemes, IRDP and JRY, the results were better at poverty reduction. This was achieved in spite 
of the poor record in program implementation.  
Anti-poverty programs in India are under reform. As they have been attempted recently it 
is too early to assess their benefits. From the previous discussions on poverty and public 
interventions becoming the focus of irrigated agriculture in India, it can be seen that though land 
reforms provided the initial impetus, scope for further redistribution of land is not available in 
several states. Population growth and fragmentation of land has already made land resource 
scarce. Added to this are divisions and devolutions of land assets benami transactions, land 
grabbing encouraged by extremist organizations (case of AP) etc. In states where implementation 
of land reforms remained tardy, attention has to be given to this aspect by the governments in the 
interests of equity and poverty alleviation. However, states like West Bengal on the other hand, 
show the need for reforms in tenancy laws and land consolidation. 
It is now well recognized that the ‘trickle down’ or ‘spread effect’ of growth cannot by 
itself reduce poverty. It is not the rate of growth which matters but the composition of growth, 
which determines the pace of, ‘spread effect’. The pace in turn is effected by the availability of 
infrastructure as a precondition, and also the absorption capacity of growth opportunities by the 
poor. Income generation interventions and creation of employment opportunities also call for 
creation of a certain level of infrastructural facilities and access to assets in a wider connotation. 
Though IRDP made an impact in some states, evidence shows that only the poor closer to the 
poverty line got benefited and poorer and poorest among the poor could not reap any benefit. 
Design of more poverty alleviation programs is needed for its ability to address the relative poor 
population. Though literature shows that the poverty in rainfed areas is more when compared to 
areas of irrigated areas, poverty still persists in irrigated areas. We argue that the poverty in long   29
established irrigated areas showed less intensity and spread compared to new irrigated areas. The 
plight of the marginal farmers in irrigated areas small and marginal farmer, and also agricultural 
laborers in rainfed areas, has not bettered in spite of several interventions that the government 
attempted from time to time. Attention on agricultural development with a clear agricultural 
policy and a deliberate policy of income and occupational diversification is called for. 
Researchers suggest direct economic transfers to the poor by duel pricing as reflected in 
the public distribution system for poverty alleviation. Subsidies and distribution of renewable 
resources also are very important. Distribution of the renewable natural resource – water – plays a 
major part in poverty reduction in irrigated agriculture. 
There are no special pro-poor programs or policies in irrigated agriculture. The allocation 
of irrigation among different sizes of farm holdings in the northern states of Punjab, Harayana 
and Uttar Pradesh is guided by the practice of warabandi (osrabandi in Uttar Pradesh) where 
available water is allocated in direct proportion to the area of holding and by turn and time. Thus, 
it is neutral to land holding size. In the South Indian states also, the out come is same though 
warabandi is not practiced. Explicit promotion of the interests of landless labourers in irrigation 
allocations is not present in any public irrigation system. They are supposed to get benefited 
indirectly through anticipated rise in demand for their services.    30
1.4.  IMPACT OF IRRIGATION ON POVERTY: REVIEW OF EVIDENCE  
The research on irrigation in India started with writings on ‘technical’ aspects in a ‘mono-
disciplinary’ style and remained so till the early seventies (and they continue today also). In the 
early seventies two trends were witnessed in the literature. On one hand it was exposing the poor 
performance of irrigation projects based on practical experience of the authors, and on the other 
hand there was hardly any literature on concrete project experiences on which such opinions 
could be based. Then came the contributions of Robert Wade and Robert Chambers on several 
aspects of project performance and water management based on field experiences, which 
broadened the knowledge and understanding in irrigation management. Several micro and macro 
level studies conducted by eminent economists brought out the importance of irrigation in the 
process of agricultural development. (Vaidyanathan et al. 1994; Rath and Mitra 1989; Dhawan 
1988; Gadgil 1948). Literature, which followed was rich and diverse. Around this time when 
irrigation management literature was developing, social scientists were also stimulated “to 
concentrate on interaction between the change in society and newly introduced irrigation” 
(Jurriens, R and Kornalis de Jong 1989). In this scenario some researchers worked on social 
processes like conflict management, state influence and collective action etc., and others on 
economic processes like income generation, production and consumption and their spatial and 
temporal distribution. But there was practically not much of literature generated on poverty and 
irrigation in India. Always, irrigation has been viewed as a crucial input for increasing 
agricultural production and there by food grains self-sufficiency in the country. Large 
investments were made in India for the development of new irrigation projects and also for the 
improvement of existing ones. Significant reduction in poverty in the country is attributed to the 
availability of irrigation which enhanced agricultural production and uptake of modern farm 
technologies namely, high yielding seeds, fertilizers and pesticides as a sequel (Ray; Rao and 
Subba Rao 1988). Irrigation development further, provided additional employment opportunities 
and also boosted up the wage rates for agricultural laborers (Dhawan 1991; Ray 1992; 
Vaidyanathan 1994; Reddy 1995). 
Thus, increased crop production and productivity and additional labor absorption and 
increased wage rates because of irrigated agriculture, in turn impact the poor positively with 
increased food availability at cheaper prices and increased incomes. Also, the income from the 
increased agricultural production is believed to find investment in diversified cash crops and 
industry, generating more income and employment. There is abundant literature on the impacts of 
irrigation in India. At the instance of the Government of India and several state governments a 
number of impact assessment/evaluation studies were conducted in various command areas of 
large and medium irrigation projects. Several academic institutions and individuals also engaged 
themselves in studies on irrigation impact and development. The reports of various commissions 
and committees appointed by central and state governments from time to time form yet another 
source of literature on the subject. International funding agencies like World Bank and DIFD etc., 
undertook appraisal and evaluation studies separately, and advisory bodies like the Planning 
Commission and Central Water Commission conducted studies at different points of time.  
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Fan and Hazell (2000), tested the hypothesis that increased public investment in many 
less-favored areas may have the potential to generate competitive if not greater agricultural 
growth on the margin, compared to investments in many high-potential areas. They tested to see 
if these investments could have a greater impact on the poverty and environmental problems of 
the less-favored areas in which they are targeted. Using district-level data for India from 1970-95, 
they found that for every investment, the highest marginal impact on agricultural production and 
poverty alleviation occurs in rainfed lands followed by irrigated areas. 
An additional Rs. 1 million of expenditure would raise 7 poor people above the poverty 
line while the same amount of investment on roads would uplift 165 people above the poverty 
line. Public irrigation also has the third largest impact on productivity growth; an additional Rs. 1 
billion would add 0.56 percent to the growth rate. Public irrigation plays a catalytic role in 
stimulating additional private investment in irrigation, but most of its impact on poverty is 
through the increased productivity it fosters (Fan et al, 1999). They conclude that additional 
government spending on irrigation and rural electrification will have little or no effect on either 
poverty or growth at this point in time. They suggest that only enough should be invested to 
maintain current levels of irrigation and power. While government spending on rural 
development (such as IRDP and RES) is an effective way of helping the poor in the short term, it 
now has little impact on the growth of agricultural productivity. 
Most of the literature on irrigation impacts in India can be grouped into five broad 
segments: i) In-depth research work based on practical experiences initially and later on empirical 
evidence collected from household surveys both at micro and meso level. ii) Analytical studies 
which are generally at macro-level based on secondary data obtained from the NSSO, National 
Council of Agricultural and Economic Research (NCAER) agricultural census, fertilizer census 
etc. iii) Reports of various commissions and committees of government and also reports of 
various funding agencies. These reports are highly analytical and draw data from several sources 
to arrive at policy recommendations. iv) Consultancy reports and sponsored assignments of 
government on command area development (CAD) projects of irrigation projects. While 
evaluating the CAD performance they also shed light on the impact of irrigation on production, 
income and other parameters like household assets, education, consumption expenditure of 
households and; v) the last set comprises generalistic newspaper articles and stories of human 
interest. Majority of such writings provide information both on positive and negative impacts of 
irrigation. 
The impacts of irrigation are grouped and discussed here under the following headings: i) 
yield, output and income impact ii) stabilization of agricultural production and drought proofing 
iii) other impacts. The present review is limited to canal irrigation only. We have not dealt in 
detail other aspects like health, education and other socio-economic parameters or ground water 
resource, except for some references for comparison and overall comprehension. 
Output and Income impacts  
Rise in the yields of crops under irrigated conditions has been asserted by several studies. When 
applied in combination with required fertilizer, pesticides and HYV (hybrid variety) seeds the 
output was found to be manifold. It was estimated (Dhawan 1986) that the land productivity is 2   32
to 3 times in canal irrigated land and 3 to 5 times in well irrigated farm lands compared to rainfed 
agriculture. The study showed that in Gandak (Bihar) and Sarada Sahayak (Uttar Pradesh) 
irrigated commands there was a production increase of 137 percent  and 148 percent, 
respectively. Based on the study of trends in four states it was found that the coefficient of 
variation in crop areas was 1.9 in irrigated lands and 2.9 in un-irrigated lands, while that of the 
yield was 4.3 in irrigated farms and 9.3 in un-irrigated farms. According to NCIWRDP (G0I 
1999), the national average yields in 1991-92 for all food grains under rainfed and irrigated 
conditions were 1.0 and 2.33 tons/ha respectively.  
Dhawan (2000) dismissed the criticism that canal farmers in India had benefited little 
from canal waters and benefits from canal irrigation were not commensurate with canal costs. 
Drawing evidence from his earlier book (Dhawan 1988), he asserted that national overall irrigated 
yield was a good proxy of irrigated yield for the entire canal network in India. The article 
elaborated on several incidental benefits of canal irrigation which were akin to primary benefits, 
and which should be treated as such for monetary evaluation, while discussing cost-benefit 
analysis of irrigation projects. The incidental benefits were:  
 
i.  increased income and output as a result of irrigation, which enhanced income and trade and 
processing activities, respectively. 
ii.  irrigation improved the ground water resources, which became an important element in 
agricultural production. 
iii. irrigation reduced the instability, which was persisting in farm economy. 
iv. irrigation waters also served several other purposes namely, drinking water, hydel power 
generation etc. 
v.  employment benefits of irrigation were clearly noted during construction phase as well as 
subsequently in farm activities in irrigated agriculture. 
 
Dhawan (1988), in his elaborate work on irrigation in India’s agricultural development, 
provides some methodological contributions for measurement of output and stability of irrigated 
agriculture. He used the official data available from different sources and analyzed the pattern at 
different points of time and for different states. Inter-state differences thus provide a comparative 
framework for obtaining insights into the role of irrigation, in the absence and impracticability of 
having generalized an all India analysis. He cautions that though a broad conceptualization of 
contributory role (pure irrigation effect) is possible, it cannot be measured satisfactorily in actual 
practice. 
One of the impacts of irrigation is on the intensity of cropping – single crop, double crop 
or year round cropping (in percentage terms 100%, 200% and 300%, respectively). For appraising 
cropping intensity the author suggests that regional variations have to be reckoned with and 
identification of crops by season becomes necessary. He also estimates that for the country as a 
whole, “one percentage point rise in irrigation availability may be accompanied by only half a 
percentage point rise in intensity of cropping”. Positive yield impacts of irrigation are commonly 
observed when irrigated yields are compared with un-irrigated yields. When in some cases any 
contrary trend is observed it is necessary to examine whether soil and climatic conditions are 
similar between the areas compared and whether the yield pertains to different crop seasons of the   33
year. The other impact of irrigation is in altering cropping pattern oriented to market. However, it 
is a misconception to assume irrigation by itself will change the crop pattern of food grains to 
non-food grains. The policies of government, technology, irrigation system design and several 
other factors come to play in deciding crop pattern by the farmer. 
The next impact of irrigation is on area and output. Dhawan, in this context, highlights 
the total crop area effect of irrigation. The impact of irrigation can be clearly seen from the 
overall contribution of increased irrigated area in food grain production. The water-related 
statistics of CWC shows the following increases between 1950-51 and 1993-94. 
 
Table 1.4.1.  Irrigated agriculture and food grains production. 
 
Particulars Unit  1950-
51 
1993-94 
Gross sown area under crops  m ha  131.9  186.4 
Gross sown area under food grains  m ha  97.3  124.7 
Gross irrigated area under all crops  m ha  22.6  68.4 
Gross irrigated area under food grains  m ha  18.31  48.247 
Gross un-irrigated area under food grains  m ha  78.98  76.453 
Food grain production  tons  50.8  134.2 
Food grains yield under irrigation   tons/ha  -  2.33 
Increase in irrigated area between 1950-51 and 1993-94  m ha  26.63 
Contribution of food grains from addl. Irrigation  tons  69.7 
Percentage contribution of irrigated area in food grain production  %  52 
Source: CWC, water-related statistics (1998) as quoted in GOI report of NCIWRDP (1999). 
 
 Benefits from irrigation result in a number of ways and on-farm income is of major 
importance. From the cost-benefit viewpoint of farmers, it is the surplus of their gross receipts 
over their costs of cultivation. When assessed at shadow prices it reflects the social cost-benefit. 
Dhawan (1988), calculated the following differential income impact of providing irrigation to a 
dry crop per hectare (statistics pertain to the end of seventies valued at 1970-71 price level): Indus 
basin – Rs. 1,723, Gangetic basin – Rs. 2,000, South India – Rs. 1,850, Deccan Plateau – Rs. 
4,430. 
Rane’s work (1981) in two villages near Delhi, one irrigated and the other un-irrigated, 
indicated that people under BPL category are significantly more in un-irrigated areas when 
compared to irrigated areas. Taking minimum nutritional levels required which are valued at 1980 
prices and calculated at Rs. 1,600 per annum, the author used Lorenz curve and Gini-ratio 
techniques for analysis of the data collected by a survey. Taking the per capita income as basis he 
found there was need to classify population below the poverty into two categories - more 
backward (un-irrigated areas) and backward (irrigated areas) for pro-poor interventions. A quick 
summation of several of the recent CAD evaluation studies conducted in India showed marked 
difference between per hectare yields and incomes of households in irrigated and un-irrigated 
commands. The difference between irrigated and rainfed household farms’ productivity was 
striking. It may be noted here that table 1.4.2 shows the trend only and not the precise quantum in 
a certain year of reference. There was also the problem in choosing control villages; some studies 
took the villages within the irrigation project but not covered by CAD, some others outside. Some 
studies had the pre-irrigation data while others did not. However, the results help us in drawing 
inferences.   34
 
Table 1.4.2. Per hectare production in different CAD projects. 
 
(tons/ha) 















Rice 4.8  1.7 2.8  -  -  - 
Maize 2.1  1.8  1.9  -  -  - 
Wheat -  -  - 2.8  1.6  1.8 
1) Griri Command Area 
Development Project, 
Himachal Pradesh 
Barseem -  -  -  25.2  21.7  22 
Rice 3.2  -  2.0  -  -  -  2) CAD Program 
Chambal, Rajasthan  Wheat  -  -  -  1.6  -  1.2 
Rice 1.3  1.0 
(before 
CADA) 
0.80 1.3 1.3  1.2  3)Barna CAD Project, 
Madhya Pradesh 
Jowar 1.4  1.0 0.91  1.4  1.4 1.3 
Rice 2.7  2.3  -  2.2  1.5 -  4) CAD Program 
Jamuna, Assam  Sugarcane -  -  -  2.5  1.9  - 
Paddy 4.4  3.5  4.5 4.1  3.8 3.6 
Jowar -  -  2.4  -  -  - 
5) Periyar Vaigai 
Project, Tamilnadu 
Wheat -  -  -  - -  2.0 
(before 
CADA) 
Paddy 1.3  -  1.0  -  -  -  6) Kukadi Irrigation 
Project, Maharashtra  Wheat  1.9  1.3  1.2  -  -  - 
Aman 2.3  1.4  0.9  - -  - 
Aus -  -  (pre-project)  -  -  - 
Boro 2.6  1.3 0.8  2.1  0.6  0.7 
7) Mayurakshi CAD 
Project, West Bengal 
Wheat -  -  -  - -  - 
 
Source: 
1 & 4. Consulting Engineering Services (India) Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1996. 
2 & 7. Water and Power Consultancy Services (India) Ltd., New Delhi, 1996. 
3. Redecon (India) Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1996  
5 & 6. Kirloskar Consultants Ltd., Pune, 1996. 
 
A study of ten command areas in large irrigation projects conducted earlier (Dhawan 
1989), found that the mean value of yield from canal irrigation was 21 quintals as against 8 
quintals in rainfed areas. The study worked out the level of land productivity and found that 
irrigated lands with relative area under non-food crops and relative area of crops requiring kharif 
irrigation had positive relation r = 0.32 and r = 0.38, respectively. Negative relation (r = -0.3) was 
seen in the rainfall level in the command area. The irrigated areas showed much greater 
productivity for non-food grains than food grains. When looked from water productivity angle the 
difference was however, narrow. The study also argued that the static and dynamic impacts of 
irrigation on crop yields were different. The static impact was reflected at the time of change-over 
from dry land farming to irrigated agriculture. This was because the farmer in the new irrigated 
regime was unable to use other inputs and the yield turned out to be modest. This gradually 
changed as the farmer bridged the gaps in application of other inputs along with irrigation 
(Dhawan 1989). 
In the irrigated commands to what extent the ‘trickle down’ mechanisms furthered the 
generation of income and employment opportunities to all categories of poor, is an important 
factor for assessing the impact of irrigated agriculture on the incidence of poverty. Inverse   35
correlation is often found between output and income on one hand and the rural poverty on the 
other (Fan et al. 1999). This was discussed at length in the earlier section on rural poverty from 
the researches of several economists in India. 
Employment  impact 
Introduction of irrigation invariably brings forth improved absorption of labor in agriculture with 
higher wage rates. The increased demand for labor is caused in view of the intensive farm 
management requirements like number of waterings, weedings, application of fertilizers etc.’ 
increased cropped area, shift to more labor-intensive cash crops, increased work requirements, 
etc., (Kallur 1988). The manpower use per hectare was almost three times in irrigated agriculture 
as compared to non-irrigated agriculture (46.19 and 16.39, respectively). Further, the gross 
receipts per man-day of agricultural laborers was higher by 85.2 percent in the irrigated areas of 
Rajasthan canal project  (Roy 1983). A review of literature on the social impact of canal irrigation 
(Kishore 2002) covered the studies of Satpathy (1984) in six villages of Orissa where canal 
irrigation was reported to have increased employment man-days especially more in marginal farm 
holdings, and the other study by A.S. Patel in Gujarat command areas. In the latter study it was 
found that one rupee of investment in terms of cost provided less employment to labor when 
irrigation was introduced than prior to irrigation, though the overall investment in labor per unit 
of land in irrigated regimes increased substantially. However, though the employment effect of 
irrigation in static framework may appear as substantive, over a period of time, the employment 
elasticity of output diminished from 0.62 (late sixties) to 0.35 in (mid seventies), (Dhawan 1988). 
Reviewing the impact of farm economy in the high rainfall area in Konkan, Dhawan (1988b), 
wrote that without the irrigation project, the output of each hectare of land stood at Rs. 4,800 for 
which 227 days of human labor was used. With the project both the numbers increased Rs.11,050 
and 500 days, respectively. “Thus, labor use rise by 140 percent when the land productivity rises 
by 130 percent, giving an employment output elasticity of 1.08. But the value of this elasticity is 
below unity (0.72) for hired labor.” (Dhawan 1988b). 
Two cases from India covered by CIRDAP in their study on the impact of small-scale 
irrigation on rural poor in Asia, was reported to have found increase of labor per acre, when 
compared to rainfed agriculture. It was about 188 percent for crops like tomato and chillie and 
108 percent for food crops. Hired labor dominated with 52 percent in the labor requirement 
(Hasnip et.al. 2001). 
From several micro studies abundant evidence of increased employment can be seen in 
irrigated agriculture. Studies in mid eighties showed that the increase in days worked on irrigation 
schemes was over 100 percent in comparison with rainfed situations in West Bengal (Damodar 
valley canals); more than 150 percent in Punjab (Ferozepur canal), 61 percent in Gujarat 
(Dantiwada), and over 100 percent in Andhra Pradesh (Kakatiya canal). Irrigation provides 
security against impoverishment. “By providing employment and incomes which are not just 
more in quantity, but more reliable and spaced over most of the year vulnerability is reduced” 
(Chambers 1985). 
Trends in real wages and income of rural wage labor households is an important 
dimension for understanding the relationship of agricultural growth and poverty alleviation. They   36
are equally important for small and marginal farmers, because many of such farmers get 
considerable earnings from labor. At 1956-57 prices, the real wage rates for males increased from 
Rs. 1.02 in 1956-57 to Rs. 1.26 in 1964-65, Rs. 1.25 in 1977-78 and Rs. 1.66 in 1983. The real 
income of agricultural labor during this period increased at the rate of 3 percent per annum. 
However, the performance of other rural labor households was better with real income growing at 
the rate of 4.8 percent (Saraswat 1993). Bhalla (1995), argued that occupational diversification 
“builds a more effective floor to earnings than high average agricultural labor income in the 
greenest of green revolution areas in Harayana.” 
Village voices (Epstein et al. 1998), is an interesting study of two villages in Karnataka – 
one with irrigation and the other without irrigation covering a time period from 1954 to 1997 at 
different intervals. The study focuses on rural development indicating culturally sensitive 
development strategies. The study shows that the irrigated village was on the way to becoming a 
model growth centre. Increased per capita acre productivity and extension of irrigated acreage 
had facilitated the land carrying capacity to accommodate increasing numbers. Villagers had a 
strong social identity and feeling of pride regarding their achievements. The village which had no 
irrigation facility became extroverted, developed social anomie and soon was likely to disappear 
and get absorbed as a suburb of the nearby expanding town. The growing regional economy 
however forced many people of un-irrigated villages to leave the villages and seek employment 
(professionals like doctors, teachers, lecturers etc.), while others commuted to work as 
mechanics, electricians and other jobs. Thus, development of canal irrigation triggered off 




Irrigation provides stabilization on three counts – crop yield, total farm output and farm income. 
This is viewed in terms of a certain extent of insulation against drought, though drought cannot be 
taken as the only cause of lower yields, output and incomes. Output depends on crop area and 
crop yield and their covariance, yet, output is not a guarantee to income stability for which price 
stabilization and price support policy is important. Given the complexity, “a priori expectation is 
that the impact of developing various types of irrigation on the output and crop area, when 
viewed in totality of the country as a whole, is bound to be considerable” (Dhawan 1985; Dhawan 
1988).  The study of Ray, Rao and Subba Rao (1988) showed that the standard deviation of 
annual aggregate crop yield and growth rates of outputs in irrigated conditions was less than half 
that of non-irrigated conditions. The study also showed a gain in output stability in studies 
conduceted in 9 out of 11 states. 
Equity impact 
The findings of several researchers showed that large landholders and rich farmers were greater 
beneficiaries of canal irrigation, accompanied by the nexus of powerful social groups and 
unscrupulous officials and members of public (Pant). Wade (1975), argued that concern with 
economic justification of irrigation projects tended to guide the thinking in terms of aggregate 
output overlooking the distribution aspect. He quoted van der velde’s research that land holdings   37
closer to canal outlets got better water service, and that holding location constant, big holdings 
receive more water per acre than small holdings. He further referred to the evidence from 
Reidinger’s research, which showed that holdings of larger and powerful landholders often were 
closest to the head reach of the water course. Jasveen (1985), pointed that large farmers in Punjab 
neglected the usage of canal water with the installation of tube wells, which deprived others using 
canal water due to non-maintenance of the entire length of water course. Thus, access to irrigation 
worsened forsmall farmers in the tail end. Implicit in the distribution system was the scale effect, 
such that the adverse consequences derived from the mode of water distribution were 
correspondingly greater for small-scale users. This scale bias reinforced inequalities among users. 
Though marginal farmers gained in absolute sense, large farmers gained proportionally much 
more from irrigation. The income of marginal and large farmers per hectare in a village study was 
found to be Rs. 2,799 and Rs. 3,498, respectively (Nadkarni 1984).  
 
Singh (1978), questioned  the water subsidies of canal projects. Since irrigation facilities were not 
uniformly distributed among all the regions in the country, and were not equally accessible to all 
size groups of farmers within a region, it was argued that water subsidies would further widen the 
inter-regional disparities in income distribution. Water subsidies thus were untenable in view of 
efficiency or equity. Another equity issue comes out of non-availability of credit and inputs. In 
Mula command area in Maharashtra, a study (Khuspe T.S and G.K. Sawant 1978) found that 
52.67 percent farmers under-utilized the canal irrigation due to non-availability of credit (78%) 
for purchasing farm inputs and high cost maintenance of field channels. 
 
Hooja (2000), in his study observed that the per capita income from agriculture is 5.5 times 
higher in big farms as compared to small size farms in irrigated areas, whereas it is only 2.5 times 
higher in case of rainfed villages in the Krishna Raj Sagar project area. Households from irrigated 
villages spent more on food and non-food items than the households in the rainfed areas. The 
percentage share of consumption expenditure on non-food items like education, health, clothing 
and travelling was relatively higher for cultivators of irrigated households. Irrigation not only 
brought higher prosperity but also higher inequity of incomes among cultivators. Both income 
and asset inequity was found to be higher in irrigated villages, but overall quality of life was also 
better in the irrigated villages. 
 
Irrigation management transfer to the farmers was considered as the best option to bring about 
equity in water distribution. However, there were several unfounded fears. Although a major 
concern among officials, there was no evidence to suggest that water distribution became more 
inequitable subsequent to transfer. In many cases equity of water distribution improved. In the 
early stages, the leaders seemed to have played an important role in ensuring equity. In the longer 
run, structures and processes put in place by the leaders are likely to provide voice to the weaker 
sections of the membership. The processes suggested that risk of water distribution becoming 
more inequitable appeared to be out of place particularly in large gravity systems, where all 
beneficiaries were aware of their rights. The transfer of smaller systems such as public tube wells, 
the access to which were at the mercy of the operator, had not necessarily resulted in equitable 
access. Many of these were taken over by a few individuals through fictitious organizations.   38
 
Selvarajan et al. (2001), in their study assessed the equity dimensions of India’s irrigation 
development. The focus of the study was to ascertain equity impact of irrigation development in 
India from 1970 through 1990 using agricultural census database covering major states and union 
territories. Using Theil’s Entropy Measure inter-farm size inequality in irrigation distribution in 
India was analyzed at all-India level as well as state level. Inequality at all-India Level was split 
into two constituent parts viz., - “Between States” inequality and “Within States” inequality for 
quantifying the sources of inequality for better irrigation policy decisions. Following the 
Rawisian approach, in which irrigation distribution policy is designed in favour of small farms, 
the expected Theil’s measure of inequality has come down substantially. Deviation of current 
canal irrigation distribution from Rawisian distribution indicates an index value of 0.78204 for 
1990/91, which is 12 percent less than that of 1970/71 levels. Deviation of current canal irrigation 
distribution by proportion has declined from 0.25710 in 1970/71 to 0.17115 in 1990/91. During 
this period actual distribution has come closer to the normative distribution based on proportional 
distribution policy pursued, and this kind of  a declining trend also remained consistent during the 
period 1971-1991. 
 
Relative equity performance analysis of canal and non-canal sources of irrigation showed that the 
distribution of canal-irrigated area is superior in promoting equity in states like, Gujarat, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. Analysis of equity impact at state-level 
revealed that there is a wide variation in the level of inequality in current distribution of flow and 
lift irrigated areas across different farm-size classifications, both in absolute terms and in terms of 
household distribution of irrigation. Large farms captured disproportionately large share of 
irrigation benefits, as compared to small and marginal farms. Changing towards Rawisian 
distribution policy will significantly bring down the levels of inequality in the current irrigation 
distribution, in general and canal irrigation distribution, in particular. Levels of inequality in the 
distribution of most of the irrigation related attributes is less than the overall inequality in the 
current distribution of cultivated area. 
 
In the past, integrated approach was never adopted in the water sector by internalizing all the 
sources and uses of water while designing the policies. Consequently, source-wise analysis of 
irrigated area exhibits mixed inequality trends in the distribution of irrigation-related attributes. 
Mutual inter-dependent linkages among different users and sources of water require designing of 
policies for development management and utilization of water for the sector as a whole, 
encompassing all uses and sources. The study recommended the following: i) To improve equity 
in irrigation development and distribution, improved distribution across farm-size groups need to 
be targeted than in terms of balanced regional irrigation development in case of canal irrigation 
source. However, contrary will be the case in the context of tube well irrigation. ii) Along with 
the efforts to install PIM, simultaneous efforts to ensure physical and financial sustainability of 
the irrigation system is necessary. This would promote both equity and efficiency in the long run. 
iii) Reforms in the existing water laws and institutions are equally needed to correct the ‘incentive 
gap’ and promote ecological security, economic efficiency and social equity in every use of 
water.   39
 
In a study, (Narayanamoorthy 2001), to establish the relationship between incidence of poverty 
and development of irrigation in 14 major states of India, irrigation was taken as the explanatory 
variable. The study also tried to locate the changing role of irrigation as an explanatory factor 
over different points of time namely, 1972-73, 1977-78, 1983-84 and 1987-88. The objectives 
were to: 1) demonstrate the importance of irrigation as an impacting policy intervention on other 
variables which were used by earlier studies for analyzing the incidence of rural poverty; 2) 
capturing the changing scenario of state level rural poverty and to analyze the relationship 
between rural poverty and irrigation across states. The poverty line declared by the Planning 
Commission in different years, and other sources of data published by the government and 
commonly used in poverty studies were taken for the purpose of analysis. Irrigation was found to 
be highly influential on all the variables used in earlier studies. The paper argued that irrigation 
should be taken as the important variable in the analysis relating to rural poverty. The study also 
linked the irrigation-poverty nexus by segregating states above poverty line and below poverty 
line with their respective irrigation endowments. Irrigated area (ha) per thousand rural population 
(IAPTRP) was found to be significantly high for below poverty line states. The study also drew 
the inference that irrigation was the main factor in increasing real wage rate of agricultural 
laborers. Computed correlation values for irrigation, and non-irrigation variables regression 
analysis was made using only irrigation as a dependent variable. This study clearly showed 
irrigation as an important factor associated with the level of poverty in India. 
Livelihoods impact 
Anti-poverty effects are perceptible from the point of view of production and livelihoods. The 
production aspects were already dealt with earlier. From the livelihoods standpoint the question 
of entitlements was made increasingly important by Amartya Sen. Raising the question “who 
gains and who loses?” Chambers (1988) mentioned, “irrigation, increased irrigation, higher 
cropping intensities and associated change in cropping patterns all affect different groups in 
different ways. For small and marginal farmers, irrigation, means more productive work… on 
more days of year and more stable”. For landless poor irrigation in addition to providing 
employment, provided security against impoverishment and averted the dangers of having to 
dispose off assets, sale of land to buy food, meet debt repayment schedules, etc. It was reported 
that while incidence of poverty is as high as 69 percent in districts in India where there was less 
than 10 percent of irrigated crop area and is 26 percent in districts having more than 50 percent of 
such area and just 10 percent in the agro-climatic sub zones of Punjab and Harayana with 70 
percent irrigated land. 
Gender impact 
A study in Harayana pointed out that changes in the pattern of production, because of irrigation, 
increased landed women’s participation in agricultural work due to greater intensity and need for 
scheduling in agriculture. Women belonging to scheduled castes got engaged in agricultural wage 
work but employment was extremely seasonal. Irrigation allowed the village to support increased 
population by bringing more land under cultivation, providing more jobs for Harijans, increasing   40
sedentariness and having greater appeal to immigrants. Irrigation also contributed to decreasing 
the time required to do various household tasks. Fodder production, fuel procurement, grain 
grinding and water carrying are examples. The landless were relatively little affected in this 
sphere. Livestock raising remained an important economic and social feature of the village. The 
change from extensive to intensive livestocking affected women’s labor since women play a 
central role in livestock management. Despite increases in cash economy and greater contact with 
urban areas, village women remained relatively isolated from economic activity and decision-
making. Social and cultural constraints played the most significant role in determining the very 
subtle and indirect changes in women’s socio-economic spheres. 
Exports impact 
The exports of agricultural products contributed to Rs. 250.4 billion during 1996-97 
accounting for 21 percent of total exports. In the post-liberalization period the quantum of 
exports is steadily increasing. Horticulture is occupying an important place while export 
of rice was to a tune of 5 MT (metric tons) in 1995-96. Kakkar argues that “the problem 
with these kinds of developments is that they hide the reality of water, irrigation, capital 
and employment scarcity in vast areas in India… would lead us to question the kind of 
irrigation options India has pursued till date” (Kakkar, 1999). 
Adverse impact 
There are several widely recognized adverse effects of large irrigation projects. Big dams 
and canals are criticized and are met with opposition on several counts like:  i) displacement of 
people and the human misery associated with it and; ii) the negative health impacts on the 
population like the spread of malaria, filaria and many other water borne diseases. Poor are more 
likely to get affected due to these impacts, as rivers and canals are common recipients for 
sewerage and domestic affluence. Environmental impacts are another set of negative impacts of 
large irrigation systems. The consequences are not only the loss of habitat and loss of water 
through evaporation, seepage and percolation, but also heavy salinization and water logging, 
causing changes in soil structure and some times degradation. The environmental consequences 
of artificial impoundments are highlighted in various reports and articles which focused closer 
attention on  the ecological impacts of dam construction. 
There are different estimates made in regard to water logging. The Irrigation Commission 
(1972) estimated that 4.84 M ha of land is affected by water logging and salinization. The 
National Commission on Agriculture (1976) estimated that about 5.98 M ha of land was affected 
due to water logging in both irrigation commands as well as non-irrigated areas. Out of this 2.6 M 
ha was found to be affected by higher water table and the rest due to surface run-off stagnation. 
World Bank (1991), felt that about 3 M ha were water logged on irrigation lands but only part of 
the water logging was induced by irrigation. The working groups constituted by the Ministry of 
Water Resources (1991), estimated that about 2.46 M ha in irrigated commands were affected 
from water logging. Those areas were in the states of Punjab, Uttar Pradesh (UP), Harayana, 
Rajasthan and Maharashtra. The working group also estimated that 3.3 M ha of land suffered 
from salinity/alkalinity in irrigation commands.   41
To sum up, consequent to  the negative impacts of irrigation, three types of economic loss 
result : i) annual/recurring losses due to reduction in crop yields on affected farms ii) one time 
loss due to huge investments made in creation of irrigation potential, which, if not fully utilized, 
leads to under-utilization of investments made in irrigation; iii) interest loss on irrigation. Further, 
the cost of reclamation of the affected lands is another economic loss.    42
1.5.  PERFORMANCE OF IRRIGATION PROJECTS – AN OVERVIEW 
The word ‘performance’ denotes a wide range of elements and boundaries. It is defined as a 
“system’s effectiveness in carrying out its internal activities – acquisition of inputs and 
transformation of inputs into intermediate and final outputs – and the effects of these activities on 
the system itself and on its external environment” (Small and Svendsen 1999). In the irrigation 
context, the water-related activities are generally grouped into three subsystem boundaries 
namely: acquisition, distribution and application. Small and Svendsen further elaborate that each 
subsystem has different functions – acquisition deals with physical and social elements associated 
with capture of water from its source, while distribution encompasses elements related to 
movement of water from source to the field. Application functions are in the domain of irrigators 
who actually apply water to the root zone of crops. Conceptually, the irrigation impacts discussed 
in the previous section represent a type of performance measure used for assessment. They 
pertain to the outcomes and effects of system outputs on a larger environment. Assessment of 
effects and outcomes is generally difficult and complex, especially, when dealing with subjects 
like water, due to the presence of a number of intervening variables. 
Different performance criteria are used for different studies on irrigation in India. In this 
section a review of literature is made on the overall irrigation performance of canal irrigation 
systems within the subsystem boundaries of water delivery. 
Big Dams  
There are more than 10 irrigation systems in India with reservoirs serving around 500,000 
hectares each and 50 reservoirs having the capacity to serve about 100,000 hectares each. Thus 
around 2/3 of the total irrigated area is serviced with irrigation from these reservoirs. The 
estimates of ultimate irrigation development potential (113.5 mha) were revised by GOI and 
upgraded to 139.9 million hectares with 58.46 million hectares through major and medium 
(M&M) irrigation, and 81.43 mha from minor irrigation (GOI 1999 c). However, these figures 
were questioned, as they were not based on any ‘river basin’ planning. The decisions on big dams 
were confined to engineers, bureaucrats and politicians. The people and other professionals of 
disciplines like agricultural sciences, social sciences etc., had little role to play in the decision- 
making related to big reservoirs. Further, the performance and experience of the irrigation 
projects never informed the decisions about dams in the past. No comprehensive post facto 
evaluations were available covering costs, benefits and impacts as envisaged in dam construction 
proposals. Also, studies were not made on how actual costs, benefits and impacts are distributed. 
Another fact was that there was no option assessment process with regard to the type of irrigation 
projects to be started (Thakkar 1999). 
Historically, prior to independence, India’s irrigation projects were mainly diversion 
structures and were sanctioned on the basis of ‘financial return’ criterion, which showed a certain 
percentage return on the sum at charge in the tenth year after the completion of the project. This 
was calculated on the basis of capital investment, working expenses, water charges and 
betterment levy realized. The criterion changed to benefit cost (BC) ratio for sanctioning 
irrigation projects, after independence. The second Irrigation Commission, 1992, recommended   43
that at the time of considering a project for acceptance, the financial return also has to be 
carefully considered. A methodology consisting of opportunity cost, shadow pricing of inputs, 
outputs, foreign exchange etc., was recommended by Nitin Desai Committee in 1983 and, as a 
first step of implementation of the report, it was decided by GOI that the project reports should 
contain the calculations of internal rate of return (IRR) with discounted cash flow, and without 
adjusting for economic efficiency prices of inputs and outputs (Ganesan 1997). Thus, the BC ratio 
was replaced by IRR in 1983. In order to qualify, the projects were to yield a minimum of 9 
percent and in projects with 75 percent dependability of water, drought-prone areas and hilly 
tracts, the IRR of 7 percent was allowed. 
Review of literature dealing with the big dam controversy is out of place here, though 
some issues pertinent to planning of M&M water resources becomes relevant. For the purpose of 
discussion the recurring problems in the performance of M&M projects can be divided into – 1) 
those coming up in construction stage and; 2) those that spring up in the operation and 
maintenance phase. The problems in construction phase are: i) paucity of finances which results 
in cost and time over-runs; ii) faulty design; iii) rehabilitation of the project-affected people and;  
iv) environmental degradation. The problems that arise in O&M phase are: i) under-utilization of 
irrigation capacity (potential) created; ii) inequity in irrigation; iii) lack of dependability of 
irrigation; iv) indifferent quality; v) wastage of irrigation water; vi) water logging; soil salinity 
and alkalinity; vii) sustainability of irrigated farming and; viii) financial losses and pricing of 
water (Dhawan 1989; Mitra AK 1996; Thakkar 1999; Vaidyanathan 1999). These problems are 
all inter-related as some of the O&M problems are ramifications of those originated in the 
construction phase of the irrigation project. Another useful way to understand the performance of 
irrigation systems is to examine the constraints that plague the systems. They are physical 
constraints, institutional constraints and financial and economic constraints (World Bank 1998). 
Right from the decision-making stage the projects were criticized for lack of 
transparency, resulting in under-estimation of costs and exaggeration of benefits. However, 
Anranga, Bedthi, Sardar Sarovar and Tehri projects as an exception were well- documented. “The 
experience of the last 50 years shows that in reality the standards of security and evaluation are 
lax, that project proposals without adequate hydrological data and preparatory investigation have 
been approved under political pressure. A study of the Public Accounts Committee of 32 projects 
showed cost escalation of 500% and beyond…. Even CWC and Central Board of Irrigation and 
Power pointed out… that the technical studies are left incomplete, the command area surveys are 
not completed and drainage and downstream issues are never addressed” (Thakkar 1999). An 
Appraisal Review Mission’s report of the World Bank on Chambal Command Area Development 
Project (MP), while estimating economic rate of return of 22 percent, cautioned that the rate of 
return was sensitive to growth rate of benefits and project costs. Delay of the project by one year 
would reduce benefits by 10 percent and 25 percent;  increase in costs would result in decrease in 
rate of return to 18 percent (Sivamohan 1986). 
Proliferation of projects and thin spread of resources were believed to be the cause of 
time and cost over-runs and the vicious cycle of resource crunch and further delays in the 
completion of irrigation projects. Thakkar quotes an analysis of 346 M&M irrigation projects 
which showed a minimum of 12 years lapse from the initiation of a project to the creation of 
irrigation potential. Further, the costs went up from Rs. 51,000 per hectare in 1978-79 to over   44
214,000 per hectare in 1995-96 (at 1995-96 constant prices – both representing 3-year moving 
averages). The Planning Commission also accepted increase in cost of creation of one hectare 
irrigation through M&M projects by 365 percent from the time of early plan period. The factors 
for the cost escalation and long gestation period are generally attributed to inflation in the prices 
of the inputs for construction, changed designs and scope of projects after they were approved, 
and procedural delays and other bottlenecks (Vaidyanathan 1999). 
Competitive politics and the mindless chase for starting new projects, though in policy 
was discouraged after the Eighth Plan Period, continued, as politicians believed this to be a good 
‘vote catching’ mechanism and also a source of generating party funds for fighting elections. 
Hasty preparation of plans and designs and complacence of the Technical Committee approving 
the projects, were common features, with projects starting without being approved. Publications 
are rare on common design deficiencies (which creep in distribution subsystem), and which were 
responsible for causing specific management problems. Some interesting design aspects were 
mentioned in a publication (ODI 1976) based on Reidinger (1980) and Van der velde (1980) and 
Wade (several papers). Because of the fact that irrigation systems in India were meant for 
protective irrigation, the designs were based on sharing shortage of water. It was felt that with the 
low design irrigation intensities, continuous flows and absence of proper control and regulation 
structures, the systems became hardly manageable giving rise to head-tail differences and related 
problems (Jurriens and Kornelis de Jong 1989). The NCIWRDP (1999) reiterated the following 
maladies for non-completion of projects according to time schedules: 
 
1.  Proliferation of schemes, insufficient plan outlays and consequent thin spreading of available 
resources. 
2.  Non-prioritization of projects. 
3.  Inadequate planning and investigations and delays in planning implementation of distribution 
systems. 
4.  Pre-emption of available resources by externally-aided schemes. 
5.  Increased provisions for rehabilitation and environmental costs due to greater awareness of 
their importance. 
6.  Delays in resettlement and land acquisition, including transfer of forest land, and 
7.  Cost and time over- runs. 
 
Whenever the performance of M&M projects are discussed, much has been said on both sides and 
the importance of M&M schemes constructed cannot be ignored for their contribution in wiping 
out food scarcity in India. The rehabilitation of projects affected people, and ecological 
challenges and environmental degradation are other issues widely discussed in India, of late.  
Under-utilization of Irrigation Capacity 
Coming to the operational side of the M&M projects in India, the persisting gap between the 
irrigation potential created and utilized, remained as a subject matter of performance evaluation 
of irrigation projects. Concern with this gap saw the creation of Command Area Development 
(CAD) authorities in the areas irrigated by M&M projects, in 1974. The other factors that   45
contributed to the formation of CAD authorities however, were the changing concept of irrigation 
and agriculture in the light of green revolution, assignment of responsibility for infrastructural 
development and distributive justice. The need for an institutional framework to undertake and 
integrate various activities and functions below the ‘outlet’ level of an irrigation distribution 
system was felt as absolutely wanting. So also, was the compelling need for equitable distribution 
of irrigation water to marginal, small, and tail-end farms (Sivamohan 1990). There is no 
uniformity about the definition of irrigation potential all over the country. Some states report net 
potential while others report annual potential. Further, while some states cover the areas served 
by the canal network, others report only when field channels are constructed.  
Areas are often reported when systems are partially completed, though water was not flowing 
because of physical constraints. The NCIWRD dealt with this aspect at length and recommended 
that the term irrigation potential created by a project at a given time during and after its 
construction be defined as “the aggregate gross area that can be irrigated annually by the quantity 
of water which could be made available through infrastructure completed upto last government 
outlet in water delivery system” (NCIWRD 1999). The Commission also recommended the 
adoption of a uniform reporting system and also periodical re-appraisal of projects. The disparity 
in the definition of irrigation potential utilized, and the reporting methodologies adopted by 
different states, is equally varying. A difference of 7 M ha of utilization exists between total 
figures of state irrigation departments and land use statistics (NCIWRD 99). Vaidyanathan 
(1999), also opined that the gap is larger when we compare land use statistics with Planning 
Commission estimates. Not withstanding the controversy, studies by research scholars suggest 
(Mitra 1996) that there exists a considerable extent of under-utilization and mis-utilization, which 
needs to be checked through improved technical efficiency in O&M, and improved distribution of 
water. However, it was also argued that the problem of poor utilization cannot be solved simply 
by improving the control capacity via improved physical structures (Wade and Chambers 1980). 
The Irrigation Commission (1972) emphasized, that the utilization was hampered by design and 
implementation deficiencies, including completion of reservoirs before the canal networks 
completed, lack of field channels, and many other such reasons which prompted the formation of 
CAD authorities. 
The NCIWRD (1999) worked out the gap, and the figurers are reproduced in table 1.2.6 
of this report. The evaluation studies sponsored by the Ministry of Water Resources for assessing 
the impact of CAD program show a positive impact, improving irrigation water utilization, 
increasing irrigation intensity and water-use efficiency, increasing agricultural production and 
productivity (GOI 2001). The NCIWRD (1999), in this context, pointed out a discrepancy in the 
statistics of irrigation potential created and utilized and called for a specific review to cull out the 
methodologies adopted and reconcile the data adopting uniform criteria regarding identification 
and annual reckoning of area of irrigation, and also suggested the use and interpretation of 




The Indian Irrigation Sector Review (World Bank 1998) identified some major constraints in the 
performance of irrigation. Stressing the increased limitations for further expansion of irrigation in   46
the country, the report recommended a strategic need for improving the performance of existing 
irrigation.  
1) Infrastructure and drainage in the flow irrigation projects was found in a state of disrepair and 
badly needed maintenance because of poor design, inferior quality of construction and more 
importantly, due to the cumulative effects of deferred maintenance. Silted canals and drains, 
eroded and collapsing structures were a common sight in these projects. The systems, thus 
dilapidated, led to wastage of water and unreliable and untimely deliveries and application losses. 
2) The quality of service provided by the irrigation departments (ID) was very poor. The 
mammoth centralized structures were not having accountability to users being monopoly 
organizations. 3) The personnel in the ID are construction oriented civil engineers and lack skills 
in operations and maintenance. The shortage of skills was felt in corporate and financial 
management, basin planning, environmental management, and so on. Job rotations in the 
organizations hampered career growth, and lack of incentives for encouraging and inducting 
specialization. 4) Irrigation sector in the country is divided into minor irrigation dealing with 
groundwater, lift irrigation schemes, tanks and major and medium irrigation projects dealing with 
vast canal networks. They are administered by different government departments and ministries 
at state level. Important functions like water resources planning, monitoring and management, 
and environmental assessment are also dispersed, and departments concerned lack responsibility, 
accountability and coordination. 5) Likewise, the linkage between irrigation and agriculture is 
weak and organizational synergy is lacking. 6) Yet another big constraint was minimal 
involvement of farmers in irrigation management for a variety of reasons. Robert Chambers 
(1992), further identified several gaps in the management of canal irrigation systems. His 
research calls for open-learning on the part of the individual professionals, maintenance gap, and 
the “fixation below the outlet,” thereby lack of systems approach in the management; absence of 
night irrigation and lastly, lack of motivation among irrigation professionals and corruption 
resulting in ‘transfer trade’ where lucrative posts are traded by politicians. The book argues that 
the potential for better livelihoods for the poor from the improved performance of canal irrigation 
systems are immense. It calls for R&D on the ‘gap’ subjects including main system scheduling 
and delivery, communications, farmer joint management, containing and cutting down corruption 
and diagnostic analysis, and learning from the field and farmers (Chambers 1992).  7) Financial 
and economic constraints in the management of canal irrigation in India figure prominently. This 
was due to insufficient cost recovery from the farmers. Water charges are very low and are not 
linked to scarcity of water, productivity or costs involved in capturing water and delivering it. 
The World Bank report (1998) points out that “due to insufficient cost recovery, irrigation 
currently contributes one-third of the states’ revenue deficit.” The total uncovered costs on 
account of major and medium irrigation works increased more than five-fold from Rs. 280 crores 
in 1997-78 to Rs. 1,525 crores in 1986-87. In 1977-78 the implicit subsidies on these projects was 
one-third of the annual capital investment into this category; by 1986-87 it became 70 percent and 
“today it is much higher” (GOI 1992). 8) The differed maintenance of systems due to paucity of 
funds, however, was mainly due to insufficient O&M budgetary allocations by the state 
governments. Vaidyanathan Committee Report clearly shows that in many states O&M 
expenditure do not cover even staff salaries. 9) The World Bank (1998) report attributes 
subsidized water and its public provision as the reason for poor incentive for water-use efficiency.   47
Broken Legitimacy 
 
Henry Hart (1978), described the ‘broken legitimacy’ in irrigation management and performance 
and ‘anarchy syndrome’ among farmers due to various operational problems. In Pant’s words “on 
one hand the cultivators have lost their expectations that their canals would furnish them water to 
suit their requirements and indulge in breaking structures and illegal diversion of water. On the 
other hand, the irrigation field staff have lost confidence that cultivators will irrigate according to 
law and rules, so do not take interest in their assigned job and exercise their authority arbitrarily 
for their own vested interests” (Pant 1986).  The inability of most of the M&M systems to 
perform as they were designed thus, gave rise to the search of alternate models for managing 
irrigation efficiently.  
Unreliability and Wastage 
Unreliability and wastage of irrigation water are two factors mutually intertwined. At the outset, 
farmers had no accurance or idea as to how much and when they would get water delivery from 
the system. “The combined evidence of water capture, sedimentation and transmission losses 
suggests that less water is deliverable or delivered than originally estimated or subsequently 
reported” (Chamber 1992). In some systems, water is available mostly when the farmers don’t 
require and in others, water is not  available when it is needed most. Added to this are the 
perpetual problems related to head and tail-end flows in the canals, and the consequent misuse 
and deprivation, respectively. In a strict sense, supplies in the system are neither demand-based 
nor need-based. Supplies are rigid and inflexible which results in farmers’ inability to plan their 
cropping pattern. 
No incentive is available to the farmer to save water in the canal systems. Further, it 
makes them waste and over-irrigate their fields, due to uncertainty of supply and also due to lack 
of knowledge of scientific management of water. There is also no group incentive for 
economizing water use (Joshi 2000) and the management of water is entirely with the irrigation 
agency. Wastage of water thus occurs due to several reasons – inadequate delivery systems, lack 
of proper leveling of land, lack of proper drainage, excessive seepage losses, negligent wastage of 
water during transmission, over-irrigation and so on. 
Assumptions and Operating Procedures 
Wade’s (1980) comparison between the operating procedures used in South India and those used 
not only in Taiwan, Japan, Spain but also north India, showed that a large potential for 
improvement was waiting to be tapped. Physical structures did not prevent a big increase in water 
control. There was a great potential for improving canal performance through better operating 
procedures without expensive rehabilitation of physical structures. The rate of improvement in 
effectiveness of canal systems could be considerably higher than what the existing engineering-
oriented remedies would lead to. Large increases in water control can be brought about if 
engineers seriously, wish to, even within the limitations of the existing physical structures and 
administration.  
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Three assumptions dominated the literature on causes and remedies of poor canal 
performance – i) problems arose mainly below, rather than above the outlet, at farm and village 
level ii) that the problems were mainly technical in nature and iii) that, so far as problems 
identified as institutional, were all related to the institutions of farmers. Canal systems were 
designed and constructed assuming a level of utilization of control capacity, which did not exist 
in most systems of south and south-east Asia. The problem of poor utilization cannot be solved 
simply by improving the control capacity via improved physical structures. Improvement at the 
on-farm level depended, in case of large water supply systems, on the ability of the farmer to 
obtain water at the right time and in the quantity required. Thus, an important interaction existed 
between centralized water management and planning and on-farm water utilization.  
The structure of an irrigation system could place severe restrictions on the irrigators options to 
apply sound conventions or innovative water management practices. The evidence suggested that 
without large investments in physical structures, but with changes in the distribution of water on 
main systems, large increases in production could be achieved with equity benefits to deprived 
tail-enders as well. In India alone, the potential was probably for millions of tons of additional 
food grains. To achieve such a quantum jump, main system management was considered as the 
key. Main system management was overlooked due to 1) visibility 2) professional concerns and 
preferences 3) blaming the farmer 4) the belief that one man’s gain is the other man’s loss 5) the 
fact that water is politics and 6) little incentive to canal operator for better performance. To begin 
now to explore and realize the potential from improved main system management required two 
thrusts : 1) cognitive and 2) diagnostic. (Wade; R. Chambers 1980). 
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1.6.  INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN IRRIGATION – AN OVERVIEW 
Application of irrigation to the crops constitutes the other important subsystem function in 
irrigation management. Ever since the 1980s, several of the situational compulsions (discussed 
earlier) prompted the Government of India and the state governments to look for alternative 
approaches from bureaucratic administration of irrigation to farmers’ management. This was also 
propelled by the globally held policy views on wider issues like the role of governance and 
creating an enabling environment, de-bureaucratization, privatization, peoples’ participation, user 
management of resources and programs, emphasis on productivity, efficiency, equity, economy 
and environmental degradation.  
Historically, farmer-managed irrigation systems were not unknown to India. Kautilya in 
the third century BC chalked out the principles of participatory management for governance of 
certain activities in irrigation. The third century AD witnessed the construction of ‘Gand Anicut’ 
across the river Cauvery by king Karikala Chola in Tamilnadu. Till the British rulers took over its 
management in 1799, irrigation under this anicut was in the hands of the local communities. 
History is replete with several instances of management of irrigation by farmers like – 
Vijayanagar Channels (11
th to 16
th century AD), kuls in Himalayas, ahar and pyne in Bihar, tanks 
in Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka and phads in Maharashtra.  The British period saw 
the beginning of the construction of large irrigation systems for maximizing revenue collection 
and movement of army through the waterways. Centralised organization structures for irrigation 
administration thus became necessary. Independent India, thereafter, continued with the inherited 
legacy of irrigation administration. It was assumed that a mix of ‘correct technology’, efficient 
markets and capable agency would provide optimal performance. The central control by powerful 
bureaucracy was made available by the imperatives of physical system and its technology. 
In India the initial approach of the participatory irrigation management (PIM) was to 
involve farmers in the management of irrigation applications judiciously and equitably at the farm 
level. With the formation of CADAs the main thrust given was to construct field channels and 
involve farmers in decisions regarding water allocation and utilization below the outlet level. By 
the early 90s the concept gradually moved to establishing partnerships between the government 
agencies and farmers, and of late to the threshold of irrigation management transfer (IMT). Some 
state governments already took initiative in legislating to this effect to a great measure. One could 
observe an evolutionary trend in this regard in Indian policy making. Several researchers and 
institutions in India had engaged in a prolonged debate on the participatory processes in this 
sector and donor agencies supported the research projects. In early 1990s, senior -level officials 
were exposed to the idea in collaboration with the then International Water Management Institute 
(now IWMI) at the Administrative Staff College of India, and the officials were taken on  a study 
tour to countries like Phillipines and Malaysia where PIM was already being implemented. It was 
only in 1984, that the Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR) issued guidelines for the formation 
of Water Users Associations (WUAs) on a pilot basis and then to replicate them. During the 
Seventh Plan period the Planning Commission wanted the farmers to be encouraged for collective 
action not only for on farm application of water but also for other aspects in irrigated agriculture. 
However, as Raju and Melony (1994) have opined, PIM was not a major objective of the plan. A 
cautious approach in initiating PIM continued and in 1985 the government wanted to experiment   50
with PIM on one minor canal in each of the CAD projects. The 1987 National Water Policy 
referred to PIM and involvement of NGOs in a passing manner. The Eighth Plan strategy called 
for greater user participation and was asked to be encouraged both at system and at local levels. 
Action projects funded by external agencies and also government of India to try out PIM in 
different locations continued. It was only after the liberalization, when the processes of de-
bureaucratisation and privatisation gained momentum, similar changes were also witnessed in the 
irrigation sector. 
Several national conferences were held by the MOWR. The Working Group of Tenth 
Five-year Plan deliberated and recommended that at least 10  percent of the irrigated area to start 
with, should be covered by PIM, and should be increased to 50 percent by the end of the Tenth 
Plan period. The 1999 union budget for the first time spelt out budget allocations for PIM. A 
good documentary critique on PIM (Deepika et al. 1999) analysed the misconceptions attributed 
for the tardy progress of the PIM in India. Some of the attributes were: 
 
i.  PIM was not on the political agenda: It was commonly attributed that lack of political will 
was responsible for PIM not to take off ground. The leadership that could develop out side 
the realm of politicians because of PIM was threatening to them. However, the subsequent 
legislation by the government of Andhra Pradesh proved it otherwise. Though PIM was 
declared as a national objective in 1987 National Water Policy document, it was not treated 
as a special national program. (Deepika et al 1999). PIM is treated as a component of CAD 
program and has no separate thrust, thereby losing its importance. Thus, ‘lack of political 
will’ explained the lethargy for implementation in many (Joshi 99) analytical writings. 
 
ii.  Systems improvement and resource constraints: As seen earlier, the performance of irrigation 
projects was restricted by lack of maintenance and repairs, which was resultant of scarce 
financial resources. But this cannot stand as a reason to doubt farmer’s willingness to pay 
more water cess if management is given to them. 
 
iii. Uneducated farmer: The feeling that farmers were uneducated lasted in government circles. 
“Researches have stated that in irrigation engineering discourse the dominant image of the 
water user and his relation to the state is that of the ‘uneducated farmer.’ (Deepika e al 1999). 
The “dependency syndrome” perpetuated by the government agency was in fact responsible 
for farmers’ apathy for taking any new initiatives.  
 
iv. Bureaucratic resistance: The resistance of irrigation bureaucracy had been a stumbling block 
for the progress of PIM initiatives in the country. Wide recognition of the need to change and 
the need for infusion of multidisciplinary skills though prevalent in the irrigation sector, the 
administrative ethos was not conducive for irrigation professionals to diversify (Maloney & 
Raju 94). Many authors (Chambers 1988; Wade 1982; Singh 1991) were critical of the 
attitude of irrigation bureaucracy towards PIM.  
 
 
   51
The literature survey on PIM in India shows that the authors focussed their attention 
initially on questions like what is PIM, why, where and how. The focus gradually changed 
towards issues in operationalizing the concepts and dealing with factors hindering 
implementation. A few studies of the evaluation of PIM were also undertaken wherever PIM was 
introduced at different points of time. 
Gilmartin-D and Madsen 1999, investigated the roots of the interface between the state 
and local community in irrigation in India to understand the notion of ‘public’ given by the 
Britishers during colonial rule. The paper pointed that the colonial state was hardly oblivious to 
the role of local community in the operation of irrigation works inspite of its construction of large 
irrigation works and centralised bureaucracy. On the contrary, many British administrators saw 
local organisations as central to the success of irrigation works. But they also saw local 
community within a distinctive framework of analysis that had critical implications for the future 
of irrigation. British ideas about the proper relationship between the local community and the 
state ultimately had as profound an impact on shaping and constraining the emergence of a 
‘public’ voice in irrigation, as did the local variables that encouraged and constrained collective 
action and irrigator cooperation in ‘village republics’ independently of the state. 
Two important arguments tendered in favour of PIM in the recent times were i) 
undependability and uncertainty of irrigation supplies bred dissatisfaction among client groups 
and led to a state of anarchy; ii) maintenance of irrigation systems was a recurring, costly and 
unmanageable problem for irrigation agencies. Singh (1991), argued that the scope of 
participation was not limited to only these factors but would extend to the strengthened 
relationship between the irrigation agency and water users – better understanding of the need to 
preserve structures, mobilization of collective effort for minor and major restoration of system 
defects, resolution of conflicts and better confidence among irrigators to justify increased 
investments in farm operations. Singh further postulated that farmers’ participation in irrigation 
can be said to have existed when water users took decisions that influenced access to water and 
its use according to the principles considered worthy by them. 
Policy Perspectives  
Initially, the concept was that the farmers who were viewed as beneficiaries were expected to 
participate with irrigation agencies in the discharge of the latter’s duties. The idiom gradually 
changed from participation to management in the early 90s. But, the then prevailing 
misconceptions of the process and rationale for developing farmers’ organisations for effective 
management were strongly conditioned by a set of unvoiced assumptions about the way such 
organisations work and about the nature of their relations to the state (Ambler 1994). Ambler 
called for the need to restructure the language of water users development in order to develop and 
sustain real water users associations (WUAs). He emphasised that farmers were not expected to 
participate in the government programs; in reality it was the other way round, farmers did not 
have patron-client relationships with them, but were in fact partners to the government, and lastly 
the commonly used expression “motivating farmers” needed change to “creating motivating 
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The user-state relationships in countries implementing PIM programs were: 1) 
Government did everything (Malaysia, and India also) 2) State dominated, users helped at the 
lowest level (India) 3) User dominated, state facilitated (Mexico) 4) Everything did by farmers 
(Nepal). The handbook (Groenfeldt 1998) after classifying the typologies of user-state 
relationships provided the rationale of PIM in the light of problems in irrigation management 
already discussed in this report. The book asserted that the logic of PIM approach was that both 
governments and farmers had separate comparative advantages. 
Several of the early studies on PIM in India reiterated that the delivery of adequate and 
reliable amount of water to the outlets was a pre-condition to any kind of community level action 
for the distribution of water, maintenance of distribution structures and resolution of conflicts 
below the outlet. The factors, which contributed to the success of farmers’ organisations in large 
irrigation projects in the past (Pant 1986) were i) right kind of leadership ii) adequate and 
predictable amount of water iii) greater interaction and more frequent contacts between officials 
and farmers iv) unanimity among members (i.e. low frequency of conflicts) v) incentives or 
rewards for water users organisations, at least in the initial stages, and vi) legitimacy of the 
authority of organisations in the eyes of government officials, agencies and financial institutions. 
A study report on IMT in India (Brewer JD, et al. 1997) presented the study findings of a 
joint team of IIMI and IIM on 21 canal, left and tank irrigation projects on IMT and spread in the 
states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Maharashtra, Bihar and Gujarat. The report analysed the 
experiments carried out in different parts of the country in detail. The policy analysis for the six 
states studied informed the lessons learnt in the IMT context. The report identified that the policy 
formulation on IMT was not a priority item for the governments, and also the then existing legal 
frame never permitted much change to take place. The farmers were disillusioned as to whether 
they could get better irrigation supplies even when IMT was effected. Because of the existing 
conditions the leadership vacuum was strikingly perceptible. The report concluded that 
enthusiasm for user participation was not shared widely with the bureaucratic and policy circles. 
“While at higher levels, the officials may be keener to transfer management functions, lower level 
functionaries who risk losing control are not supportive. Even the existing policies have not 
received enough attention in implementation”. Some authors (Maloney and Raju 1994) were of 
the view that building farmers’ organisations for irrigation was not a mechanical process. The 
other points of debate in literature was whether the approach to create farmers’ organisations 
should be “top-down” or “bottom-up”, whether community organisers had to be used on a large 
scale (Maloney and Raju 1994), and the need of government officers themselves taking up the 
responsibility of forming associations. (ISPAN 1994, Groenfeldt 1998). 
Researchers had also discussed at length on aspects like size and location of water user 
associations in the hydrological systems. It was felt that no single optimal size could be 
prescribed for the WUAs. Examples in literature ranged from 2 hectares to 80,000 hectares with 
membership from 10 to several thousand. The choice however, depended on land holding pattern, 
type of irrigation system, social institutions and leadership capabilities. Thus, the policy debate on 
size revolved around organising water users on water courses below the outlet, minor level or 
distributory level.  States like Harayana still limit the WUAs to water course level; large number 
of states moved to organise WUAs at minor/distributory level. The reasons were many: i) farmers 
cooperation already existed below the outlet in some form or other and that alone was not   53
challenging enough to sustain an organisation structure; ii) decision-making opportunities arose 
and were facilitated with the cooperation of farmers if the associations were big enough. This in 
turn helped in emergence of leadership, gave greater opportunities for control and O&M 
improvements and water allocations (Ruth Meinzen Dick 2000). Based on several experiments 
and research on PIM so far conducted in the country, the national workshop held at the 
Administrative Staff College of India in 1992 recommended a size of 600 hectares as viable for 
the formation of WUAs (Sivamohan & Scott 1994). 
The general consensus that emerged during various workshops held subsequently was 
that a minor canal was the ideal unit for the formation of WUA where a command of 300 hectares 
to 500 hectares or even 1000 hectares would be available (Hooja Retal 2002). The PIM working 
group (GOI 1996) was  also of the opinion that minor level was highly suitable for farmers to take 
up O&M works.  
The objectives envisaged for WUAs by the working group were: 
 
•   Improvement of service deliveries through better operation and maintenance and optimum 
utilization of water with crop needs. 
•   achievement of equity in the distribution of water. 
•   production improvement of per unit of water and per unit of land. 
•   helping farmers in wider choices of crop sequence and timing of water supply. 
•   optimal use of both ground water and natural precipitation. 
•   promotion of ownership feeling and responsibility among farmers and facilitating collection 
of water charges and economy in use of water and also to gradually branch out to other 
activities (than distribution of water alone). 
•   mobilization of local resources (cash and kind) for costs involved in the upkeep of the system 
and its management. 
 
The working group on PIM further reiterated that ‘legal support’ for WUAs was 
necessary to enable them to work efficiently (GOI 1996). The provisions required for the 
strengthening of WUAs included – WUA as representative organisation of irrigators when 
dealing with external agencies, rights to mobilize resources, ability to operate bank accounts as a 
legal entity, ownership rights of irrigation systems. All of these requirements in turn warranted 
amendments in state irrigation and drainage laws giving legal status to WUAs. The IIMI-IIM 
study (Bewer JD et al. 1997) examined the legal lacunae and proper framework for PIM in India 
and suggested issues and points to be covered by irrigation acts. It cautioned that legal 
amendments were necessary but not a sufficient condition for the success of PIM. 
 
Debate on policy perspectives underwent a dramatic change with the initiation of reform 
processes in the irrigation sector at state level. The state of Andhra Pradesh took the initiative and 
passed the Andhra Pradesh Farmers Management of Irrigation Systems (APFMIS) Act in 1997. It 
was hailed as first of its kind to bring in a paradigm shift in irrigation management. The Act 
contains broad provisions relating to the types of irrigation schemes, tiers of farmers’ 
organisations (FOs), election functions of FOs, resources and penalties for offences. The Act had 
brought in a major institutional change and is being emulated by other state governments. This is 
discussed in detail in our report on irrigation and institutional development.    54
 
A World Bank publication (Obitas; JR Peter et al. 1999) reviewed the development of the 
major irrigation reforms initiated in Andhra Pradesh. After tracking the reform process from the 
beginning, it  highlighted the key features which facilitated steps towards reform and considered 
both immediate and long-term actions needed to support the financial viability of the state 
irrigation sector. It affirmed that further progression of the reform program would ultimately 
create a ‘virtuous cycle’.  
 
Participator Irrigation Management: Pilot Projects 
 
The policy development on IMT in India was also a sequel to participatory experiments 
conducted in different irrigation systems on one hand, and the coalition building of individuals in 
government, aid-giving agencies and academic circles (Sivamohan and Scott 2002), on the other. 
Further, PIM, ever since the beginning of 1980s was seen as part of a world-wide trend of 
devolution in natural resource management (Raju et al. ed. 2002; Vermillion ed. 1996). Though 
several examples of successful traditional irrigation systems where farmers managed irrigation 
were available, it was believed for a long time in the government quarters that large systems were 
not amenable for farmers’ management. However, papers submitted at various seminars and 
workshops (which were latter edited and published) mirrored several instances where PIM helped 
in increasing area under irrigation, productivity, equity, water use efficiency and reduction in 
irrigation disputes (Singh ed. 1991; Raju and Maloney eds. 1994; Sivamohan and Scott eds. 1994; 
Joshi and Hooja eds. 2000). 
The MOWR documented the profiles of water users associations (Pathak 1991) pointing 
out the need for promotion of PIM in India. Mohini Cooperative Society was one of the initial 
water users organisation started in 1979, which functioned successfully for over a decade. This 
was started with the initiative of irrigation officials as a vehicle to bridge the gap between 
irrigation potential created and utilized. While the reasons attributed for its successful functioning 
among others were strong and dedicated leadership and support from the irrigation officials, its 
failure came because of the disappearance of those attributes (Singh 2000). The case of farmers’ 
committees in Pochampad Project in Andhra Pradesh was extensively researched by KK Singh. 
In a paper (Singh and Kanwar 1988) after describing how farmers involvement was sought in 
Pochampad Project, the study identified six research issues: – i) assessment of the contribution of 
the peoples participation in better water utilisation ii) factors contributing to the 
institutionalisation and viability of farmers’ organizations for managing irrigation iii) linking 
irrigation committees with the community and government iv) incentives for institutionalising 
farmers’ irrigation organisations v) potential for joint management forums between farmers and 
government officials for irrigation management and vi) the role of government in creating  and 
sustaining farmers’ committees. The study concluded that the task of PIM can be helped if 
experience gained is properly documented for future use. 
Kolavalli (1995), found that though inequities continued to persist in many of the WUAs 
studied, water distribution on the whole was found to be more equitable than before. Irrigation 
transfers resulted in more reliable supplies and to an extent better maintenance, which in turn had 
benefited tail enders. The study asserted that WUAs would be effective in their functioning as   55
long as their members believed them to be beneficial. Four years’ experience of the Centre for 
Applied Systems Analysis in Development (CASAD) in organizing and operationalizing WUAs 
in the command of Minor 7 of Mula right bank canal in Ahmednagar district, Maharashtra was 
documented (Lele and Patil 1994) and published in a book form. The book vividly showed how 
farmers were motivated and how their skills were built. It also described the difficulties faced and 
how the negotiations were conducted with the government. It took into consideration the training 
needs of  farmers as well as officers, and provided training modules and suggestions for capacity 
building. 
The action research project of the Institute of Resource Development and Social 
Management (IRDAS) in Andhra Pradesh state in Pochampad Project area, demonstrated that 
PIM was possible in large irrigation systems provided farmers were organised and legal support 
given. The savings of water, spread in irrigated area, reduction in disputes were all clearly 
observed where IRDAS interventions were provided (IRDAS 1995). The action research was 
scaled up with increased area coverage and once again similar outcomes were found. The 
sponsors of the action research project in Pochampad namely, MOR, and the department of water 
utilisation in Andhra Pradesh, and later the Ford Foundation, were interested in answers to such 
questions as – a suitable methodology for organising farmers, manpower and skill levels required, 
functions that FO can perform, capacity building, and what can strengthen and ensure the long-
term survival of farmers’ organisations. The action research project addressed itself to those 
questions. 
The areas covered by PIM by the formation of WUAs and others managed by the 
irrigation department in Mula and Bima Commands were compared and contrasted (Brewer and 
Shakitvadivel) for performance of maintenance. The study found that the area covered by WUA 
had: i) better information on maintenance requirements ii) could undertake maintenance annually 
with ease iii) WUA had the flexibility in funding and was not bound by rigid departmental 
regulations and procedures and iv) the WUA had greater flexibility in implementation. The 
departmental maintenance also showed contrary features. Thus, maintenance was found to be 
much better in farmer- managed systems.  
Organisation Models and Processes 
The farmers’ organisations (FO) took different shapes suiting the local traditions and culture. 
Wherever cooperative movement was strong most of the water users organisations were modelled 
on ‘cooperative societies’. They were set up in major irrigation projects in Gujarat (Patil 1991) 
and Maharashtra (ISPAN 1994). While Andhra Pradesh state adopted loose associations as a 
model in the initial stages, Tamil Nadu had water users committees. The change agents employed 
were also different. In late 1970s government departments created outlet-based irrigation 
committees under the CAD program. Later on, the NGOs and some training institutions such as 
water and land management institutes took up the task of organising farmers. In Tamil Nadu, the 
agricultural engineering department and irrigation management training institute (both part of 
state government) set up multi-tier farmers’ organisations. A two-tier FO was organized likewise 
on Paliganj distributory in the zone command area in Bihar. This was organized with the 
assistance of WALMI and some other research institutions. In the small tanks, lift irrigation   56
schemes, research institutions, NGOs and government played a major role in establishing FOs. 
Many of these were donor-funded by donor agencies like EEC (Tamil Nadu), USAID 
(Maharashtra) and Agakhan Foundation and SWDF (Gujarat and Harayana). Irrigation 
departments and Agriculture departments funded micro-level projects which were managed by 
users (Singh 1997). 
 
Impact of IMT 
 
Several of the experiments like those discussed earlier prompted the respective state governments 
towards taking a policy decision of transfer irrigation management to farmers. While the state of 
Andhra Pradesh started with a ‘big bang’ approach other states also initiated reforms and effected 
changes in laws. In Maharashtra where IMT is not yet extensively implemented, its impact in 
areas of the canals where it was implemented (follow-up study) was found to be very positive 
(Naik et al. eds. 2002). The objective of the study was not to test a methodology for quantitative 
impact assessment and to provide insights into the impacts. While in the earlier studies the 
perspectives of the government – increased agricultural production, equity etc., – were 
highlighted, the concerns of the farmers in this regard were neglected. Taking the ‘trade-off’ 
model in decision-making on alternatives, the study asserted that farmers preferred WUA 
management to the irrigation departmental management. The farmers clearly perceived that with 
IMT the maintenance and water distribution of irrigation systems, agricultural productivity, cost 
of irrigation incomes of farmers, all had increased. Parthasarathy (2001) studied IMT in Gujarat 
and Andhra Pradesh and felt that “the rapidity of implementation may also have a galvanizing 
effect on farmers and officials, allowing for a fresh approach to participation in irrigation 
management”. The study asserted that inequities persisted in the functioning of WUAs; stakes in 
improvement tended to be pro-poor in Andhra Pradesh because of the location of small farms at 
the tail end and the preference of small-farm holders to use canal water, which was cheaper. The 
farmers rarely used alternate (ground water) sources of irrigation. In Gujarat, though the 
concentration of small holding at the tail-ends of the systems was common, canal irrigation was 
farm-size neutral. 
IMT being a recent phenomenon, detailed impact studies are not available in good 
numbers and a review of literature by Meinzen-Dick and others pointed out that research on 
outcomes, processes and issues has remained insufficient. 
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1.7. SUMMING  UP 
Though the contribution of agriculture to GDP has been declining over time, (a natural trend in 
development), about 60 percent of the Indian rural population is still employed in agriculture. 
During the first half of the post-independence period, when agriculture contributed to a major 
proportion of the GDP, the fluctuations in GDP were attributed to the monsoon vagaries. The 
increased stability during the later periods is attributed both to decline in the proportion of 
agriculture to the GDP and improvement in irrigation infrastructure, which stabilized agricultural 
production.  
One can discern distinct trends in research on poverty-related issues over the years. The 
measurement of poverty, defining poverty lines and the related tools, engaged the attention of 
researchers for a considerable period of time. Various researches on the ‘Green Revolution’ 
experiences provide contrasting evidences about the validity of the ‘trickle down’ theory of 
growth. Though there has been a fall in the overall levels of poverty over time, the rate of decline 
has been slow. Presence of safety nets in the form of drought and flood-relief programs seems to 
have enhanced the impacts of other interventions on poverty alleviation. Researches on the 
impacts of economic reforms on poverty reveal that poverty exacerbated during the first years of 
reforms and no significant effects were experienced at the micro-levels. Incomplete and partial 
reforms seem to adversely affect poverty alleviation efforts.  
The investments in irrigation peaked during 1980-90, while they almost doubled from 
their previous levels during the 1992-97 plan period. Institutional finance for irrigation showed a 
similar trend. While the potential of major irrigation has always been under-utilized, the 
utilization fell short of potential in the case of minor irrigation from 1980 onwards. Despite the 
improvement in irrigation infrastructure and the consequent creation of employment 
opportunities, it was observed that only households with assets and who were closer to the 
poverty line were able to cross the line.  The composition of growth and the absorption capacity 
of growth opportunities by the poor are critical for poverty alleviation.  
In general, poverty in irrigated areas is lower than in rainfed areas. It is less intense and 
less widely spread in long-established irrigated areas than in new ones. There have been no 
special pro-poor programs/policies in irrigated agriculture. The allocation of irrigation is neutral 
to land holding size.  
While initial research on irrigation focused on the technical aspects and performance, 
subsequent researches took account of the social processes like conflict management and 
collective action. The major economic impacts of the irrigation interventions have been in the 
form of increased income generation, mainly through providing additional employment 
opportunities due to increased intensity of farm management requirements. The reduction in 
poverty experienced was mainly through increased agricultural production and adoption of 
modern farm technologies leading to reduced food prices, and generating income through 
employment. However, there is no conclusive evidence on the impacts of irrigation on poverty. 
Some studies show that investment in less favored areas, like rainfed areas, would have a greater 
impact on poverty and environment than in irrigated areas.  
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There is evidence to show that irrigation improved the yields and reduced the variation in 
crop area. It has also contributed to improving the ground water resources. There have also been 
changes in the cropping pattern to orient to market due to irrigation. Irrigation alone, however, 
does not seem to bring about any perceptible impact in income or poverty alleviation. 
Complementing this with other inputs is very crucial to appropriate the benefits from irrigation. 
Irrigation has undeniably contributed towards improving the carrying capacity of the areas. 
Large irrigation projects have been largely criticized for their negative impacts especially, 
in terms of large-scale displacement of population, negative health impacts and environmental 
impacts in the form of loss of habitat, salinization and water logging leading to reduction in crop 
yields. The costs of reclamation of the affected areas added to the cost of the projects, which have 
been generally high especially with the investments being underutilized due to the utilization 
always falling short of the potential created. 
The major issue of contention has, however, been equity in distribution of benefits. The 
scale bias in irrigation is presumed to have reinforced inequality among users. Though there is 
evidence that marginal farmers gained in an absolute sense, large farmers gained proportionally 
more. While the quality of life was found to be better in irrigated villages, the income and asset 
inequality was also found to be higher in these villages. The distribution of benefits seems more 
equitable in canal-irrigated areas. Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) was seen as a 
mechanism to bring about equity in distribution. The success of these initiatives are yet to be 
tested systematically.   59
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PART  2 
Institutional Arrangement for Irrigation Management in India 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Institutions are sets of common habits, routines, established practices, rules or laws that regulate the 
relations and interactions between individuals and groups. They are commonly described as the “rules of 
the game”. They can be recognized at micro-level in the form of day-to-day operational rules, and at 
macro or constitutional level in the form of allocating the responsibility of making and enforcing the 
existing day-to-day rules. “While substance of institutional reform relates more to the operational level of 
analysis, the process of institutional reform relates more to the governance and constitutional 
level,”(Gerrad 2000). 
The dimensions of institutions are classified in several ways as centralized versus decentralized, 
authoritarian versus non-authoritarian, formal versus informal, incentives based versus penalties based 
and neutral versus biased towards specific solutions. Hence, it should be noted that institutions are multi-
dimensional. The function of the institution and the institutional ideology accepted in the country decides 
its dimensional points. Institutions are of prime importance in natural resource management and poverty 
alleviation, as the institutions and resources are interlinked, influencing each other mutually. For 
analytical purposes, “institutions may be perceived as comprising a) institutional structures b) institutional 
processes and c) institutional functions. Institutional structures refer to organizations – both formal and 
informal. Institutional processes refer to policies, laws, rules and regulations and practices. Institutional 
functions refer to implementation of institutional processes. Both processes and functions may be 
perceived as software parts of institutions. “Structures are important because they develop the institutional 
processes, implement them and make them functional,” (Hussain, Biltonen 2002).  An attempt is made 
here to delineate the institutions related to irrigation in India at different levels namely macro (national), 
meso (state) and operational or micro (project/filed levels). While the micro-level institutional functions 
are covered separately in the in-depth analysis of the research project, discussion on national and state-
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2.2.  NATIONAL-LEVEL INSTITUTIONS FOR IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT  
Constitutional Provisions 
The Indian constitution includes detailed provisions with regard to the relationship between the center and 
state governments. The distribution of powers between the union parliament and state legislatures is dealt 
in Articles 245 and 246. Article 245 empowers parliament to make laws for the whole or part of the 
country, and the legislature of the state to make laws for the whole or part of that state, in both cases, 
subject to the provisions of constitution. According to Article 246(1) parliament is given exclusive 
powers to make laws with respect to any matters enumerated in List 1 in the Seventh Schedule to the 
constitution. This list is known as “the Union List”. Likewise, Article 246(3) of constitution bestows 
powers on to state governments for making laws on matters listed in List II of the Seventh Schedule. This 
is known as “the State List”. The union or any state legislature also has, according to Article 246(2) of the 
constitution, concurrent powers to legislate on any of the matters listed in List III in the Seventh Schedule 
and this is known as “the Concurrent List”.  
In the constitutional context of India and its quasi-federal character, the relationships centering 
around water though are not widely recognized and researched upon by professionals, of late, have 
however assumed vital importance. The discussions on federalism by far focus on centre-state financial 
and political relationships, balance of political power, issues of decentralization and local government and 
so on. Examination of relevant constitutional provisions like entry 17 in the state list, entry 56 in the 
union list and Article 262(2) show the direct link to the subject matter of water. Entry 17 in the state list, 
which specifies water as state matter reads “water that is to say, water supplies, irrigation and canals, 
drainage and embankments, water storage and water power subject to the provisions of entry 56 of List I”. 
Entry 56 on the other hand endows union parliament with legislative authority over “regulation and 
development of inter-state rivers and river valleys to the extent to which such regulation and development 
under the control of the union is declared by parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.” 
Further Article 262(1) of the constitution deals with disputes relating to inter- state rivers. It states that 
parliament may by law provide for the adjudication of any dispute or complaint with respect to use, 
distribution or control of the waters of or in any inter-state river or river valley. Article 262 (2) states that 
parliament may by law provide that neither the supreme court nor any other court shall exercise 
jurisdiction in respect of any such dispute or compliant as is referred to clause (1), not withstanding 
anything in the constitution. Pursuant to Article 262 of the constitution parliament enacted Inter-state 
Water Disputes Act in 1956. Thus the constitution forms the foundation of institutional development 
related to irrigation in India. It has also been argued that water is not as much a state subject as it is 
believed to be. In the Indian federal system the center has not made much use of the potential for 
legislation and executive action given to it by constitution in respect of inter-state rivers and river valleys 
(Iyer 94). This observation was made in the light of competing demands for water, which are ever 
increasing among the states and the disputes between them defying solutions. The 17 major rivers in the 
country are shared by two or more states each, and the spatial and temporal variations of water resources 
are many. Added to this are the factors of steadily declining per capita availability of water and heavy 
reliance on irrigated agriculture.   67
The institutional arrangement that was evolved with the enactment of 1956 inter-state water 
disputes act is as follows: when the interests of a state are affected prejudicially or likely to be affected by 
the other, the state may request under the 1956 Act central government to refer the water dispute to a 
tribunal for adjudication.  The reasons for inter-state disputes could arise because of: 
 
1.  any executive action taken or proposed to be taken by the other state, or  
2.  failure of the other state or any other water authority to exercise any of its powers with respect to the 
use, distribution or control of such waters, or 
3.  failure of other state to implement the terms of any agreement relating to the use, distribution and 
control of such waters. 
 
Ever since the enactment of 1956 Act, five disputes came up and the tribunals were constituted. 
The rivers concerned are Krishna, Narmada, Godavari, Ravi and Beas. Some of them received final 
adjudicatory orders. 
Though the decisions of the tribunals were often criticized for delays, certain legal norms were 
firmly established. The principle of reasonable and equitable utilization was the guiding rule for the 
tribunals in resolving riparian rights of the conflicting states. In the process a number of principles 
emerged (Salman 2002). Some of them were: i) the manner in which dependable flow can be calculated 
and the consequences of failure of one state to utilize its share during one water year, and ii) treatment of 
prescriptive rights and of excess or deficit flows. Thus, the creation of tribunals for conflict resolution was 
very useful; many constitutional experts feels that a more assertive role can be played by the centre in 
matters regarding water. The background paper on Article 262 (Bakshi 2002) and inter-state disputes 
relating to water for the National Commission for the working of constitution, exclusively dealt with 
various ‘legal provisions’ and ‘doctrines’ involved in sharing of water in between the states. Barring the 
legislative role, the center can however, influence the states by making policy announcements and 
allocation of budgetary resources. Since most of the state governments are severely cash-strapped, the 
center can and does influence the states through budgetary allocations. The Sarkaria Commission on 
center-state relations examined the issue of constitutional provisions in respect to water and could not find 
favor with the suggestion that water should be included in the union list alone. The National Commission 
for Integrated Water Resources Development (1999) was of the opinion that while constitutional changes 
are not required, it urged the union government to enact laws to deal more effectively with inter-state 
rivers and develop effective institutional consultative mechanisms through which the center and states 
could agree on a number of issues related to water. 
Soon after independence there was a lot of emphasis on providing irrigation infrastructure. Over a  
period of time we find that the large irrigation projects are no longer preferred. Over the years poverty 
alleviation programs of various types have expanded in size and today absorb a large volume of 
resources. The plan provision for rural development is Rs.7,000 crores, for food subsidy Rs.13,000 crores 
and for kerosene and LPG the subsidy is about Rs.12,000 crores, making a total of Rs.32,000 crores. 
Against this, the provision for irrigation is only Rs.17,000 crores. The drop in the public investment in 
irrigation is largely due to the resource crunch faced by the governments – both center and state. 
However, there is considerable scope to improve the efficiency of existing irrigation infrastructure 
through better and more participative management practices, making use of the potential already created.   68
 
 
National Water Policy 
The National Water Resources Council formed under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister formulated 
the First National Water Policy in 1987. It was revised and a new National Water Policy was adopted in 
2002. It is an important milestone in as far as it makes explicit the role of the people in management of 
the water resources with emphasis on the poor and deprived sections of the society. We reproduce the key 
features of the National Water Policy that reflect the national thinking and influence the policy 
environment. 
 
•   Focus on disadvantaged: Special efforts should be made to formulate projects either in or for the 
benefit of areas inhabited by tribal or other specially disadvantaged groups such as schedule castes 
(SC) and schedule tribes (ST). In other areas too project planning should pay special attention to the 
needs of SC & ST and other weaker sections of the society. 
 
•   Participation in project planning: The involvement and participation of the beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders should be encouraged right from the project planning stage itself. 
 
•   Equity: Water allocation in an irrigation system should be done with due regard to equity and social 
justice. Disparities in the availability of water between head reach and tail-end farms and between 
large and small farms should be obviated by adoption of a rotational water distribution system and 
supply of water on a volumetric basis subject to certain ceilings and rational pricing. 
 
•   Management: Management of the water resources for diverse uses should be done by adopting a 
participatory approach, by involving not only the various government agencies but also the users and 
other stakeholders in an effective and decisive way in various aspects of planning, design, 
development and management of the water resources schemes. 
 
•   Water Users’ Associations: Formation of water users associations with authority and responsibility 
should be encouraged to facilitate management, including maintenance of irrigation system in a time-
bound manner. 
 
In order to influence the state governments to adopt the key provisions of the National Water 
Policy, a working group of National Council constituting the state irrigation/water-resources ministers 
was created. A draft policy was presented and adopted by the working group. While each state 
government is free to develop its independent approach to water resource development, it nevertheless to 
a large extent incorporates the plan priorities and direction set by the central government in the National 
Policy. 
Some of the national-level organizations are discussed here to map out the structure at macro-
level. 
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The Planning Commission 
The Planning Commission was established by the Government of India in 1950 to promote a rapid rise in 
the standard of living of the people by efficient exploitation of the resources of the country, increasing 
production and offering opportunities to all for employment in the service of the community. The 
Planning Commission was entrusted with the responsibility of making assessment of all resources of the 
country, augmenting deficit resources, formulating plans for the most effective and balanced utilization of 
resources and determining priorities. Thus, on behalf of the government the Planning Commission 
provides the overall framework of planning and growth for the country as per government’s policies and 
priorities. These policies and priorities are in the form of five-year approach papers that layout the 
objectives, targets and strategies, resources and other measures, sectoral policies, governance and 
institutional framework for development. 
The Tenth Five-year Plan Approach Paper (2002-07) identifies “water” as a critical input in 
raising agriculture output and removing poverty. While the paper laments that the public investment in 
irrigation has fallen significantly over successive plan periods, it exhorts that there is considerable scope 
for improving the efficiency of the existing irrigation infrastructure, through better and more participative 
management practices. The Approach Paper makes significant pronouncements regarding user charges 
that has bearing on the irrigation sector and other public services and utilities. It says, “A good deal of 
public sector investment is in the provision of public services. The pattern and condition of the provision 
of such infrastructure services has been done in such a way that the public has got used to not paying 
economic charges for these services. This includes key services such as power, water supply, irrigation 
and transport among others. It is primarily the absence of appropriate pricing of public services and the 
lack of will to collect the levied charges that has caused the large fiscal imbalance that afflicts the 
country”. The Paper takes on the fallacy of subsidizing the services in the name of the poor by saying. 
“The argument for not charging appropriate user charges has essentially been based on equity 
considerations. It is argued that the poor are not able to pay adequately for these essential public services. 
This argument ignores the fact that it is the better-off sections of the society that consume most such 
services and therefore benefit from these services. In fact, if the better-offs are made to pay, it would then 
become possible to provide essential services to reach the poor.” The Planning Commission wields 
informal influence by reflecting the latest thinking on various issues irrespective of whether anyone 
acknowledges and follows them in the short run. It influences the direction of national thinking and in 
determining policy environment in the medium and long term. However, the Planning Commission 
exhortations are gradually losing their significance ,and it is the independent ministries that determine the 
specific sectoral policy, thrust areas and specific scheme-wise resource allocations. Its influence over the 
states is even more dilute. 
The Planning Commission which had set up a Committee on Plan Projects (COPP) in the fifties, 
“published first rate studies on the functioning of irrigation projects, focusing on the deviations from 
design, their causes and consequences. But COPP has long since been wound up and nothing has been put 
in its place,” (Vaidyanathan 1999). Vaidyanathan further argues for the revival of this practice, as 
objective examination of deviations from the original specifications would have informed us about   70
improved project planning required avoiding past mistakes. Lack of reliable irrigation statistics, and non-
accessibility of available statistics impede project planning and transparency. Many researches held that 
faulty designs and planning were primarily responsible for the sordid state of present day irrigation 
performance. 
 
The Ministry of Water Resources 
The Ministry of Water Resources is the nodal agency for Water Resource administration in the country. It 
was earlier called the Ministry of Irrigation and Power, which was bifurcated and re-christened in 1985, 
and is responsible for laying down policy guidelines and programs for the development and regulation of 
the country’s water resources. It also provides technical guidance, research support, planning for 
command area development and coordination between states. The Ministry also monitors centrally 
sponsored schemes (CSS). 
The Ministry headed by the secretary has various administrative, financial and technical wings. 
The administrative wing works under the joint secretary (admn) and financial wing is headed by the 
financial adviser. The technical wings are headed by joint secretary (policy and planning), commissioner 
(industries), commissioner (projects), commissioner (Bangladesh and Nepal) and joint secretary 
(administration) with the charge of also Central Ground Water Board (CGWB). The command area 
development, water management, minor irrigation divisions and the CGWB are directly under the 
administrative control of the Additional Secretary, who in turn is assisted by the Chief Engineer (CAD), 
Chief Engineer (WM) and Chief Engineer (M)) and Joint Secretary (admn) in the respective division. The 
overall activities of the Ministry are described in the Ministry’s Annual report (1989-90) as follows: 
 
1.  Providing overall policy, planning and guidance for the water resource sector as a whole. 
 
2.  Providing technical guidance, scrutiny, clearance and monitoring of the irrigation, flood control and 
multi-purpose river projects (major and medium) of the states. 
 
3.  General infrastructural, technical and research support for sectoral development at state level. 
 
4.  Providing special central financial assistance or help obtaining finances from funding agencies like 
World Bank and other agencies in special cases. 
 
5.  Detailing overall planning, policy formulation and rendering guidance with respect to minor irrigation 
and command area development and administration and monitoring of CSS. 
 
6.  Formulation of national water development perspective and determination of water balance of 
different basins/sub-basins for eventual inter-basin transfers. 
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7.  Overall resource planning for ground water development, establishment of utilizable resources and 
making polices for exploitation, overseeing of support to state level activities in ground water 
development. 
 
8.  Coordination, mediation and facilitation in regard to the resolution of inter-state conflicts and disputes 
in sharing of water, and in some cases overseeing implementation of inter-state projects. 
 
9.  Negotiating and talking to neighboring countries (Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakisthan) inter alia in 
regard to river waters, water resource development projects, operation of treaties (Indus Treaty). 
 
10.   Operating the central network of flood forecasting and warning in the context of flood control in 
inter-state rivers, providing central cases and preparing flood control master plans for the Ganga and 
the Brahmaputra. 
 
The above listed functions give a broad picture of the center’s role and responsibilities in the 
water resources sector. The role in implementation is of a catalytic nature. The budget of the central 
government is supplemented by funds provided in the budgets of various state governments. Accelerated 
Irrigation Benefits Program (AIBP) was launched by the government of India in 1996-97, for accelerating 
implementation of ongoing irrigation/multipurpose projects, which are in advanced stage of construction, 
and could yield irrigation benefits, and which are beyond the resource capabilities of the state 
governments. Outlay for this program during 2001-02 was Rs. 2000 crores. The Accelerated Irrigation 
Benefit Program is an important instrument for providing resources to state governments in support of 
ongoing irrigation schemes. 
Under the Ministry of Water Resources there are a number of specialist organizations looking 
into various aspects of the water resources – including ground water, flood control, hydrology, project 
construction and some major river project authorities and boards. A number of these organizations seem 
to have a cocooned existence. For instance, “the technical guidance and scrutiny of major and medium 
irrigation projects is done by the Central Water Commission. The general infrastructural and research 
support to sectoral development at the State level is provided by the Central Water Commission, the 
Central Water and Power Research Station, the Central Soil and Materials Research Station, the National 
Institute of Hydrology and the Central Board of Irrigation and Power. Consultancy services in regard to 
water resources projects are provided by Water and Power Consultancy Services (India) Limited, a public 
sector undertaking under this Ministry. The Central Water Commission also operates a flood forecasting 
system on inter-state rivers. The preparation of flood control master plans for the Ganga and the 
Brahmaputra systems has been the responsibility of the Ganga Flood Control Commission and 
Brahmaputra Board. In regard to ground water development, the Ministry functions through the Central 
Ground Water Board. Under the national perspectives for water resources development, the water 
balances of peninsular river basins and sub-basins are being prepared by the National Water Development 
Agency. There are also a number of Boards and Committees concerned with specific inter-state projects 
(the Sardar Sarovar Construction Advisory Committee, the Betwa River Board, the Bansagar Control 
Board, the Mahi Control Board and the Tungabhadra Board). Questions of inter-state coordination, water   72
allocation, cost allocation and related matters pertaining to certain projects on the Narmada are the 
responsibility of the Narmada Control Authority, a body set up under the Narmada Water Disputes 
Tribunal’s Award. Lastly, the construction, maintenance and operation of the Farakka Barrage Project has 
been the responsibility of a separate project organization under the Ministry,” (Kabra 1992). 
 
 
Central Water Commission 
Employing more than 5,000 persons, the Central Water Commission (CWC) serves as an apex 
organization in the country in the field of water resources.  Historically, when it was constituted in 1945 it 
was called “Central Waterways, Irrigation and Navigation Commission”. In 1951 it was merged with the 
“Central Electricity Commission” and came to be known as “Central Water and Power Commission (CW 
& PC).  Consequent to the changes in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, the water wing of CW & 
PC assumed the name CWC in 1974 and functions as an ‘attached office’ to the ministry of water 
resources, GoI. The CWC is an important organization created by the Ministry. 
The CWC is headed by a chairman, with the status of ex-officio secretary to the government of 
India.  The work of the commission is divided among 3 Wings – designs and research wing, water 
planning and projects wing and river management wing.  Allied functions are grouped under respective 
wings and each wing is placed under the charge of a full-time member with the status of ex-officio 
additional secretary to the GoI.  The members are assisted by officers of the rank of chief engineer, 
director / superintending engineer, deputy director / executive engineer, assistant director / assistant 
executive engineer and other engineering and non-engineering officers and supporting staff in various 
field organizations and directorates. Of late, the CWC is re-organized and it has 13 regional offices each 
headed by a chief engineer.  They are located at Shillong, Siliguri, Patna, Lucknow, Bhopal, Vadodara, 
Nagpur, Bhubaneshwar, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Coimbatore, Chandigarh and Delhi. 
The CWC is entrusted with the general responsibilities of initiating, coordinating and furthering 
consultations with the state governments concerned, on schemes for the control, conservation and 
utilization of water resources throughout the country for the purpose of flood management, irrigation, 
navigation, drinking water supply and power generation.  The Commission, if required, also undertakes 
construction and execution of any such schemes as required. The following are the broad functions of the 
CWC: 
 
•   Make all necessary investigations and surveys and if so required, prepare schemes and designs for the 
development of river valleys in respect of power generation, irrigation by gravity flow or lift, 
navigation, flood management, environmental management, rehabilitation and re-settlement of the 
project-affected families, soil conservation, anti-water logging measures, reclamation of alkaline and 
saline soils, drainage and other related facilities such as malaria control, recreation and fish culture 
and drinking water supply. 
 
•   Undertake construction work of any river valley development scheme on behalf of the GoI or state 
governments concerned. 
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•   Advise and assist the state governments when so required (commissions, corporations or boards that 
may be set up) in the investigation, surveys and preparations of river valley and power development 
schemes for particular areas and regions. 
 
•   Advise GoI in matters of water resources development, rights and disputes between different states, 
and any matter that may be referred to CWC in connection with river valley development. 
•   Advise GoI and the state governments on the basin-wise development of the water resources. 
 
•   Advise GoI on issues of settlement of priorities for plant, materials and foreign exchange between 
various river valley development schemes and monitoring of projects. 
 
•   Collect, coordinate, analyze and publish the data relating to the waterways, tidal rivers, rainfall, 
runoff and temperature, ground water resources, sitting of reservoirs, behavior of hydraulic structures, 
environmental aspects and to act as the Central Bureau of Information in respect of these matters, and 
collect, maintain and publish statistical data on water resources utilization, including quality of water. 
 
•   Initiate schemes and arrange for training of engineers in India and abroad and co-ordinate the training 
activities in the state government institutions. 
  
•   Standardize instruments, methods of observation and record, materials and construction design and 
operation of irrigation projects. 
 
•   Initiate studies on socio-agro-economic and ecological aspects of irrigation projects. 
 
•   Conduct and coordinate research on various aspects of river valley development schemes such as 
flood management, irrigation, navigation, hydropower development and the concerned structural and 
design features. 
 
•   Promote modern data collection techniques such as remote sensing, satellite technology for water 
resources development and river forecasting and development of computer software for the same. 
 
•   Conduct studies on dam safety aspects for existing and future dams and standardize instruments for 
the dam safety measures; 
 
•   Initiate morphological studies, river behavior, bank erosion / coastal erosion problems. 
 
•   Conduct research, experiments and such activities to promote economic and optimum utilization of 
water resources and 
 
•   Promote and create mass awareness in the progress and achievements made by the country in water 
resources development. 
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CWC members and officials are represented on several policy levels and advisory board committees 
constituted by the GoI and state governments from time to time. CWC officials are invariably 
represented on several river boards and committees examining inter-state water disputes. 
 
National Water Development Agency 
 
The National Water Development Agency was set up in 1980 to promote scientific development for 
optimum utilization of water resources in the country and for preparing feasibility reports for inter-basin 
transfer of water. The main objectives of the agency are to: 
 
•   Promote scientific development for optimum utilization of water resources in the country. 
 
•   Carry out detailed surveys and investigations of the possible storage reservoir sites and 
interconnecting links in order to establish the feasibility of the proposal of Peninsular Rivers 
Development and Himalayan Rivers Development Components of the National Perspective for Water 
Resources Development. 
 
•   Carry out detailed studies about the quantum of water in various Peninsular/Himalayan River 
Systems, which can be transferred to other basins/states after meeting the reasonable needs of basin-
states in the foreseeable future. 
 
•   Prepare feasibility reports of various components of the scheme relating to Peninsular Rivers 
Development and Himalayan Rivers Development. 
 
National Water Board 
The GoI constituted the National Water Board in 1990 with the secretary, Ministry of Water Resources, 
GoI as its chairman, secretary of the concerned union ministry and chairman, CWC and chief secretaries 
of states/union territories, as members. The functions entrusted to the Board are: 
 
•   Reviewing the progress of implementation of the National Water Policy and reporting to the 
council. 
•   Recommending the setting up of appropriate organizations and institutions for the integrated 
development of water resources as envisaged under the National Water Policy. 
•   Assessing the achievements of different institutions/agencies working on the appropriate 
measures for further action. 
•   Recommending pattern of financing of the water development projects. 
•   Suggesting guidelines for training of personnel required for the water sector. 
•   Making suggestions for undertaking appropriate programs in pursuance of the directives in the 
National Water Policy.   75
•   Suggesting investment priorities in the water sector for achieving the objective of National Water 
Policy. 
•   Considering problems/matters associated with development and management of the nation’s 
water resources as and when brought before the Board, and recommend suitably to Ministry of 
Water Resources/National Water Resources Council. 
 
“The Board held ten regular meetings and one special meeting so far,” mentions NCIWRD report (1999), 
and “it served as a useful forum for centre – state discussions at senior officers’ level and on a number of 
complex issues agreement could be reached at the level of officers”. 
 Water and Power Consultancy Services (India) Ltd 
Water and Power Consultancy Services (India) Limited, New Delhi, provide an integrated package of 
consultancy services in the water resources sector. The main objectives of the company are to: 
 
•   Establish, provide and perform engineering and related technical and consultancy services for 
development of water resources, irrigation and drainage, electric power, flood control and water 
supply projects. 
 
•   Establish, provide, maintain and perform procurement, inspection, expediting, management of 
construction and related services in connection with the construction of water resources development 
projects including dams, barrages, weirs, tunnels, canals, hydro-power stations and thermal power 
stations and transmission and distribution systems. 
 
•   Carry on all kinds of business relating to:  
 
a.  the pre-investment surveys and investigations, planning, design, supervision of construction, 
operation and maintenance of all kinds of works involved in the development and utilization of 
water resources, generation and utilization of electric power; and 
b.  topographic surveys, aerial photography, hydrological surveys, meteorological surveys, 
geological surveys, material surveys, underground resources investigations, soil surveys and land 
classification surveys. 
 
•   Issue tenders for works, services and equipment on behalf of customers and be responsible for 
scrutinizing them and advising the customers suitably. 
 
•   Organize and supervise the erection and commissioning of generating plants, electric transmission 
and distribution systems. 
 
 
Centrally Sponsored Programs 
The rapid development of irrigation potential through the construction of major and medium irrigation 
projects in India after independence, though in the initial stages showed promising results, gradually fell 
into low performance. The indicators were low rates of utilization of irrigation potential created, un-  76
reliability of water supply by the irrigation systems and water logging and salinity. The GoI with the 
assistance of World Bank tried to improve the situation through two major interventions. They were the 
initiation of centrally sponsored programs – 1) Command Area Development (CAD) program in 1970s 
and 2) National Water Management Program (NWMP) in 1980s.The NWMP laid stress on full control of 
irrigation flows with a view to decrease water losses,  improve reliability and  prevent salinization. This 
was in nature of a technical and bureaucratic intervention – building of more control structures and lining 
of more canals along with attempts to introduce new communication systems. The CAD program on the 
other hand was aimed at improving field-level irrigation performance and the management at project-
level through administrative innovations and institutions. In this context CAD as an institutional 
intervention needs further discussion. 
 
Command Area Development Program (CAD) 
 
The core components of works envisaged under the CAD program right from its inception are 
construction of field channels, field drains, land leveling/shaping and introduction of warabandi 
(rotational water supply) to improve the utilization of irrigation potential created. The centre provided 
elaborate guidelines on the structuring of organizations by the individual states for the implementation of 
the program. Several circulars have been issued by the CAD wing of the Ministry of Water Resources, 
GoI, on how to go about executing the works mentioned from time to time. However, different states 
followed different patterns and approaches in the organization structures and also for the field channel 
construction at field levels. Though CAD organizations were envisaged as multi-departmental structures 
for functioning under one roof, and promoting irrigated agriculture, the organizational structures vary 
from state to state. 
In some states like Jammu and Kashmir and Meghalaya the CAD program works under the 
preview of the agriculture department. In the states of Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Goa, 
Gujarat, Harayana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Nagaland, Orissa, Punjab 
and Tripura, the CAD falls under the jurisdiction of the water resources/irrigation department. In Bihar 
and West Bengal, minor irrigation department looks after the program. In Himachal Pradesh, the 
responsibility of implementation is with the department of irrigation and public health. In some states like 
Rajasthan special CAD departments were created, and in Tamil Nadu, the program is implemented 
through agricultural engineering department. Except in Rajasthan, the multi departmental structures 
envisaged at project level for better coordination could not be sustained. Inter-departmental coordination 
committees in most of the states bring together the secretaries in charge of related departments to ensure 
inter-disciplinary approach at state-level. Several of the state governments do not have CAD authorities 
functioning at the project level and the concerned government departments administer the program. 
Providing distribution network through field channel at territory-level, varied from leaving it to farmers or 
doing it through departments. The experience of CAD and NWMP helped irrigation engineers to become 
more conscious of the need for a broader perspective in the planning and management of irrigation 
(Vaidyanathan 1999). 
The following components and activities were incorporated in the program, some of them as it 
progressed and as the need for them was felt: 
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a.  On Farm Development (OFD) 
-  Development of field channels (FC) and field drains (FD) within the command of each outlet. 
-  Land leveling and shaping on an outlet command basis. 
-  Reclamation of water-logged areas. 
-  Introduction of Warabandi and fair distribution of water to individual farmer, possibly through 
promotion of farmer’s participation in irrigation management of irrigation water (PIM) and 
through improved communication system including wireless. 
-  Realignment of field boundaries, wherever necessary and possible, in combination with 
consolidation of land-holdings. 
-  Supply of all inputs and services, including credit. 
-  Strengthening of extension services. 
 
b.  Selection and introduction of suitable cropping patterns, again through adaptive trials, 
demonstration and training. 
 
c.  Development of ground water irrigation to supplement surface water irrigation through conjunctive 
use of ground and surface waters, by promoting cooperation with related line departments. Subsidy 
to small and marginal farmers was envisaged for ground water development and sprinkler-drip 
irrigation. 
 
d.  Development and maintenance of the main and intermediate drainage systems. 
 
e.  Modernization, maintenance and efficient operation of the irrigation system up to the outlet with 
capacity of one cubic food per second (cusec) flow. 
 
f.    Increase the production and productivity of agriculture through cooperation amongst different 
disciplines and departments with adaptive trials, demonstration and training inputs. 
 
g.  Monitoring and evaluation for mid-term correction/improvement through organized cells and 
through field visits by officials and consultants. 
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2.3. STATE-LEVEL  INSTITUTIONS  FOR IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT 
Irrigation Laws 
As irrigation is primarily under the states’ purview different states in India enacted different statutes and 
rules to regulate and administer irrigation. There are considerable variations in irrigation practices 
differing vastly from state to state and sometimes within a state itself. These variations were evolved over 
a century of history. Several factors like rainfall, soil characteristics, topographic features, agricultural 
practices of the people etc., of the locality and region influenced their evolution and development. Jacob 
and Singh (1972) compiled the historical development of various state laws in different regions of the 
country for the use of the Irrigation Commission 1972. 
In the northern states of Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Harayana irrigation canals draw water from 
snowmelt perennial rivers and run through flat lands of uniform characteristics. The North Indian Canal 
and Drainage Act 1873 as amended from time to time by different states is applicable to these states. The 
Rajasthan Irrigation and Drainage Act 1954 and Jammu and Kashmir Canal Drainage Act 1963 are 
similar to North India Canal and Drainage Act. In these areas water is comparatively cheap and plentiful. 
To a great extent these conditions were responsible for the emergence and successful implementation of 
warabandi. These acts empower state governments to use surface water from the rivers, streams and lakes 
for irrigation. They vest powers with irrigation agencies to regulate supplies of water, construction of 
water courses, field channels etc., along with powers to levy water charges on the users. 
In the western parts of the country irrigation is governed by the Bombay Irrigation Act 1879. 
Maharashtra is covered by the Madhya Pradesh Irrigation Act 1931 and Hyderabad Irrigation Act 1357 F 
in Vidarbha and Marathwada regions, respectively. The Madhya Pradesh Irrigation Act unlike other acts 
bars the accrual of prescriptive rights of easement against the state. However, the Indian Easements Act 
1882 through section 2 bars prescriptive rights of easement against the government. Irrigation 
management under these Acts is to an extent “demand-based,” fluctuating accordingly with storage levels 
in reservoirs, low rainfall conditions and variations of monsoon from year to year. Farmers apply for 
permission from irrigation agencies before every crop season for the crop they intend to grow. 
In the eastern states of Bihar and West Bengal the irrigation systems operate under the Bengal 
Irrigation Act 1876 with some variations. Under this Act farmers have to apply for water every fasal (crop 
season). Even denial of irrigation supplies for the defaulters of irrigation cess was incorporated in the Act. 
In West Bengal, water rates are either on the basis of area and crops as per the contracts, or uniform water 
rate in the command area irrespective of crops raised. Under the former method it is immaterial whether 
the areas were actually irrigated or not but the contracted water cess has to be paid. 
The method of localization for wet and dry crops discussed earlier is practiced in the irrigation 
systems and is provided in the enactments by governments in south India. With the linguistic 
reorganization of states in India, the states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala came 
under the provisions of different irrigation acts applicable for the areas merged. Thus, there are several 
acts in existence for governing irrigation. Further, for irrigation related activities several other acts were 
enacted by states as per the need. The multiplicity of legal statutes and their interpretation complicate 
irrigation administration in India. The Irrigation Commission called for consolidation of these acts into   79
one model act, so that each state can develop its own law within the overall framework. Several research 
studies also reflected the need for consolidation of irrigation statutes. 
In Madhya Pradesh, the following two statutes provide for irrigation development and 
management in the state. 1) The MP Irrigation Act, 1931;  2) The MP Sinchai Prabandhan Me Krishko Ki 
Bhagidari Adhiniyam, 1999.  
The MP Irrigation Act, 1931 contains provisions for the following, which are relevant to water 
resource development and planning: rights in water, the supply of water from canals and charges 
therefore, supply of water to a village tank, construction of submergence tanks, levy and collection of 
water charges, irrigation agreement and irrigation panchyatas, rights to cut grass, to graze cattle, to fish, to 
cultivate land, or to do other acts on land or in water under the charge of the irrigation department, 
construction and maintenance of private irrigation works, power to make rules, define offences and 
impose penalties. The MP Sinchai Prabandhan Me Krishko Ki Bhagidari Adhiniyam, 1999, deals with a 
new law transferring irrigation management to farmers. 
 
Rights on Water 
 
•   The MP Irrigation Act declares the right of the government in the water of any river, natural stream or 
natural drainage channel, natural lake, or other natural collection of water (Section 26). 
 
•   Section 28 bars the accrual of rights in water to the detriment of an existing canal. No right can be 
acquired against the government under section 15 or section 16 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, in 
the water of any river, natural stream or natural drainage channel, lake or other natural collection of 
water, any of whose water supply an existing canal or one under construction. 
 
•   The right of the government overrides not only past and present rights of other persons, but also 
future rights. No right shall be acquired against the government under section 15 and 16 of the Indian 
Easement Act, 1882, in the water of any river, natural stream or natural drainage channel, lake or 
other natural collection of water, any of whose waters may supply a proposed canal. 
 
•   Even when government supplies water from its canals, the Act bars the accrual of perspective rights 
of easement or otherwise to such supply. Water will be supplied only with accordance with the 
provisions of the Act, which provides for periodical supply agreements or grants under specified 
terms and conditions. 
 
•   The Act declares the right of government even over the water discharged as waste after its use for the 
purpose for it was supplied.   
 
•   In summary, the rights of government over water resources are supreme, and its use by any person is 
entirely subject to the regulations imposed by law. 
 
•   Under the provisions of the Act, the government may supply water to village tanks, construct-
submerging tanks, on the request of landholders.   80
 
•   Water rates are charged for this supply as much as supply for irrigation, industry etc. The supply is at 
the discretion of the executive engineer. The Act empowers the government to frame rules for this 
purpose. 
 
•   In addition to a water rate, government may also charge an irrigation cess not only on the area 
commanded from a canal system but also from submerging tanks, ex-Malgujari tanks, regulators, pick 
up weirs, Bhandaras and grants-in-aid works. 
 
•   If water supply from a private irrigation work increases as a result of the construction of a state canal 
nearby, the increase in irrigated area due to such proximity may also be subjected to a water rate. 
 
•   Cultivated lands on which water has been used in an unauthorized manner shall also be subject to 
payment of water rates. Wastage of water is liable to attract the payment of bulk rates, as determined 
by the executive engineer. 
 
Irrigation Agreements and Irrigation Panchayats 
 
•   The Irrigation Act provides for the conclusion of irrigation agreements between the government and 
the holders of land, either for short-term or long-term. The agreements would include conditions as to 
the payment of water charges by the landholders and freedom from liability of government for loss 
occurring to the landholders due to failure or shortage in the supply of water from excess supply. 
 
•   Section 62 mandates the establishment of irrigation panchayats for every village or chak or a group of 
villages. The Act prescribes the membership of the panchyat, a representative body of the 
landholders, and their duties and powers. The members of the panchayat have been declared by the 
Act to be public servants for the purposes of the Indian Penal Code.  
 
•   Rights to cut grass, to graze cattle, to fish, to cultivate land, or to do other acts on land or in water 
under the charge of the irrigation department. 
 
•   An important provision in the Irrigation Act relates to certain activities on land and in water under the 
charge of the irrigation department, the sums due from which are to be collected by that department. 
 
These are: 
-  Cutting grass and wood 
-  Grazing cattle 
-  Fishing  
-  Cultivating land in tank beds 
-  Fishing in tanks and canals 
-  Plucking all kinds of fruits and any other produce. 
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The irrigation department has the authority, generally, to grant leases for the right to the above. In respect 
of tanks and tank beds adjoining government forests, the power to grant leases for fishing, other water 
right and tank beds cultivation only lies with the irrigation department. The disposal of forest produce 
such as fruits, honey, lac, gum, harra wood, tendu leaves, bamboo, etc., is left with the forest department. 
 
Executive orders issued by the government provide for the following: 
  
-  Leasing out tank bed cultivation. 
-  Leasing out fishing rights other than those in the possession of the fisheries department.  
 
Construction and maintenance of private irrigation works 
•   This Act empowers the state government to make a grant or loan of money to any individual towards 
the cost of construction or improvement of a private irrigation work.  
 
•   Any permanent holder designing to construct any dam or any other work of similar nature in any 
river, natural stream, natural drainage channel, lake or other natural collection of water as part of a 
private irrigation work or a grant-in-aid irrigation, may apply in writing to the state government 
through the Collector. 
 
•   Where such grant-in-aid irrigation work has been constructed or improved, the government has the 
power to enforce maintenance of the works in accordance with rules prescribed under the Act, on the 
person who acquires such grant and loan, or his representative – in interest. 
 
•   The Act also provides for acquisition of land for constructing or improving irrigation works if the 
applicant so desires, and has applied for it. These facilities are available even for those who undertake 
construction or improvement of irrigation works without the aid of grant or loan from government. In 
such cases, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 applies. 
 
Power to make rules, define offences and impose penalties  
 
This Act confers on the state government exclusive power to frame rules for the implementation of the 
Act. Even in the case of irrigation panchayats, the government reserves the power to make rules for their 
functioning.  
In summary, the MP Irrigation Act provides for the following rights as well as powers of the 
government, to be exercised by the irrigation department. 
 
•   Rights over all water resources. 
•   Power to control construction, maintenance, and operation of private irrigation works. 
•   Monopoly powers to supply water and charge rates for irrigation, or industry through agreements. 
•   Power to supply water to village tanks on government–determined terms and conditions.   82
•   Power to constitute and control, through rules determined for the purpose, irrigation Panchayats. 
•   Powers to confer and regulate rights to cut grass, to graze cattle, to fish, to cultivate land, or to do 
other acts on land or in water under the charge of the irrigation department. 
 
Andhra Pradesh Irrigation Acts 
 
There is no statutory Irrigation Act for the Andhra region. Some directions from the government and 
revenue board’s standing orders covered some aspects of irrigation discipline. Some of the important 
legal acts pertinent to irrigation in AP are: the AP Telangana Irrigation Act 1357 (fasli), and Andhra 
Pradesh (Andhra area) Irrigation Cess Act. The AP Irrigation (Construction and Maintenance of Water 
courses) Act 1965 deals with construction of watercourses upto a block of 10 hectares. The AP Irrigation 
Utilization and Command Area Development Act 1984 was aimed at implementing various programs 
under CAD effectively. It provides for regulation, maintenance and repairs of irrigation systems, water 
management for optimum use of water, prevention of land erosion and water logging, improvement of 
soil fertility and regulation of cropping pattern and for pro-poor maintenance and upkeep of irrigation 
systems in the state, for ensuring benefits to the cultivators under the command areas.  
This act also provides for levy of penalties  (by outlet committees), in addition to the water 
charges collected by the revenue department. Thus the CAD act was a forerunner to the concept of 




The Andhra Pradesh Farmers’ Management of Irrigation Systems Act (APFMIS) 1997 and M P Sinchai 
Prabhandhan Me Krishko Ki Bhagidari Adhiniam (hereafter called MP Act of PIM) are by far the most 
important acts in the irrigation sector reforms. The state of Andhra Pradesh was the first to promulgate 
this act followed by MP. Both the acts have the following features: 
 
•   Gives water rights in an irrigation system to the farmers, through farmers, through the farmers’ 
organizations (FOs). 
 
•   Ensures functional and administrative autonomy to the FOs. 
 
•   Provides the modalities for the creation of FOs in all irrigation projects of the state representing all 
the water users. At the field level these are called Water Users’ Associations (WUAs) covering a 
group of minors/ or small distributories. A group of WUAs along a distributory or distributories are 
federated into a distributory committee (DC). The DCs under a major irrigation project are brought 
together as a project committee (PC). 
 
•   Makes irrigation department (ID) staff accountable to the WUAs, DCs, and PCs as a competent 
authority, requiring ID staff to implement the decisions of the FOs. 
 
•   Encourages FOs to resolve conflicts themselves. 
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•   Enables proper and adequate maintenance and improvement of the irrigation systems by the FOs 
based on resources raised by them or from the grants given by the government, as a percentage of 
water charges collected from the water users. 
 
•   Allows access to information on scheme operations. 
 
•   Permits preparation of the operational plan and the maintenance plan by the WUAs/DCs/PCs. 
 
•   Gives freedom of cropping pattern to farmers within the availability of water, and 
 
•   Provides procedures and guidelines on accounting, social auditing, water budgeting, election 
procedures and other matters of administration. 
 
The farmers’ organizations as per the Acts have a right to take action on any of the offences specified in 
the Acts. 
 
Department of Water Resources / Department of Irrigation 
The department of water resources / irrigation is the nodal agency for developing the irrigation potential 
of the state and monitoring and maintaining the irrigation systems in the state. 
In Andhra Pradesh the major irrigation projects are each headed by a chief engineer, each. Thus, 
NSLC and Krishna Delta area have a chief engineer each supervising all functions related to irrigation. 
They are assisted by a number of superintendent engineers and executive engineers as per departmental 
norms. In Madhya Pradesh, the executive engineer (EE) is the chief officer at the level of an irrigation 
system, unless the system is really large, in which case a superintendent engineer may oversee the system. 
The EE is a field-level posting and will have his office within the system’s command area. 
The systems are divided into sub-divisions headed by sub-division officers (SDO) or the assistant 
engineers / assistant executive engineers. The SDOs are responsible for release of water, operations and 
maintenance of the canal system, making payments etc., in their sub-division. The SDO has the powers of 
a deputy collector to enforce the collection of revenue, in Madhya Pradesh. In Andhra Pradesh, revenue 
collection is done by the revenue department, separately.  
Under the SDO are a number of sub-engineers, who are in some ways the hands and feet of the 
irrigation department and they are the ones who are actually responsible for all the regulations, canal 
repair and maintenance works, etc. 
Along side the sub-engineers are the amins or revenue collection officers. They are the part of the 
revenue wing in the office of the SDO. Amins make the collection demands on the farmers based on the 
area-irrigated, crop variety and mode of irrigation-flow or lift. They also collect the revenue in Madhya 
Pradesh. Revenue can also be deposited directly by the farmers in the office of the SDO in Andhra 
Pradesh. The department has a host of other class-four employees like the guards, timekeepers, dak-
runners (work-charged staff), etc. and department laborers for carrying out canal repairs. The structure of 
the irrigation department in AP and the structure of the water resources department in MP are given in 
figures 2.5.1 and 2.5.2, respectively.   84
Other Institutions affecting Irrigation 
District Administration 
Districts are administrative units in the states. They are headed by district collectors (DC). They are 
normally from the Indian Administrative Service cadre. All the state government departments, including 
the irrigation department, function under the administrative control of the DC. District collectors are 
responsible for: 
 
a)  administration and revenue collection through sub-divisional magistrates, 
b) law and order through the police set up and 
c)  development functions through the district development administration. 
 
DC is a key agent of the state government in the district. DC assisted by the different departments is 
responsible for enforcing any contract on behalf of the government. Under the MP Participatory Irrigation 
Management (PIM) Act, Collectors are required to demarcate the area of operation of Farmers’ 
Organizations (FO). They are also responsible for holding elections and such statutory functions. The 
process of removal of elected representatives has to be conducted under the supervision of the DC or a 
representative. The irrigation charges collected by the department of water resources are effected by the 




The Judiciary is a significant factor in ensuring enforcement of any law of the land. Any action under the 
law can be challenged in the courts. It is the final arbitrator in all cases. Hence, it is important to 
understand the judicial system in the country/state. 
The Indian judicial system has three basic tiers: there are courts at the district level, at the state 
level and at the national level. Judgements of district-level courts may be appealed in the state-level court 
and judgements of the state courts may be appealed in the national-level court. 
At the district level, a sessions court is one that tries criminal cases, a district court tries civil 
cases. At the district level one also finds several specialized courts. These include the rent tribunal, 
consumer court, labor court, revenue court and executive court. The court of the district judge is the 
highest court in the district to try civil cases. The district judge is empowered to try civil cases and to hear 
appeals from the lower courts. Under the district judge are the courts of the senior sub-judges, the sub-
judges, the munsifs and the small cause courts. The highest district court to try criminal cases is that of 
the district and the sessions judge. The district judge acts as the sessions judge in a district. The criminal 
cases are heard by the magistrates. There are three classes of magistrates – the first class, the second class 
and the third-class magistrates. 
The judicial system, especially at the level of districts, has become a virtual hostage to a huge 
backlog of cases. The procedure of prosecution is such that it is very easy to get adjournments and 
postponements resulting in the cases never ever being finalized. There are umpteen instances where the 
cases run the entire generation of defendants. Courts are considered only as a last resort or more often as 
an alternative to be used for harassment of the opposite party. Under the conditions, the authority of the   85
courts as an institution for imposing penalties to the offenders or for seeking justice by the aggrieved has 
been largely eroded. Lower courts almost cease to matter as an institution of relevance to the common 
man. 
 
Command Area Development Program 
 
Command Area Development (CAD) was introduced as a centrally sponsored program in 1974 mainly for 
improving irrigation utilization in the command areas of major and medium irrigation projects. 
The Madhya Pradesh government has created nine Command Area Development Authorities 
(CADAs) for the implementation of Command Area Development (CAD) program. The main objective 
of the CAD Program is to increase agricultural production in irrigated areas by:  
 
a)  Bridging the potential created and its utilization.  
b)  Efficient management of irrigation, water, soil and various inputs.  
c)  Scientific crop planning provision for expansion of marketing facilities.  
d)  Farmers' participation in the program right from the beginning.  
 
In 2001-02, in MP there were six command area authorities in 17 districts covering a command 
area of 13 irrigation projects. The total command area under the scheme is 1.082 mha. The program is 
supported with the funds provided by the central government. 
The NSLC in Andhra Pradesh was covered under the Command Area Development (CAD) 
program, which was an intervention to improve the system and ensure availability of water to all the 
reaches and to all the farmers. To facilitate the implementation of CAD concept an Act called “Andhra 
Pradesh Irrigation Utilization and Command Area Development Act” (No. 15 of 1984) was enacted in the 
state. The preamble of the Act states that it is made “to provide for an accelerated increase in agriculture 
and allied production in the state of AP through a programme of comprehensive and systematic 
development on scientific and modern lines of command areas, comprising measures for optimum use of 
lands and water, prevention of land erosion and water logging, improvement of soil fertility and 
regulation of cropping pattern and for proper maintenance of upkeep of irrigation systems in the state for 
ensuring maximum benefits to the cultivators under the command area”. A “Pipe Committee” with duly 
elected members is to be formed, to enforce warabandi (rotational supply of water) by turn, so that every 
landholding under sluice gets irrigation. To facilitate the flow of irrigation water to all fields, the 
government of AP, envisaged construction of field channels i.e., water courses beyond the outlet up to the 
commanding point of each survey number or 5 hectares, whichever is less. This direction was further 
modified to provide the water course or field channel with related structures beyond the 5 hectare limit, 
and up to each individual holding within the outlet command, at project cost in all ongoing projects. The 
NSLC being an ongoing project at this point of time had the benefit of providing a conveyance system up 
to the holding of each individual farmer, irrespective of the size of the holding. 
The process of formation of field channels to convey water to each individual farmer did not fully 
ensure supply of irrigation to all the farmers. To enable all farmers in the command area to get water 
within the existing limitations of supplies and structural facilities available, the government decided to 
“introduce integrated water management above and below the outlet. The organized system of rotation in   86
the main system has to be finalized in full consultation with the command area development authorities 
and with participation of farmers’ to enable the tail-enders also to take advantage of this arrangement”.  
The above efforts were made to systematize the distribution of water in the system, so that all farmers, are 
equally served. In spite of all these administrative efforts, supplies of irrigation to the tail-reaches 
remained evasive and the concept of pro-poor remained as a myth. 
A review made by GoI in 1995 states that “one of the major causes for this inefficient 
management of water resources is that there is little or no involvement of farmers in management of 
irrigation system. As a result, the water to the farmers is often unreliable, at variance with their needs, 
inequitable, unsustainable and insufficient”. In the Krishna Delta System, the situation is different 
because of two reasons. The first one is that there is no dearth of water in this project since it is at the end 
of the river system, and availability of water is in surplus. Secondly, the system being in existence for the 
150 years and the general terrain being flat, a certain stability in water availability to all reaches of the 
command was achieved and water-sharing mechanisms were stabilized, except for the fact that tail-end 
farmers get water supplies a bit late. This has resulted in delayed transplantation operations by farmers for 
the rice crop in the lower reaches, and the lower yields are recorded by 8 to 10 percent as compared to the 





nd amendment to the constitution, it is mandatory for the state governments to have Panchayati 
Raj Institutions (PRI) or the local self-government in the rural areas. MP like the other states has a three-
tier structure for local governance - Village Panchayats at the village level, Janpad Panchayat at the block 
level (mandal-level in AP) and Zilla Panchayat at the district level. The village panchayat has ward 
members and is headed by Gram Pradhan / Sarpanch. All these representatives are elected directly. 
Members to Janpad/Mandal and Zilla Panchayat are also elected directly. However, in the case of 
Janpad/Mandal and Zilla Panchayats the members elected to these respective bodies elect the 
Chairpersons. All these bodies have reservations for women and schedule caste/schedule tribe 
representation. Thus, different constituencies are reserved by rotation.  
The pachayats are gradually gaining importance with the government increasedly focusing on 
them for implementation of all development activities. Gram Pradhans / Sarpanchs are beginning to have 
a reporting relationship with the lower-level state government employees providing services in the 
village, i.e., village school teachers, health workers, etc.  
These bodies have yet to become important instruments of democracy where the concerns of the 
majority poor and underprivileged are heard. In spite of the reservations for schedule castes and tribes, in 
many cases, higher caste people have captured the positions in the Panchayats - formally or through 
surrogates - and hence, continue to dominate both social and economic relationships. There are also 
positive effects of the PRI System. The election processes have made the village polity more aware of 
their voting prowess. The social change process expected to take place with grassroots self-governance 
system is at best very gradual.  
It is important to establish some kind linkages of Farmers’ Organizations (FOs) with the PRIs. As 
the PRIs gain importance they will invariably interfere in FO domains and may lead to scuttling each 
other's efforts. Friction arose in some places in AP in between these local bodies especially in matters   87
related to usufruct rights, fishing in tanks/canals etc. Tensions also surfaced in between FOs of canal and 
tank-irrigated areas in some places in the Krishna delta. On the other hand these institutions could have a 
mutually supportive relationship, wherein PRIs may provide some of their flexible resources to support 





Informal institutions in the rural areas have a major implication on the water distribution and maintenance 
of the irrigation systems from the perspective of the rural poor. These institutions are discussed in brief 
below.  
 
Social hierarchy - Castes  
 
In India, social and economic deprivation often go together. With some exceptions, the lower caste people 
are the "poor" in the rural areas. An understanding of the social hierarchy is important to design pro-poor 
interventions.  
India has a long history of occupation-based caste system. Whatever may be the origin and 
rationality of the caste structure, it had become very exploitative. In the rural areas, the higher caste 
people have most of the assets in the form of land etc., and the lower castes, especially the schedule 
castes, have very little to none but have to provide menial labor and carry out other dirty tasks mostly for 
the higher caste people. The higher castes have dominated the social relationships and they continue to 
look down upon the lower castes with disdain. These conditions have changed to a large extent in the 
urban areas, and in many states including AP, in the rural areas too. However, these customs are still quite 
strong in rural MP and more specifically in the project sites visited as part of the field study. In AP, the 
social equations predominantly changed with the relative economic development of the caste groups. 
Any attempt by the lower caste people to ameliorate their condition invariably brings retribution 
in some form or the other, from the higher caste people. There are social customs that prevent the lower 
caste people from feeling  equal with the higher caste people. In water distribution, the lower caste people 
are unable to access water towards the end of the distribution chain, by which time the water may also not 
be available.  
 
System of Attached laborers  
 
The attached labor system is called harwahi in  local parlance in Madhya Pradesh. The landless people 
mostly get employed as harwahas of the big land owners. The harwahas get paid at the rate of one quintal 
of wheat per month. However, they have to get their own food and be present at the house of the 
employers at all hours, if there is a need. The harwahas are also bound to their employers through loan for 
which they are not charged any interest. The harwahas can be bound to their employers for years. A 
similar system was prevalent in AP sometime back, but is abandoned with the advent of enactment of the 
act abolishing the practice of bonded labor.   88
 
Land Tenancy  
 
Sharecropping is a common feature in the states where the land holdings are very skewed. It is a lifeline 
for a large number of the landless poor. The normal condition of sharecropping is to share half the inputs 
and also the produce between the landowner and sharecropper. In some cases the land is given on outright 
lease for a year for an annual rent that varies according to the quality and productivity of land. It varies 
between Rs. 1000 to Rs. 2000 per acre of land per year, i.e. kharif and rabi crops in MP and in AP. 
 
Rural Informal Credit System 
 
Formal credit institutions are not present in good numbers in MP. In the isolated pockets where they are 
present, they mobilize more deposits than lending in the area. Even if they do, it is to some large farmer. 
The poor are almost completely out of the ambit of the formal banking system. The situation in Andhra 
Pradesh is far better. Several agricultural cooperatives and rural banks provide credit, even though the 
farmers also take credit from money lenders. 
In MP the normal credit source in the villages is a large farmer who would prefer to give loans 
without interest to someone who would thereafter become bonded labor to him.. Otherwise, the prevalent 
rate of interest for loans is three to five percent per month amounting to 36 to 60 percent per annum, 
depending on the urgency of the loan.  
 
Corruption – Almost an Institution in Itself 
 
It often comes as a surprise to outsiders the level of acceptance of corruption as a normal practice by the 
village folk. Villagers are very casual about corruption and pay extra to get a legitimate copy of their land 
record or to lodge an FIR in the police station or to enter the grain market (mandi parishad) to sell 
produce, etc. These practices are accepted and are not scoffed at. Corrupt is one who does not deliver in 
spite of accepting gifts. Nevertheless, one does come across instances where the concerned officer would 
resist corruption and demands for making extra legal payments.  
Most often, corruption is due to lack of information or knowledge about procedures. The poor 
and the lower caste people are largely illiterate and end up bearing the major brunt of corruption. The rich 
also reconcile to this practice as a ‘way of life’. Moreover, the poor invariably do not have any caste 
kinship in the bureaucracy to use such relationships to get things done in their favour. Being members of 
a lower caste they are reconciled to accept things as given. 
 
System of Localization in Andhra Pradesh 
Irrigation systems are commonly designed for supplying the full water requirements of crops to be grown 
in the systems, and as a contiguous one-piece command area. The first design principle maximizes the 
yield of the crop per unit area and the second minimizes the construction costs per hectare, because, the 
total canal length and the number of structures required are minimized. However, the design 
characteristics of protective irrigation systems differ from this normal criterion since it aims at low   89
irrigation intensities and high duties. By planning irrigation for part of the irrigable area, and by limiting 
irrigation on a particular piece of land to one crop per year, the water is spread over a large area. By 
designing a large area to be irrigated per unit discharge, supplementary irrigation is implied. The intention 
is to avoid crop failure on as large an area as possible, rather than to irrigate for maximum yield per unit 
area. 
Thus, the concept of localization is practiced delineating areas for wet or irrigated dry (ID) crops, 
which is generally in the ratio 1:2. This sort of demarcation has created inequities, particularly in major 
projects. The “Commission for Irrigation Utilization (1982) AP” examined this aspect critically. Its report 
says: 
 
•   “Localization for different types of irrigation which should normally be based on agro-climatic 
factors, soil types and the cropping pattern prevalent at the time of project formulation generally 
becomes an arbitrary exercise. The decisions on intensity of irrigation to extend the canal to more 
villages, talukas or districts results in large commandable areas at the top-end of the canals being left 
out of localization, resulting in large-scale indiscipline by farmers located at the head reaches and 
within easy reach of water. Thus, if the intensity is decided at 50%, this results in 50% farmers in the 
village getting 100% water needed for full development of the crop and the remaining 50% being 
totally deprived, causing an ever growing social and economic imbalance in the village, besides 
inhibiting efficient use of water by the beneficiary farmers.” 
 
•   “Protective irrigation through the process of localization and the stated objective to maximize the 
overall production in the command area of the irrigation system contradicts the individual production 
and income maximization strategies of farmers. The reason is that the maximization of output per unit 
of land is a more obvious strategy for individual farmers than the maximization of the (subsistence) 
crop output per unit of water. Rice is the important cash crop that happens to consume a lot of water. 
There are strong economic incentives for farmers to grow this crop. Farmers therefore do not adhere 
to protective cropping patterns. There is a strong tendency towards concentration of irrigation water 
on rice lands resulting in unequal water distribution and unequal spread of the economic benefits of 
irrigation.” 
 
Protective systems are designed completely to be supply-oriented and water supply into the 
system is not determined by actual and fluctuating demands in the field. Fine tuning supply to demand, 
which is needed to maximize yield is not the aim. The supply orientation has led to minimum control of 
water regulating devices for controlling water levels between the intake of the system (weir or dam) and 
the outlet command areas at the farmers level. The systems are designed for continuous flow and/or 
‘automatic distribution’ (that is distribution with no or very little necessity for adjusting outlets over the 
season). In this way, the management intensity (number of personnel per acre or unit length of canal), and 
costs are planned to be kept low. 
The principle of “localization” in AP was introduced in 1949, first under the Kurnool-Cuddapah 
canal in Rayalaseema area. It was adopted subsequently by major and medium irrigation projects 
constructed in the state. While no specific Act as such was formulated for the adoption of localization, it   90
is governed by different rules issued by the government from time to time. The Commission for Irrigation 
Utilization (1982) observed that there is no rationale behind some of the rules issued. 
Localization involves part of the command area in kharif season and another part in rabi season 
and becomes a “regimental magisterial form of governance”. Having access to irrigation in the process of 
localization, some farmers within the culturable command area were deprived of any share in the water 
and this has resulted in them deliberately diverting water to their lands. This tendency to divert water 
from an irrigation system to lands not legally notified or localized for irrigation under that source, in 
normal parlance, is called “unauthorized irrigation” (Mollinga 1998), and is considered to be one of the 
main reasons for shortage of water in the lower reaches of the system. Wherever such unauthorized draws 
of irrigation is practiced, certain enhanced water cess is to be levied as a deterrent measure for such illegal 
tapping. 
 
Irrigation Management Transfer in Andhra Pradesh 
Though different CAD Acts/Government orders promulgated in different states contain provisions for 
promoting farmers’ organizations (outlet committees / pipe committees etc.), there were too many 
infirmities, and no pipe committee formed under those provisions was found functioning. The envisaged 
partnership of farmers in operations and maintenance of the irrigation systems under CAD could not be 
achieved. As part of the irrigation sector reforms, the government of Andhra Pradesh was first to address 
the problems and enacted a separate legislation called the “Andhra Pradesh Farmers Management of 
Irrigation Systems Act (APFMIS) in 1997. An understanding of the context and processes of passing the 
Act is necessary to understand the processes of institutional development. The APFMIS Act gives the 
farmers and their organization an important role and brings them to the centrestage in operation, 
maintenance and management of all irrigation systems hitherto managed by the government, which 
include canal systems and tanks. 
As common with major and medium projects of other states, large investments, low returns, 
dilapidated conditions, lack of finances and inadequate maintenance and anarchy in water use 
characterized the projects in AP also. The ‘gap area’
* in the state was estimated to be around half a 
million hectares. As a prelude to irrigation reforms during April 1996 a series of public consultations 
were organized in the command areas of major projects. The first consultations were in the nature of 
eliciting farmers’ view points and the subsequent consultations were used for structured discussions with 
the stakeholders. The government of AP also by then learnt lessons from the Sriramsagar Project, where 
pilot projects were undertaken by the Institute of Resource Development and Management (IRDAS), an 
NGO, deployed by the central government and other funding organizations. Scaling up of the experiments 
was discussed in government quarters and with farmers. The government also circulated a ‘white paper’ 
on irrigation and had thorough discussions with opposition political parties. Thus, the preparatory work 
undertaken by the government was quite elaborate before passing the APFMIS Act. 
The government of Madhya Pradesh also followed by passing a similar act called “Madhya 
Pradesh Sinchai Prabhadhan Me Krishkon Ka Bhagidari Adhiniyam,” in 1999. The provisions of these 
acts are similar but have some minor variations. These acts are considered as the vehicles of irrigation 
                                                 
* ‘Gap area’ is the difference between potential created and utilized.   91
sectoral reform that is currently under way, underlying the aspects of institutional change. The operational 
points pertinent to the provisions of the acts will be dealt with in the subsequent analysis of the main 
research project. Here, the provisions and procedures envisaged in the acts are described.   92
A. Andhra Pradesh Farmers’ Management of Irrigation Systems (APFMIS) Act 
Structure of Farmers’ Organization (Section 5, 6, 7 & 8) 
 
The primary level farmers’ organization is the Water Users’ Association (WUA). The structure of the 
farmers’ organization depends on the size of the irrigation system. In the case of minor irrigation system it 
will be a single-tier organization, in medium irrigation projects it will have two-tiers and major projects 
will have a three-tier. 
The WUA will form the basic structure of the organization. A group of WUAs, on a distributory 
or distributories will be federated to form a Distributory Committee (DC) which will be the second tier. 
These distributory committees will be federated to form the Project Committee (PC), i.e. the third tier. 
All the presidents of the WUAs, in the area of operation of DC will form its general body. The 
general body will elect a president and four members to form the managing committee of the DC. The 
presidents of the DC in the project will form general body of the project committee. This body will elect 
the president and the members for the managing committee. The tenure of each of these bodies is five 
years. 
 
Water Users Association (Section 3/4) 
 
The operational area of a WUA is delineated on a hydraulic basis, which has to be administratively 
viable. The delineation done provisionally is published in the villages concerned and after considering the 
feedback from the villagers, the boundaries of a WUA are finalized and notified. All the irrigators as per 
the village revenue records are members of the WUA with voting rights. Other water users are also 
members of the WUA without voting right. 
The area of a WUA is sub-divided into smaller units or territories, each called the Territorial 
Constituency (TC). The managing committee of a WUA will consist of a president and members elected 
from each of the TCs. The number of TCs varies from 4 to 10 (only even numbers). The individuals with 
voting right in each TC area will elect their representative on the managing committee of the WUA. In 
addition, all the members will elect a president for the WUA.  
Within the physical boundary of a WUA there are two categories of members who exist: all 
landholders and tenants as per revenue records are members with voting right, all other water users are 
members without voting rights. The Managing committee consists of the President and 4 to 10 members 
elected from each of the territory. The General body consists of all members in a WUA area, which 
includes both the voting members and non-voting members. 
 
Rights of Farmers’ Organization (Section 17,18 & 19 and Rule 5) 
To enable the farmers’ organization, achieve the envisaged objectives, the Act confers certain rights. 
They are: 
 
•   The major objective of a FO is to distribute water equitably among all its members. To realize this 
objective the Act has enabled the following rights:   93
-  Obtain information in time about water availability, opening/closing of main canal, periods of supply 
and quantity of supply from the concerned, and  
 
-  Receive water at the specified point as per agreed quota for distribution among the water users on 
terms of equity and social justice; 
 
•   Continuous flow of funds is an essential prerequisite for the sustainability of the FOs and to ensure 
this, the Act has provided for the following regular sources of income: 
 
-  Levy separate service charge or additional fees for maintenance of the system to meet management 
costs and any other expenses as approved by the general body; 
-  Utilize the bunds and other common land area along the system planting timer, fuel or fruit trees or 
grass for augmenting the income of the organization; 
-  Hire charges from land, building etc., belonging to the WUA; 
-  Share in the water tax, as fixed by government; 
-  Any contributions made by members or others; 
-  Special grants provided by government for any specific purposes and borrowing for any specific 
purpose; 
-  Sale of proceeds from any of the products from its areas like fish, grass, fruits etc. 
 
•   Obtaining optimum productivity per unit of water is a challenge for the FOs. To facilitate this, 
agricultural extension activities and the right to grow any crop within the allocated water have been 
provided in the Act. The activities include: 
 
-  Obtain the latest information for optimizing agriculture productivity and organize to procure inputs 
such as seeds, fertilizers and pesticides for use of its members; 
-  Freedom to grow any crop other than those expressly prohibited by a law and adjust crop areas within 
the total water allocated; 
-  Participate in planning and designing of micro-system. Suggest improvements/modifications in the 
layout of field channels and land development in the command; 
-  Plan and promote use of the groundwater and all other activities to optimize irrigation utilization. 
 
 
Responsibility of Farmers’ Organization (Section 17, 18 & 19, Rule 6) 
 
•   To ensure efficient utilization of water the FOs are responsible for the maintenance of the system, 
water distribution, crop planning, preventing wastage of water etc. They have to attend to the 
following: 
 
-  Carry out timely maintenance and repairs to the distributory system, including drains and other 
properties; 
-  Ensure measurement of water flows at head and obtain allocated quantity of water;   94
-  Prepare the schedules of water deliveries to different reaches in the system and communicate to 
the concerned with the approval of the general body; 
-  Organize supply of water to all members in the command area as per the schedules 
communicated; 
-  Preparation of crop plan to match water deliveries with crop requirements. Ensure use of water 
economically and judiciously and avoid misuse and wastage of water; 
-  Inspect water utilization by the farmers in the command; assess irrigated crop areas and crop 
yields; 
-  Take action for the misuse and wastage of water and tampering the irrigation network (as per the 
provision of the Act) by way of fines and collect the amounts; 
-  Educate farmers on adopting modern methods of field irrigation such as borders, furrows, graded 
bunds for improving water use, and educate farmers by organizing training on water management 
and related items; 
-  Assist in obtaining agricultural inputs for agricultural operation where feasible and needed; 
-  Improve the system for efficient and economical use of available/allocated water; 
-  Ensure transparency and accountability by involving the general body in its programs by 
regularly conducting the meetings; 
-  Organize social auditing and settle all the disputes among the members. 
 
Recall of Elected Members 
•   If an elected member or president acts contrary to the interest of the farmers’ organization the general 
body may take action to “recall” him as per section 10 of the Act and rules framed. 
 
-  Recall provides right to remove an elected member and can be applied only after at least one year 
of functioning; 
-  A notice signed by one-third members is required to be given and a general body meeting has to 
be convened within 7 days to approve recall motion by a simple majority and, 
-  Notification will be issued recalling the elected member by the district or state authority 
concerned. 
 
Functions of Managing Committee (Section 4(6), 6(5), 8 (5&3) and Rule 16) 
 
The elected body of the WUA/DC consisting of the president and other members form the Managing 
Committee (MC) of FO. This body (MC) takes care of day-to-day working and has the following 
functions: 
 
i.  Preparation and implementation: of operational plan for each season in its area of operation; kharif 
and rabi plans for various crops to be grown; budget and allocate resources for various activities; 
annual and long-term plans for repairs, maintenance, rehabilitation for development of the irrigation 
and drainage systems and to accord administrative sanction for taking up works as per availability of 
resources, on priority; 
 
ii.  Ensuring equitable distribution of water among various water users; evolving and implementing 
systems for regulation, control, monitoring and reporting of water use and land use; 
 
iii. Settlement of disputes amongst the members; providing developmental services to the members 
related to irrigation and agriculture and taking up training program for the members; 
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iv. Assisting the revenue, irrigation and agriculture departments in the preparation and maintenance of 
basic records and maintaining and operating a reserve fund; 
 
v.  Scrutinize the audit reports and rectify defects and report to the general body, and  establish a 
management information system and submit periodical report, as may be prescribed by the 
government. 
 
Constitution/Functions of Sub-committee (Section 11 and Rule 18) 
 
This Act provides for the formation of a sub-committee, whose the various tasks may be carried out 
effectively. The general body of a Farmers’ Organization may constitute sub-committees under section 11 
of the Act, to carry out specific functions. The convenor of a sub-committee shall be a member of the 
managing committee other than the chairman/president. In addition, there will be four members. In the 
case of a project committee the four members of the sub-committee will be selected from presidents of 
WUAs in that project. In the case of a distributory committee, the four members of the sub-committee 
shall be selected from the territorial constituencies of the WUAs in its jurisdiction. In a WUA, the 
members shall be drawn out from members with voting rights. It is proposed to have four sub-committees 
to deal with: finance and resources, works, water management, and monitoring-evaluation and training. 
Functions of the sub- committees are: 
 
i)  Finance and resource sub-committee: mobilize and collect resources; ensure collection of dues from 
members as levied under section (20) of the Act; recommend to the managing committee the use and 
deployment of resources and maintain records relating to financial matters. 
 
ii) Works sub-committee: recommend estimates of works for administrative approval; supervise works 
and ensure quality control and approve payments for the works. 
 
iii) Water management sub-committee: carry out decisions of the managing committee and general body 
on the water regulation, schedule of water release, organize patrolling of the canal, channels and 
regulate the use of water, check the irrigation and drainage system regularly, record the water 
deliveries, report to the managing committee any violations in the use of water, and maintain records 
of landowners and water users. 
 
iv) Monitoring-Evaluation and training sub-committee: identify training needs and organize training to 
the Water Users; educate in optimum use of water and monitor-specific items like area irrigated, 
productivity, disputes settlement and resources building. 
 
The sub-committees will meet as frequently as necessary and function under the general 
superintendence control and direction of the managing committee of the organization. The members of 
the managing committee in charge of the sub-committees will preside over the meetings and maintain a 
record of discussions and decisions. 
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Resources (Section 22 and Rule 25) 
 
The funds of the farmers’ organization shall comprise the following, namely: 
 
i)  grants received from the government as a share of the water tax collected in the area of operation of 
the farmers’ organization; 
 
ii) such other funds as may be granted by the state and central government for the development of the 
area of the operation; 
 
iii) resources raised from any financing agency for undertaking any economic development activities in 
its area of operation; 
 
iv) income from the properties and assets attached to the irrigation system within its area of operation; 
 
v) fees collected by farmers’ organization for the services rendered in better management of the 
irrigation system and 
 
vi) amounts received from any other sources. 
 
 
Social financial Audit of Farmers’ Organization (Section 17, 18 & 19 and Rule 20 & 26) 
 
It is essential to bring about transparency and accountability in the functioning of the FO; for this 
purpose, regular social and financial audit is to be organized. The audit so conducted will be made known 
to all the beneficiaries under the farmers’ organization, by way of displaying a list containing the benefits 
accrued with reference to funds spent, on the notice board of the office of each of the farmers’ 
organization. 
 
Formation of Farmers’ Organization (FO) 
 
The APFIMS Act aims “to provide for farmers participation in the management of irrigation system and 
for matters concerned therewith or incidental thereto”
3. The creation of WUAs as per the provisions of the 
Act and the initial support provided by the government for building up the capacities of the WUAs are 
discussed below: 
The operational area of a WUA under canal irrigation system is delineated on hydraulic basis, 
each to be served by a distinct segment of the system with a control structure or mechanism at its head for 
the supply of allocated quantity of water
4. In case of tanks, the entire command area under each tank is 
formed into a single WUA. 
The area of operation of a WUA is divided depending upon its size into 4-10 “territorial 
constituencies” (TCs), also on a hydrological basis with the objective of providing representation to all 
farmers in the WUA, as follows: 
                                                 
3 The APFMIS Act of 1997 and Rules, department of I&CAD, Government of AP 
4 Rule 3 (iii) issued in G.O. No. 45 dated 30.04.1997.   97
Territorial Constituencies  (TCs) 
 
Major and Medium Irrigation Projects 
Up to 1,000 ha.  4 TCs 
From 1,001 to 1,500 ha.  6 TCs 
From 1,501 to 2,000 ha.  8 TCs 
More than 2,000 ha.  10 TCs 
Minor Irrigation Projects 
Up to 200 ha. (500 Ac.)  4 TCs 
From 201 to 400 ha. (1,000 Ac.)  6 TCs 
From 401 to 600 ha. (1,500 Ac.)  8 TCs 





The organizational structure is determined according to the size of the system. 
•   - Single-tier system in minor schemes  :  WUA 
•   - Two-tier system in medium schemes  :  WUA & Distributory committee (DC) 
•   -Three-tier system in major schemes  :  WUA, DC & Project committee (PC) 
 
The president and TC members constitute the managing committee (MC) of the WUA. The MC is 
responsible for carrying out the day-to-day functions, as specified under the Act. The presidents of all the 
WUAs within a DC area constitute the DC’s general body and from this the MC is elected. In major 
projects, all the presidents of the DCs in the project area constitute the general body or the project 
committee. The PC will  also have a MC comprising chairman and up to nine members, responsible for 
functions at this level. Presidents of all PCs are finally to be federated into an Apex Committee at the state 





The water in a irrigation system is used by the community not only for raising crops but also for other 
purposes like washing clothes, drinking, cleaning of animals, rearing fish, brick-making etc., and each of 
the users are stakeholders in the system. Many of these economic activities are directly or indirectly 
related to water, and the question that arises is who should have a say in the management of the irrigation 
system when conflicting interests arise. For example, fishermen would like to reduce the water levels to 
enable them to harvest fish, which may be detrimental to the landholders who need the water to be stored 
for irrigation. 
The irrigation projects in AP, either canal systems or tanks
5, are essentially managed and operated 
by the irrigation department whose main focus is supplying water for irrigation to raise crops. This 
overriding purpose or function of the system is given priority in the formation of the managing committee 
for the WUA. 
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•   Members with voting rights: These are the members who have been registered as owners or tenants 
in the record of rights. In respect where both the owner and the tenant are landholders of the same 
land, the rights are given to the tenant. 
 
•   Other water users: All other water users are categorized as members with no voting right. These 
include any individual or body corporate or a society using water for domestic, power, non-domestic, 
commercial, industrial or any other purpose from a government or the corporation source of 




The government of AP decided to conduct elections to form WUAs under all the irrigation sources, which 
are managed by the department of irrigation and notified for 10,292 WUAs covering 89 canal irrigation 
systems, which included, 16 major irrigation projects, 73 medium irrigation projects and 8,315 tanks 
(which are categorized as minor irrigation sources). The canal irrigation systems cover around 75 percent 
of the total irrigated area in the state, with only 20 percent of the WUAs. This is mainly because the 
irrigated areas are contiguous while tanks which account for 80 percent of the WUAs are scattered all 
over the state, each with a small area. 
The election process was set in motion by appointing the Commissioner, Command Area 
Development (CAD) of the irrigation department, AP as the chief election officer of the state and the 
district collectors as the election officer in-charge of the district and 17
th June 1997 was notified for 
election. 
The process of election at the district level was organized in two stages. Stage one consisted of 
issuing a special notification for a WUA in the prescribed form, indicating the dates for filing 
nominations, withdrawals, date of election and counting. This was followed by publication of the final list 
of candidates contesting and allotment of symbols. The second stage was related to polling arrangements, 
publication of final list of polling stations, conducting voting, followed by counting and declaration of 
results. Each candidate contesting the election was required to deposit a sum of Rs. 200/- along with the 
nomination form. If a candidate does not poll, one-eighth of all the votes polled in that constituency and 
his deposit would be forfeited to the government. In the case of others, the deposit would be refunded. Of 
the notified 10,292 WUAs, elections were completed for 9,885 and in the balance 407, the elections could 
not be held either due to stay orders from the court or government or due to technical reasons like 
deficiencies in voters list, lack of nominations, death of candidates etc.
7 
 
                                                 
6Section 3 (4) of the APFMIS Act specifies the membership. 
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Support by the Government 
To encourage the farmers to come together, the government declared a payment of Rs. 50,000 as a special 
incentive grant to a WUA where all the members of the managing committee are elected unanimously. 
For the WUAs where there has been a contest, the government decided to give an advance of Rs. 30,000 
for meeting the immediate expenses, to be adjusted in the maintenance or any other grant to be provided 
to it later. Of the total WUAs formed, 53 percent were elected unanimously. In all, a sum of Rs.40.42 
lakhs was made available to the elected WUAs either an incentive grant or advance. 
The tenure of the WUA is for a period of three years as originally prescribed under section 4 (5) 
of the APFMIS Act. A convention of the presidents of all the WUAs was organized by the state 
government of AP during the middle of the second year of the tenure of the WUAs
8 to assess the working 
of these organizations and the facilities required for strengthening the WUAs. During this convention 
many of the presidents expressed that the 3-year term of the WUA is too short. As per their experience, 
the first year is more or less gone in understanding the various problems in different reaches and during 
the second year the necessary measures are initiated both for improving the system and in regulating 
water distribution. Many felt that the field activity needed to be observed and corrective steps have to be 
initiated based on experience and by that time the term of the WUAs will be practically coming to a close. 
An unanimous demand was made to increase the term of the WUA from 3 years to 5 years, so that the 
organization can accomplish meaningful results and the process of self-management can become an 
accepted norm in management of irrigation systems. This was agreed to by the Chief Minister of AP who 
participated in the deliberations. This acceptance as an amendment to the legislation and  brought about in 
November 1998
9 and the tenure was raised to 5 years. The tenure of the WUAs elected in June 1997 
would end by the middle of 2002. 
The distribution network in most of the irrigation systems had been in a bad condition because of 
poor maintenance. The normal grant is Rs. 40 per acre. From this, 85 percent was to meet the salaries of 
the field staff leaving very little for maintenance. 
During the years 1989-99 and 1999-2000, this procedure changed and an amount of Rs.100 per 
acre was made available for maintenance. These funds are made available to the WUAs at the field level, 
and distributory committee at the next level. The maintenance works are identified and works executed by 
the WUAs only. This pattern of maintenance brought about three changes. One, the WUA and farmers 
have a direct say in what to do and where to do the work. Since the WUA themselves executed the work, 
the overall quality of work is much better and lastly, there is economy in the expenditure, and money is 
used more productively. Above all, a sense of ownership of the irrigation system developed among the 
farmers and WUAs. 
With this maintenance irrigation water could flow to tail-end areas. The net result was that the 
overall net irrigated area increased by about a million acres. 
One of the important supportive facilities for the WUA made by the government of AP was to 
provide financial assistance for improving the system. For taking up a minimum rehabilitation of the 
                                                 
8 A state level convention of all WUA was organized in November 1998, at Hyderabad, in which all the presidents 
of WUA in the state attended. 
 
9 Bill No. 32 of 1998, dated 24.11.1998, was introduced in the AP State Legislative Assembly and approved.   100
system, considerable finances were made available in the first 3 years to all the WUAs
10. It was also 
stipulated by the government of AP, that the list of maintenance works proposed to be taken up will be 






Building up of proper environment for effective functioning of the farmers’ organization is a long drawn 
process since many of the deep-rooted procedures, norms, privileges, etc., need to be modified or 
changed. Irrigation management at the field level has concentrated the authority and money in a few 
hands with vested interests. Thus, the WUAs need to break it, which is possible only through building up 
their capacities. This has been one of the major thrust areas, to enable the WUA to attend to not only 
water management but also proper maintenance of the system, resolve disputes and ensure the 
sustainability of the WUAs. 
In fact, farmers in general, need to be exposed to their new roles of leadership and decision 
making. They need to be made aware of their rights and responsibilities and the need for transparency in 
the functioning of the president and the managing committee. 
A series of training programs have been organized both for the presidents of WUAs and irrigation 
and other concerned agencies within the district/project area. For each course, reading material in simple 
local language is developed and distributed in large numbers. In addition to the formal training programs, 
conventions and sadassus at district, regional and state level involving the farmers, officials and policy 
makers has been a novel feature in the capacity- building of the WUAs. These gatherings served as 
forums for discussing the issues and working out feasible rectifying measures and many GOs have been 




Various guidelines issued by the government of AP, aim to ensure transparency in all the works, effective 
utilization of the funds available and minimize any possible leakages in the utilization of funds. In spite of 
these, some of the presidents of the WUAs have misutilized and misappropriated the funds for personal 
benefits. The Commissioner-CAD has the necessary powers to remove any member or president of the 
WUA for misconduct and misappropriation of funds as per APFMIS Act, under section 41-A (vi). As of 
end September 2001, nineteen presidents have been removed by the Commissioner-CAD. In addition, 
three WUA presidents, one in each of the districts of Anantapur, Krishna and Mahabubnagar have been 
recalled by a member of the WUA as per section of 10 of the APFMIS Act
12. 
 
                                                 
10 The funds come under the APERP project supported by the World Bank. The amounts made available are: during 
1998-99 Rs.118.82 crores, 1999-2000 Rs.169.57 crores, 2000-2001 Rs.51.55 crores and 2001-2002 Rs.149.80 crores 
(Source: Commissioner, CAD office). 
11 Details & Guidelines were issued in G.O. No. 994 of Irrigation & CAD department dated 12.08.1997 and re-
iterated in order No.538 of I & CAD department dated 26.12.1997. These were again indicated in G.O. No.64 dated 
02.05.1998 
12 The information is gathered from the office of the Commissioner-CAD, Hyderabad.   101
 
 
B. Madhya Pradesh Sinchai Prabandhan Me Krishako Ki Bhagidari Adhiniyam, 1999 
MP was the second state in the country to enact the progressive Participation Irrigation Management Act 
(MP Sichai Prabandhan Me Krishako Ki Bhagidari Adhiniyam, (No 23 of 1999)). The Madya Pradesh 
State Legislature Assembly enacted this act  modeled on the APFIMS to foster participation of farmers in 
the management of the irrigation systems of which they are beneficiaries. Also called the MP 
Participatory Irrigation Management Act (PIM Act) it came into effect from September 1999. It is 
applicable to the entire State. The Act is in line with the National Water Policy that seeks to ensure 
participation of the beneficiary community in the management of water systems. Salient features of the 
Act are discussed below. 
 
Objectives of the Farmers' Organizations
13 
The objectives of the Farmers' Organizations (FO) as in the Act is to promote and secure distribution of 
water among its users, adequate maintenance of the irrigation system, efficient and economical utilization 
of water to optimize agriculture production, protect the environment and achieve ecological balance by 




Under the Act a three-tier structure consisting of Water Users' Association (WUA), the Distributory 
Committee (DC) and Project Committee (PC) has been created at the (major) system level. An Apex 
Committee with the Minister in Charge of the Water Resources Department as Chairperson has been 
created at the State level. Other members of the Apex Committee are Presidents of the PC, two members 
from NGOs and three officials (not below the rank of Chief Engineer) from the Water Resources and 
Agriculture Department. The FOs formed under the Act have to take over the irrigation management over 
a period of time. The farmer organization structure is discussed in greater detail when elaborating the 




The FOs can receive funds from grants and commissions from the State Government as a share of the tax 
collected in the area of operation. It can receive funds from other agencies including the central 
government, or as service charges from its members, or from the assets in its control, or any other source.  
 
                                                 
13 Source: MP Sichai Prabandhan Me Krishako Ki Bhagidari Adhiniyam – Chapter III # 16. 
14 Source: MP Sichai Prabandhan Me Krishako Ki Bhagidari Adhiniyam – Chapter II # 3,5,7,9 
15 Source: MP Sichai Prabandhan Me Krishako Ki Bhagidari Adhiniyam – Chapter IV # 22   102
Funds received by WUAs 
 
Since the formation of WUAs, in April 2000, the 1,470 WUAs received Rs.75 million at Rs.50 per 
hectare. in June 2000. In March 2001, the WUAs were given another installment of Rs.30 million at Rs. 
20 per hectare. In addition, all the 1,470 WUAs in the state were given Rs.5000 each, for administrative 
and other expenses.  
In the financial year 2001-2002, the WUAs were given Rs.90 million at Rs.60 per hectare for 
major projects, Rs.50 per hectare for medium projects and Rs.40 per hectare for minor projects. All the 
1,470 WUAs were given Rs.5000 each, for administrative and other overheads (Source: Vibhagiya 
Prashasanik Prativedan). 
 
Offences, penalties and appeals
16 
On a complaint by the Farmer's Organization, the Act has provision for penalties/fines (Rs.500-1,000) and 
even imprisonment (up to two years) for various offences. These offences could relate to damaging, 
altering, obstructing, enlarging the canal or interfering with the water flow, interfering in the authorized 
use of water, using water in an unauthorized manner, wasting water, etc. The Farmer's Organization can 
levy and collect the fines for the offences and no one can be penalized more than once for the same 
offence.  
Any dispute or difference arising from the constitution, management, powers or functions of a 
farmer's organization arising between members shall be determined by the Management Committee (MC) 
of the WUA. If between the MC and member, it would be referred to the  MC of the DC. Similarly, if 
between WUA and DC it will be referred to the MC of the PC and so on. If aggrieved with the decision, it 
can be appealed to the higher level of the FO. Every appeal has to be disposed within 15 days from the 
date of filing.  
 
Farmers' Organizations 
According to the PIM Act a three-tier structure consisting of the Water Users' Association (WUA), the 
Distributory Committee (DC) and Project Committee (PC) has been created at the system level. Each of 




The command area under each of the irrigation system is delineated on hydraulic basis
18 as a water users' 
area. This is further divided into four to ten territorial constituencies. Water User Associations (WUAs) 
are formed for each water users' area.  
                                                 
16 Source: MP Sichai Prabandhan Me Krishako Ki Bhagidari Adhiniyam – Chapter-V #23,24,25 
17 Ref: MP Sichai Prabandhan Me Krishako Ki Bhagidari Adhiniyam – Chapter II # 3,4. 
18 “Hydraulic basis” means the basis of identifying a viable irrigated area served by one or more hydraulic structures 
such as head works, distributories, minors, pipe outlets and the like   103
 
The WUA consists of all the water users who are land holders in the delineated area, and three ex-officio 
members viz. one of Amin cadre, one sub-engineer from the Water Resources Department to act as a 
coordinator between the department and the WUA, and the third from the Agriculture department to act 
as an advisor.  
The Managing Committee (MC) for each WUA consists of the President and one member from 
each of the territorial constituencies (TC) of the water users' area. The members of the WUA elect the 
President and the territorial committee members by direct secret ballot. If the MC does not have a woman 
member, one woman who is resident of the area is co-opted by the MC. Unless recalled, the tenure of the 
President and members of the MC is for five years. The MC exercises all powers of the WUA. 
 
Functions of the WUAs:
19 
Following are the functions of the WUA. 
 
•   Prepare and implement warabandi schedule (rotational distribution of water) as approved by the 
DC/PC. Regulate the use of water among the various pipe outlets according to the warabandi 
schedule and promote economy of water. 
 
•   Prepare a plan for maintenance of the irrigation system at the end of each crop season and carry out 
the maintenance of distributory systems, minors and field channels in its jurisdiction. 
 
•   Maintain register of landholders as published by the revenue department. Prepare and maintain an 
inventory of the irrigation system.  
 
•   Resolve disputes, if any, between members. 
 
•   Raise resources and carry out other organizational maintenance functions like maintaining records, 





Distributory Committees (DC) are the second tier of the farmers' organization. Government delineates an 
area consisting of one or more WUAs as area of operation of a DC. All the Presidents of the WUAs and 
two nominated members—the Assistant Engineer of the Water Resources Department, who would 
coordinate with the Department and an advisor from the Agriculture Department—are members of the 
DC and constitute the General Body.  
 
                                                 
19 Ref: MP Sichai Prabandhan Me Krishako Ki Bhagidari Adhiniyam – Chapter III # 17 
20 Ref: MP Sichai Prabandhan Me Krishako Ki Bhagidari Adhiniyam – Chapter II # 5, 6.   104
The General Body elects through secret ballot the Managing Committee consisting of a President and MC 
members (not more than five). If there is no woman in the MC then the MC co-opts a woman who is a 
resident of the area. The MC has a term of five years and exercises all powers on behalf of the DC.  
Constituents  
 
The DCs consist of all the Presidents of the WUAs in its command area and two nominated members; - 
the Assistant Engineer of the Water Resources Department and another person from the Agriculture 
Department are members of the DC and constitute the General Body. The General Body elects the 
Managing Committee consisting of a President and MC members through secret ballot. If there is no 
woman in the MC then the MC co-opts a woman who is a resident of the area. The MC has a term of five 
years and exercises all powers on behalf of the DC.  
 
Resources & functions 
The DCs are responsible for the maintenance of the distributories. The state government has allocated 
some funds as grants to the DCs. In some cases we see that the WUAs have pooled their funds for the 
repair of the distributory. In the Halali Project, the WUAs gave part of their funds to the DC for repair of 
the distributory since it was in a very bad shape and unless repaired the minors were starved of water. 
Judicious use of funds is one clear advantage we see after the formation of WUAs. In the earlier 
department-controlled system such transfers of funds across different allocations would not have been so 
easy and natural.  
In spite of the advantage of having a DC as we see above, DCs are yet to find some ongoing and 
regular agenda to work. Their roles have not yet emerged sharply. WUAs interact with the farmers 
directly and have a clear-cut agenda of responding to their problems, whereas, DCs' interactions are 




Entire command area of an irrigation project is the operational area of the Project Committee (PC). PCs 
consist of all the DC Presidents and two nominated members—Executive Engineer of the Water 
Resources Department for coordination, and Deputy Director from the Agriculture Department as an 
advisor. The PC Management Committee consisting of a President and members (maximum nine) are 
elected for five years through secret ballot and would co-opt a woman member who is resident of the area 
if none gets elected.   
Project Committees have not been constituted till now. As and when they are constituted they will 
have an important function of achieving overall development, efficient and distributive use of water. In 
the Harsi Project we found that the WUA and DC Presidents looked forward to the formation of the 
Project Committees very expectantly. They think that the real transfer of the irrigation systems as per the 
PIM Act will happen only after the constitution of the PCs. 
                                                 
21 Ref: MP Sichai Prabandhan Me Krishako Ki Bhagidari Adhiniyam – Chapter II # 7,9. 
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Functions of DC and PC
22 
The functions of the Distributory Committee and Project Committee are similar except that their 
jurisdictions are different—distributory and project, respectively. The main functions of these committees 
are as follows:  
 
•   Prepare an operational plan based on its entitlement area, soil, cropping pattern, etc. at the beginning 
of each irrigation season.  
 
•   Prepare a plan for the maintenance of both the distributories/canals in its area of operation and 
execute the works.  
 
•   Regulate water use among the WUAs/DCs. 
 
•   Resolve disputes, raise resources and carry out other organizational maintenance functions like 
maintaining records, accounts, audit, hold meetings, etc. 
 
                                                 
22 Ref: MP Sichai Prabandhan Me Krishako Ki Bhagidari Adhiniyam – Chapter III # 18, 19   106
2.4.  LOCAL-LEVEL FORMAL AND INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS FOR WATER 
SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION  
Water Rights  
Ever increasing water scarcity and competing demands on water on one side and burgeoning population 
and inefficiencies in water distribution on the other, have brought the issue of water rights to a sharp 
focus in India. The traditional laws relating to water resources and their use is being questioned. Several 
researchers argued that a different system of water rights has to be brought in place to remedy the ills 
plaguing the rational utilization of water. “These writers have, however, seldom fleshed out their 
proposals in any detail. Only Singh and following him Saleth devote some attention,” writes Rekhi 
(1992). He further writes that “Saleth has not taken the opportunity to work out the details of the 
implications of his postulates and have not thus really gone beyond in suggesting the principle of 
hegemonical state control of water resources”. Change in the legal system is necessary but, it has to be 
based on historical developments, values and calls for a whole hog change of laws uniformly in all the 
states. This has become very difficult in the current socio-political context of India.  
In India, usefruct right is the only right that is available in water in its natural state. All the 
irrigation acts reiterate the nature of the state’s rights in natural water. However, the state cannot 
arbitrarily exercise its power, though its right to regulate irrigation in natural waters is paramount and 
sovereign in character. All the laws came into existence by institutionalizing water rights in order to 
regulate and mitigate conflicts in its use. Informal and customary water rights evolved and developed in 
the country suiting the time and space. They have remained dynamic and changed according to the 
changing conditions. These rules and rights thus developed performed well even in a heterogeneous 
society as in  India with a local power structure and unequal access to means of production. 
The alien rule and later on the ‘welfare state’ usurped several of the rights in water resources 
which communities enjoyed and to a great extent changed the power relations. Rajagopal and Janakarajan 
(1992), detailed the traditional and customary water rights enjoyed by the farmers in Tamil Nadu; their 
disappearance and the recent attempts to revive them under the  Tamil Nadu Farmers’ Management of 
Irrigation Systems Act, 2000. Customary water rights were not given but we regained and acquired and 
were recognized by the Hindu laws and English laws. The traditional farmers’ institutions and their 
functioning traced by the authors were somewhat similar to all the south Indian systems where, the 
acquisition and management of water was undertaken by the local communities. Neerkathi system was 
common in Karnataka, AP and other states for distribution of irrigation. Repairs and maintenance of the 
systems was well-known. Starting from the 19
th century, the government through various government 
orders centralized the power in the hands of the irrigation bureaucracy. The case law from several court 
cases however show that courts by and large held customary rights valid making it difficult for the 
government to make comprehensive legislation on water. However, several special acts relating to 
irrigation were passed. Attempts to pass a comprehensive bill on water could not materialize even after 
independence (Rajagopal and Janakarajan). Starting with the AP legislation of handing over some rights 
to farmers in the management of irrigation systems, several state governments followed suit. Many of 
these recent legislations legalize water as the property of landowners only, excluding landless people who 
hitherto enjoyed customary rights in water.   107
During the Sixth Plan period the construction of field channels and completion of the construction 
of infrastructure below the outlets was given focused attention, and the works were executed by project 
authorities at top speed. All these efforts were to have made irrigation water available to each farmer’s 
field. But, for water to actually run into the field there are two pre-conditions to be fulfilled. The water 
must first be  available in sufficient and assured quantity at the outlet points, and the farmers should avail 
only their legitimate share of water so that the tail enders also get their due. The realization that 
construction of field channels alone was not sufficient to ensure delivery of water to all eligible farmers 
led to the conclusion that a system of water rotation was necessary along with the development of outlet 
commands to provide for equity and regularity in the supply of water. While looking for a suitable model 
of operation, attention turned to ‘warabandi’ as practiced in north Indian canal systems, and ‘shejpali’ in 
Maharashtra and Gujarat and other comparable systems in operation under large tanks in the southern 
states of India. 
However, among all the available rotational systems at the farm level, warabandi found wider 
appeal among the policy makers and the irrigation bureaucracy. The government of India in its plan 
documents insisted on speedy implementation of warabandi by the state governments. The Irrigation 
Manual holds that in order to limit supplies to individual fields to that which is required for optimum 
growth of crop and to enforce discipline and minimize unnecessary flows, warabandi should be 
introduced and implemented in all the irrigated areas (GoI 1985). Chambers writes that “…at high levels 
of government, warabandi had a life of its own as an article of faith, a standard solution, a universal 
panacea to be introduced and enforced,” (Chambers 1988). Today, none of the farm rotational systems 
operate satisfactorily as they are basically intended as institutional rationing devices formally 
administered by the irrigation bureaucracy. Experience showed that the rotational operations below the 
outlet were realized as a function of the operations of the irrigation system above the outlet level, and 
both have to be integrated (Hashim Ali 1983). Further, it is increasingly felt that farmers’ organizations 
alone can effectively implement warabandi program (GoI 1991). While warabandi was appreciated as an 
ideal model for water use efficiency, equity in distribution and utility for higher productivity (Malhotra 




Warabandi is an old method of rotational water supply practiced in northern and northwestern irrigation 
systems. The states of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan have adopted this system successfully. Farmers in 
these parts of the country accept this as a system of equitable distribution of water. Warabandi or 
‘osrabandi’ was evolved in the historical context of finding ways to avoid conflicts when individuals who 
could not get water started asserting their rights. It was first reported in the areas of the upper Ganga canal 
system, one of the oldest in the country, when farmers started to quarrel over water sharing (Singh 1980). 
The Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 1873, provides beneficiaries the right of distribution of water. 
In cases where the beneficiaries were unable to arrive at an agreement among themselves they could 
apply to the executive engineer of the irrigation department to enforce warabandi under the Act (Agarwal 
1980). Thus, essentially this system is in the nature of a bureaucratic intervention at the farm level.   108
 
Reidinger (1974), while discussing the rationing of the canal water of Bhakra at three levels 
described how warabandi-rationing at the lowest level (farm level) was implemented. Malhotra vividly 
described the warabandi system (1982). Some of the technical problems have been rectified since then 
and the warabandi is now operated with several adjustments in time duration for water flows and also 
uses semi-auto control devices. 
Before describing how warabandi is practiced it is necessary to explain how the required amount 
of water is made available through the main system to the outlet points down to the tail-end. The system 
of running canals is very flexible and is based on the principle of supply rather than demand. In other 
words, the supplies are made available as equitably as possible, irrespective of the fact whether it meets 
the demand of any particular farm holding. Efforts are made to estimate the farmer’s demands well in 
advance as to the quantity of water likely to be made available to the farmers’ as well as the dates of 
release by schedule of the running of canals. The schedule of operations is drawn generally in the first 
week of October every year, when the position of water levels in reservoirs is ascertained by the irrigation 
department with the help of data received from the meteorological department and from estimations of 
snow melting. While strict precautions are taken to adhere to the schedule prepared, the unforeseen 
shortfall in supplies if any is taken care of in distribution in such a manner that the impact is distributed 
evenly among all the individual farmlands.  
To distribute available water in various distributaries and minors the system is divided into three 
or four subgroups. Different canals are grouped in such a manner that the full supply discharge of canals 
in one group approximately equals the full supply discharge in other groups. Each subgroup of canals at 
the authorized full discharge are run in a rotation of eight days at a time. The advantage perceived in 
running the canals at full supply discharge lies in the possibility that all outlets in a minor up to its tail-
end will be drawing their full supplies without any gate at the head of the outlet. The regulation is 
attempted up to the head of the minor only, and outlets are not provided gates. In the design of the system 
gauging arrangements were in-built. To indicate that water has reached all fields the gauge at the tail 
cluster should show one-foot stage. The outlet types used in the distributary system are ‘semi module’, 
i.e., earthen, adjustable, proportionate module or open-flume type. Though the adjustments of outlets 
cannot be easily made, the skilled irrigation staff can always adjust them to ensure authorized shares. 
Cross-regulators are provided at every off-take point in the main canal, branch canals, distributaries and 
minors for distributing water by rotating the canals. Wireless systems are installed to expedite 
communications. Thus, the system can be said to have semi-automatic controls. 
The rotation plan in the main system is closely linked to the rotation of supplies below the outlet 
level. In the warabandi system, the turns of water allocation to the holdings within the outlet command 
are divided for supplies in a period of seven days, though the minor subsystem minor continuously run for 
eight days. The idea is to allow a day’s time for water to reach the tail-end outlets at full-supply levels. 
Turns of irrigation allocation to the individual holdings are decided from head reach to the tail end. 
During the 168 hours in a week water is allocated to the farm holdings of the entire culture command of 
the outlet, and in conformity to their respective sizes. The turns of water allocation to the fields generally 
start from Monday at 6 A.M. of a week to Monday 6 A.M. in the next week. This implies the necessity of 
night irrigation and vigilant watch of the field channel by the farmer availing the turn. However, from   109
year to year, the warabandi schedule is reshuffled by 12 hours to ensure that any one farmer is not put to 
the inconvenience of night irrigation year after year. 
The warabandi system as described here though seemingly excellent, is not devoid of problems. 
The system allows for allocation of water proportionate to the size of holding, based on supplies and 
irrespective of where the holding is located. It is estimated that about 40 percent of the water is lost due to 
seepage while in transit to the tail-end fields. Warabandi does not take this into account in its operation. 
Chambers points out to the lack of micro-level empirical evidence of any successful implementation of 
warabandi. His research shows that four pre-conditions are essential for implementation of warabandi and 
concludes that the rarity with which these four conditions could be met confirms the fact that very little 
warabandi could occur. The four pre-conditions mentioned by Chambers are: 
 
i.  identified land ownership for water allocation, timings and turns; 
ii.  existence of field channels to individual farm fields; 
iii. stable water scarcity and irrigation turns taken at night and; 
iv. constant flow at the outlet at predetermined flows. 
 
Warabandi was looked at as an administrative exercise to achieve physical targets. It is still considered to 
be so. Singh warned that though the objectives of getting additional area under irrigation and supplying a 
fixed quantity of water at planned time intervals was fine, the danger lies in forgetting the significance of 
warabandi as a human system having potential in bringing social discipline, group cooperation and social 
accountability (Singh 1980). However, the ‘blue print’ approach which is commonly amenable for 
bureaucratic action found wider acceptability with the government agencies at that time. The cardinal 
principle underlying warabandi is equity. The available water whatever its quantum is to be allocated to 
the farmers in equal proportion to their CCA, and not just some of the farmers, to meet their total demand 
(Malhotra et al. 1984). While doing so, the engineering and administrative solutions have to be blended 
with social engineering in achieving equitable distribution of water. Hence, the policy of the government 
was to encourage formation of water users’ associations at the outlet level to implement warabandi. 
 
Shejpali System 
The system of shejpali – another method of rotational water supply below the outlet of the irrigation 
system is extensively practiced in the Maharashtra state and parts of Gujarat. This system is considered as 
a demand-based water supply by the practitioners. This system must have had its origin in the institutional 
need to promote agricultural production in the newly irrigated regimes after large irrigation projects were 
constructed in the traditionally rainfed agricultural areas. The idea was to induce farmers to apply for 
irrigation and help utilization of the newly created resource. 
In this system farmers are notified by the irrigation department to make applications for water 
stating their requirements in terms of crops they intend to raise in the ensuing crop season. The irrigation 
officials collate the requirements, match them with the work out availability of water in the reservoir for 
the crop season, and sanction the allocations. In this process, the entire demand of the individual farmer 
may or may not be granted by the irrigation department. While granting allocations, the irrigation officials   110
also keep in mind the planned extent of areas for commercial and food crops in the irrigation command, 
in all the three crop seasons viz., kharif, rabi and summer. 
 
The supplies to the farmer’s fields in accordance with sanctions made is effected from tail end to 
the head reaches of the distribution network of a minor. In the project areas where shejpali is practiced, 
gated outlets normally exist so that the discharge can be varied to meet the fluctuating requirements in the 
area covered by a field channel from an individual outlet. The farmers draw water to their fields according 
to the sanctioned schedule. One interesting feature of shejpali is that for irrigating the individual fields 
time is not a constraining factor. The successive farmer in turn irrigates his land when his former 
completely irrigates his land during his turn. Thus, the system of shejpali differs from warabandi on the 
following: 
 
a)  The demand for irrigation is actually assessed from the farmers instead of basing it merely on 
assumptions; 
b) Sanctioned allocations are supposed to be given starting from the tail-end to the head reach, and; 
c)  Time duration is not fixed for completion of irrigation in individual farm lands when the turn comes. 
 
The third feature in the system more often creates problems in its implementation. Sometimes, the 
farmers tend to become lazy in drawing water in an optimal time, while on other occasions they accrue 
losses by engaging labor before hand anticipating their turn at a specific time. The system can be operated 
successfully in situations where there is no scarcity of water in the system and cent percent irrigation 
requirements can be met out of the reservoir. Any slight shortage caused due to any reason whatsoever, 
made the farmers at the head of the outlet to usurp the rights of those at the tail-end. As this system is 
practiced from tail-end to head-reaches, it makes the farmers at the head reaches cause breaches in the 
watercourses causing disruption to the supplies. Further, the operation of the system being outlet-wise, it 
gives tremendous power to the field staff, which in turn may lead to increased corruption. 
 
Thokwari and Chakwari Systems 
These are two forms of warabandi practiced in Uttar Pradesh. ‘Thok’ means a group and in thokwari 
system a group of farmers get irrigation to their agricultural lands according to a predetermined time 
schedule. The group may not be homogeneous in terms of caste composition or land holding size. Further, 
their land may not be contiguous and quite often may intertwine with the lands of other thoks. Thokdars 
(or  thok heads) are chosen by the groups based on the farmer’s acceptance and overall confidence 
commanded in the individual groups. Generally, persons known for their impartiality and integrity are 
chosen as thokdars. This system suffers from several defects. The water has to run up and down several 
time through the main channel resulting in wastage. The system is also susceptible to corrupt practices by 
the thokdar if he is dishonest, as the list specifying the time of irrigation for each member in the group is 
available and operated by the thokdar alone (Singh 1980). 
The word chak means an outlet command. The chakwari system in Uttar Pradesh was introduced 
in the areas where land consolidation is completed. Thus, it is of a relatively recent origin. However, in   111
most of the cases thokwari and chakwari systems co-exist. The operation of chakwari is similar to that of 





This is an extensively practiced traditional water supply method in irrigation systems, including the tanks 
in south India. This system has been practiced over generations. The word ‘vant’ connotes both ‘share’ 
and ‘turn’. The turns for irrigation of each farmer’s holding is decided and the full share of water 
proportionate to the full extent of holding is ensured in this system. Generally, the areas covered are those 
cultivating paddy or sugar cane crops; most of these irrigation systems are water abundant in nature. In 
the times of scarcity, the shortage is shared among farmers with a perfect understanding, by reducing the 
area to be irrigated. Under some tank irrigation systems when the water could not reach tail ends, the 
owners of these lands are compensated by the farmers who utilize the water. In yet some other systems, 
water is distributed only when it is sufficiently available in the tank. 
This is not a rigid system like warabandi where the turn and time are fixed, or like the shejpali 
where the farmers have to apply to the irrigation department in advance for irrigation during each season. 
It is flexible. Farmers can adjust turns among themselves by bipartite or tripartite agreements. Thus, 
specific fields and crops under water stress are provided with irrigation first if they are in the vicinity of 
their turns. 
This system calls for the backing of a tradition as is observed for example in the old irrigation 
systems of the Vijayanagar Channels (Sivamohan 1991) in south India, where one finds minimal number 
of water disputes compared to the adjacent Tungabhadra new irrigation canals network. In the vant 
system irrigation proceeds in a sequence, from one field to the other. This system has in it both the 
concepts of ‘turn’ and ‘share’. However, this is not explicit in the present management, wherever it is 
practiced. When the system becomes water-deficient several problems come to the surface. 
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2.5.  IRRIGATION FINANCING: WATER CHARGES AND COST RECOVERY 
With the objective of increasing food grains production the government, for several years, followed the 
policy of providing large subsidies to all inputs including irrigation. Though one of the essential 
requirements for according approval for the construction of an irrigation project was its financial viability, 
this was virtually overlooked in the interests of providing ‘protective irrigation’. As a result, the aspect of 
revenue generation of irrigation projects was completely neglected and the losses continued to accumulate 
over the years. In 1977-78, gross revenue from irrigation accounted for about a fifth of the estimated total 
cost (including full capital charges) of providing the irrigation. By 1993-94 the recovery rate further 
deteriorated. Losses on irrigation were are also responsible for the mounting fiscal deficits of the state. A 
study conducted by the CWC in 1992 showed that between 1974-75 and 1986-87 the average gross 
receipts from irrigation projects in 16 major states was Rs.12,184 lakhs which was around 52 percent of 
the total average working expenses of Rs. 23,375 lakhs, for maintaining irrigation infrastructure over the 
period (IRMED 2001). This study under-pinned the need for a critical review of water rates for meeting 
minimum requirements of covering annual O&M expenses, and a specified percentage of interest on 
capital invested from gross receipts of the irrigation projects. The 1987 National Water Policy, the 
national conference of states’ ministers’ of irrigation and water resources also endorsed this view. 
In 1992, the Planning Commission appointed a 17-member committee (GoI 1992) headed by 
Vaidyanathan to examine afresh the question of water rate revision. Endorsing the commonly held view 
that the revision should cover O&M costs and modest capital charge in the short run, the committee held 
the view that eventually it should cover recurring and capital costs fully. The committee further asserted 
that the fixation of rates should not be based on those expenditures incurred by the government (which are 
always on the high side due to inefficient management and ‘leakages’). They suggested that the cost 
revision should be based on season-specific area rates instead of the current practice of crop-specific area 
rates. This is expected to lead to volumetric pricing in the future (Vaidyanathan 1998). The Vaidyanathan 
committee on water pricing opined that given the poor state of government finance, the possibility of 
extending the benefits of irrigation to new and wider areas will be severely constrained if those who are 
benefiting from public investment in irrigation do not bear the cost of services they receive. So, the 
irrigation charges should be Rs. 50/hectare (basic levy) and working costs along one percent interest on 
capital expenditure (Khuspe and Sawant 1998).  
The prevailing fiscal conditions of the states would soon compel them to take steps to reduce 
irrigation losses and subsidies and will prepare the ground for imminent reforms. The World Bank (1999), 
felt that “inadequate financial flows (cost recovery) and lack of direct linkages between revenue and 
expenditure and between client and service agency are the root of all these problems”. Hence, it was 
suggested that a substantial increase of water be charged to cover O&M. The Water Users Associations 
(WUAs) that are created to collect the water charges (working along with the irrigation agency) have to 
maintain records and utilize the share in the collections as stipulated for O&M activities. The other 
recommendations for implementation were – i) improving collection rates ii) generating additional 
resources through commercial rates for bulk supplies to other users like municipalities, fisheries, 
industries, power plants etc., iii) introducing volumetric pricing in the place of existing area-based 
charging system, iv) improving cost-effectiveness of O&M, v) undertaking client-driven service   113
improvements and vi) establishing systems for price regulation, capacity building and transparent billing 
and cost monitoring. 
The World Bank emphasized that the setting for water charges should be removed from the 
‘political arena’ and an independent Water Tariff Board be established.  Water pricing is also gaining 
importance among the states as an effective measure of public policy for the effective use of water and 
sustainability. 
The IRMED (2001), in their study on impact of increasing irrigation charges on production costs 
found that: 
 
i)  The cost of cultivation, by and large, varied inversely with the size of the farm; larger farms had 
lower costs and smaller farms had higher costs. Apart from the economics of scale that operated, the 
small farmers in order to increase the output used proportionately larger doses of inputs. This could 
be further substantiated by the observation that per hectare yield of small farms was higher. 
ii)  Farmers from all categories were able to earn profit from irrigated agriculture for most of the 
selected crops. 
iii)  The quality of irrigation provided from surface irrigation is far from satisfactory in most cases. 
iv)  Increases in irrigation rates would not adversely affect the profit of even farmers having smaller 
holding sizes. 
 
The study while recommending the extent of increase in irrigation rates that are feasible in different 
states, stressed the need for developing standard annual O&M expenses of the projects to facilitate 
periodic review. Further, the study emphasized that assured water supply to the farmers by the agency in 
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Figure 2.5.1. Structure of the irrigation department – Andhra Pradesh. 
 
 
Structure of the Irrigation Department – Andhra Pradesh 
 
Minister 


















































































D.E.E  D.E.E D.E.E D.E.E
AE AE AE AE
























   115
Figure 2.5.2 Structure of the department of water resources – Madhya Pradesh. 
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PART  3 
Country Study- An Analysis for Strategic Interventions 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As explained in part one of the report, the overall goal of the study is to promote and catalyze equitable 
economic growth in rural areas through pro-poor irrigation interventions. The immediate objective is to 
determine what could realistically be done to improve the returns to poor farm households in the low-
productivity irrigated areas. The study focused on selected representative irrigation systems in Andhra 
Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh with a large number of people living under persistent poverty. The 
emphasis is on identifying and assessing a set of appropriate economic, financial, institutional and 
technical interventions at field and system levels, and changes in overall policy and institutional 
framework as far as they affect the poor’s access to water resources and their productivity levels. The 
study is based on primary data collected at the system and household levels, supplemented with secondary 
data wherever necessary. 
This part of the report provides details on selected study areas, data, analysis, results, findings and 
conclusions of the study. This part is divided into 7 sections. Section 1 presents details on study settings, 
data collection procedures, and characteristics of selected systems and sample households. Section 2 and 
3 provide analyses of poverty, including spatial dimensions of poverty, characteristics of the poor and key 
determinants of poverty in irrigated areas. Section 4 assesses the performance of selected irrigation 
systems and associated impacts on poverty. Section 5 identifies key constraints to enhancing crop 
productivity in the studied systems. Productivity and poverty impacts of recent institutional interventions 
are assessed in section 6. Based on the above, section 7 presents a detailed analysis of constraints and 
opportunities for reducing poverty in irrigated agriculture. The eighth or last section provides a summary 
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3.2.  STUDY SETTINGS AND DATA 
The research in India covers a  total of four major irrigation
23 systems, two located in Madhya Pradesh 
and two in Andhra Pradesh. This section provides an overview of the resources in the two states. 
 
Andhra Pradesh 
Andhra Pradesh with a population of about 72 million (Census, 2001) and a geographical area of 27.68 
million hectares, is the fifth largest state in the country. It is located in the tropical region between 13
0 N 
to 20
0 N and 77
0 E to 85
0 E. It is bounded by the states of Orissa and Madhya Pradesh in the North, 
Maharashtra and Karnataka in the West, Tamilnadu in the South and Bay of Bengal in the east with a 
coastline of 974 Kms. About 73 percent of the population live in rural areas. The labor force constitutes 
about 45 percent of the total population, and about 65 percent of it are engaged in agriculture. One of the 
more robust “stylized facts” about poverty in India is that agricultural laborers are highly represented 
among the poor (Lanjouw 2000).  Andhra Pradesh proves to be no exception.  The state comprises three 
regions namely: a) the erstwhile Nizam’s territory called Telengana (with 39% of the state population and 
42% of the geographical area), b) Coastal Andhra (with 43% population and 34% area), and c) 
Rayalaseema (with 18% population, and 24% area). Of the state’s geographical area, 47 percent (12.9 
mha) is under cultivation and the net area sown is about 11.04 mha (4.88 mha irrigated).  The dominant 
pattern of land ownership in Andhra Pradesh is small private farms with an average of 1.56 hectares per 
holding. Irrigated holdings have an average size of 0.88 hectares. About 30 percent of the state economy 
is contributed by agriculture.   
The State has vast water resources with three major rainfed rivers – Godavari, Krishna and Penna, 
and 37 other medium and minor basins draining the entire state. The total surface water available from 
these sources is 2,746 thousand million cubic feet (TMC). Ground water availability is 1,000 TMC. The 
ultimate potential that can be developed from all the surfaces is estimated to cover 9.5 mha (7.3 mha from 
surface water and 2.2 mha from ground water). By 1999-2000, the total irrigation potential created from 
all sources is estimated at 6.4 mha.  
The Krishna river, the second largest next to the Godavari river in South India, traverses through 
Mahaboobnagar, Nalgonda, Kurnool, Guntur and Krishna districts in Andhra Pradesh. It has 19 
tributaries, important among them being Tungabhadra, Bhima and Musi. The river originates in the 
Sahyadri range of the Western Ghats in Maharashtra and flows through Maharashtra, Karnataka and 
Andhra Pradesh for a length of 1,400 km before joining the Bay of Bengal. 
AP has 10 major irrigation projects (out of 16) completed in the state. Three of these projects are 
quite old (over a 100 years), around nine have been developed in the past 4 to 5 decades and the rest are 
in various stages of development. For this study, one project which is old and another project, which was 
constructed after the beginning of post-independence planned era in 1950, have been identified. The first 
one is the Krishna Delta project, which is about 150-years-old and the second is the Nagarjunasagar 
                                                 
23 In India, irrigation projects having cultivable command area (CCA) of more than ten thousand hectares are 
classified as major, less than two thousand hectares as minor and those ranging from 2,000 to 10,000 hectares as 
medium. 
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project – Left Command Area (NSLC), which is around 35-years-old. The first one (Krishna delta) is a 
diversion system with a barrage across the river. The second one Nagarjunasagar Project (NSP), has a 
reservoir with storage capacity of 7,058 McM or 200 TMC. It is constructed on the river Krishna. The 
NSP Dam has two main canals, one on the right flank and the other on the right side of the dam and 
covers a total command of 0.895 mha. 
Both the projects are on the Krishna river, which has a catchment area (basin) of 258,948 Sq.km 
extending in three (3) states as shown in table 3.2.1. 
 
Table 3.2.1. River flows - Krishna Basin.
24 
 





% Sq.  Km % 
 
Maharashtra 306  22  76252  29 
Karnataka 482  34  69425  27 
Andhra Pradesh  612  44  113271  44 
Total 1400  100  258948  100 
 
 
The total dependable water availability in the basin is assessed and this quantity is allocated to different 
states by a tribunal as follows (table 3.2.2). 
 
Table 3.2.2. Allocation of waters in Krishna Basin.
25 
 
Allocated Water  States 
McM   or  TMC  % 
Maharashtra 16000  565  27.4 
Karnataka 19700  695  33.8 
Andhra Pradesh  22660  800  38.8 
Total 58360  2060   
* McM – Million cubic meters, TMC- Thousand million cubic feet. 
 
The allocated quantity of water in the state of AP is apportioned among the various irrigation projects in 
the basin. The Krishna delta project has an allocation of 5,162 McM or 181 TMC and the NSLC has 
3,765 McM or 132 TMC.  
A major part of the state (around 75%) is covered with red soil with varying soil depth and clay 
content (Alfisols), mostly spread out in the entire state. These are generally undulating with low-fertility 
status. The black soil (Vertisols) occupies around 25 percent of the total area, mostly located in the 
northern part of the state and to some extent in the central portion. These areas are generally flat with 
medium to low-fertility status. The alluvial soils are mostly located in the delta areas of the major river, 
before their confluence into the sea, and extend over 10 percent of the state’s area. The balance 5 percent 
is occupied by sandy soil, laterites, and other mixed soils. 
The last five years have seen the state of Andhra Pradesh making rapid strides in its economic 
reforms. The irrigation sector has been positively influenced by institutional reforms largely focusing on: 
                                                 
24 Irrigation Commission (1972), Govt. of India, Volume –III, part 2, p-187/188. 
25 Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal Report ,1973.  121 
 
i) introduction of a suitable policy and legal framework;  ii) formation of water users' associations across 
all types of irrigation systems in the state;  iii) implementation of large-scale training programs for 
farmers and staff of the irrigation department; iv) bringing in significant financial reforms to influence 
quality performance of users’ organizations.  Today, the state is leading in its irrigation reforms in India 
(Raju 2000). Major steps are focused on institutional reforms towards irrigation management turnover all 
over the state. In this connection, the state has formed 10,292 water users associations and 174 
distributory committees.  
 
Madhya Pradesh 
Madhya Pradesh (MP) is located in the central region of India between 18° and 22° north latitude and 74° 
to 82° east longitude. Madhya Pradesh accounts for 7.8 percent of India’s population and 13.5 percent of 
the country’s geographical area. Madhya Pradesh is among the poorest states in the country with a per 
capita income of Rs. 4025 against the country average of Rs. 5530
26. The state has a literacy rate of 
around 45 percent 
27. MP has a geographical area of 44.5 million hectares out of which the gross sown 
area is 25 million hectares, while the net sown area is 19.8 million hectares. Only 5.2 million hectares is 
sown more than once  a year.
28 The state consists largely of a plateau with a mean average elevation of 
1,600 ft above sea -level. Madhya Pradesh has three principal varieties of black soil and mixed red soil
29. 
 
Medium black soil: Medium black soil covers about 20 districts in the south-western and parts of central 
Madhya Pradesh. Medium black soils are rich in humus and are conducive to growing wheat, cotton, 
groundnut and soyabean. 
 
Mixed red and black soil: Mixed red and black soil covers most parts of Bundelkhand region of north 
central Madhya Pradesh. It is light textured and is devoid of lime and free of carbonates. It supports a 
large variety of crops but needs irrigation. 
 
Deep black soil: Deep black soil covers a major part of the Narmada valley, especially the districts of 
Hoshangabad and Narsinghpur. It has a very high humus content and is very good for cotton, wheat and 
gram.  
 
Madhya Pradesh has a gross cultivated area of 25 million hectares, out of which the gross irrigated area is 
6.2 million hectares. Thus, the area irrigated is just over 24 percent. Out of the net cropped area of 19.8 
million hectares, the area under food crop is 17.5 million hectares, thus over 70 percent of the cultivated 
area is under food grains. This indicates the prevaling trend of agricultural practice in the state. The 
principal food crops are wheat and rice, gram and pulses. Mustard, cotton and sugarcane are other 
significant crops grown in the irrigated areas of the state. The state has eight major irrigation projects. 
Table 3.2.3 shows the details of the various sources of irrigation in AP and MP. 
 
                                                 
26 Source: MP Human Development Report, 1998. 
27 Source: Census of India Madhya Pradesh, 1991. 
28 Source: Agriculture Statistics, Directorate of Economics and Statistics (DES), Government of India. 
29 Source: Population Atlas of India, 1991  122 
 
Table 3.2.3  Sources of irrigation – AP & MP. 
 
Sources of irrigation (in ‘000 ha)  Name of the State 
Canals  Tanks  Tube wells  Other wells  Other sources  Total 
Andhra Pradesh  1595  723  828  944  188  4278 
Madhya Pradesh  1795  205  875  2394  760  6029 
 
Table 3.2.4 gives the productivity of principal crops in AP and MP in comparison with the national 
average. Rice and maize productivity is higher in AP, while wheat and gram productivity is higher in MP. 
 
Table 3.2.4. Productivity of principal crops (productivity per ha in kgs). 
 
Name of the crops  Andhra Pradesh  Madhya Pradesh  India 
Rice 2650  831  1900 
Wheat 670  1625  2470 
Maize 3258  1318  1721 
Gram 486  933  812 
Soyabean -  1149  1126 
Source: Statistical abstract of government of Andhra Pradesh 2000,  and department of Agricultural Statistics. 
 
In the Ninth Five-year Plan period (1997-2000), it was planned to invest a sum of Rs. 6,030.30 crores.  A 
budget provision of Rs. 2,092.89 crores was made for major, medium and minor irrigation projects for the 
year 2001-2002. 
The cost for the development of a canal system has increased form around Rs.10,000 per hectare 
in the early Sixties to around Rs. 50,000 by year 2000
30. The investments in MP for irrigation are not 
readily available. 
 
Table 3.2.5. Plan-wise outlays in AP – irrigation schemes (rupees in crores)  
                                                          
Plan  Canal system (major and medium 
irrigation projects) 
Tanks (minor 
irrigation Projects)  Total 
I - Plan (1951 - 56)  37.47  3.52  40.99 
II - Plan (1956 - 61)  57.43  4.38  61.81 
III - Plan (1961 - 66)  91.52  18.60  110.12 
3 Annual Plans (1966 - 69)  60.87  10.81  71.68 
IV - Plan (1969 - 74)  118.71  18.15  136.86 
V - Plan (1974 - 78)  269.11  38.82  307.93 
2 Annual Plans (1978 - 80)  257.69  23.79  281.48 
VI - Plan (1980 - 85)  729.59  50.73  780.32 
VII – Plan (1985 - 90)  1306.40  131.40  1437.80 
2 Annual Plans (1990 - 92)  616.67  121.16  737.83 
VIII - Plan (1992 - 97)  2754.35  431.56  3185.91 
1997 – 1998  662.77  121.57  784.34 
1992 – 1999  642.26  194.45  836.71 
1999 – 2000  962.99  170.61  1133.60 
Source: I&CAD Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, March 2001. 
                                                 
30 Interview with senior irrigation officials. 
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Figure 3.2.1: Irrigated area under major, medium and minor 



















Characteristics of Selected Systems 
 
Selected Systems in Andhra Pradesh 
 
The research study in India covers a total of four major irrigation
31 systems, two located in Andhra 
Pradesh, namely, the Nagarjuna Sagar Left Canal (NSLC) and the Krishna Delta (KD), and two in 
Madhya Pradesh namely, Halali and Harsi. The four systems are diverse in nature and put together, to a 
great measure, are representative of the irrigation systems in India. Characteristics of these systems are 
presented below. 
The NSLC, located on the river Krishna is served by a reservoir with a live storage of 200 TMC. 
The reservoir has a main canal on the right side with a command area of 453 thousand hectares, and 
another main canal on the left side with a command area of 357 thousand hectares. The latter one is called 
the Nagarjuna Sagar Left Canal (NSLC) project. The map of the NSLC project is given in Annexure 1. 
The NSLC is a contour canal and runs over a length of 298 Kms. The entire command area is 
divided into around 31 blocks, each served by a main distributary which takes off from the main canal 
based on local minor ridges. The extent of a block varies from 5,000 ha to 38,000 hectares.  
The Krishna Delta Project is located in the lower reaches of River Krishna, around 100 Kms 
upstream of the confluence of the river with the sea. The river water is diverted into the irrigation system 
by a barrage built across the river. A series of main canals emanate both on the left flank and the right 
flank. The command area on the left flank is 295 thousand hectares and on the right side it is around 231 
thousand hectares. The map of the KDS project is given in figure 3.2.2. 
                                                 
31 In India, irrigation projects having cultivable command area (CCA) of more than ten thousand ha. are classified as 
major, less than two thousand hectares as minor, and those ranging from 2,000 to 10,000 hectares as medium.  124 
 
To appreciate the causes for deprivation of irrigation water under major irrigation systems with a 
very widespread and intensive distribution network in Andhra Pradesh, it is necessary to look into three 
specific issues relating to the project formulation and development. They are: 
 
i)  The planning gap in designing of the system for providing irrigation, 
ii)  Delineation of areas for irrigation and for specified type of irrigation, and 
iii)  The operational procedures adopted for water regulation. 
 
Planning Gap 
The difference in the available water in the project and what is actually required to serve the entire 
command, determines the planning gap. The “Commission of Irrigation Utilization” of the government of 
AP in its report in 1982, examined the process of planning in detail and said that the planning gap occurs 
“due to adoption of over-optimistic and unrealistic duties, inadequate water allowance, under-estimation 
of seepage and other losses, over-estimation of dependable yields, etc.”. In the case of the Nagarjunasagar 
Left Command Area, the Commission estimated the planning gap as 38 percent, the water allocated for 
the project being 3,735 McM, while the requirement for the planned crops stands at 5,550 McM. 
 
Delineation of the Areas for Irrigation 
In the command under the NSLC, while delineating lands for the purpose of irrigation, certain areas were 
deleted, like areas near to the village up to about 400 meters, as anti-malarial zone and high spots. Some 
lands were left out as future inclusions. However, in practice,  once irrigation water started flowing, local 
farmers made their own channels to draw water into all these excluded areas. Even though, technically, 
their lands are not included in the command, they take water and this is called unauthorized irrigation. 
The net outcome of this practice is that the flows are reduced and designed flows never reach the lower 
half of the system. 
Operational Procedures 
There are no specific operational procedures, except at the macro-level, where each year before the start 
of the season a notification is issued by the government indicating the date of release of water into the 
main canal. The concerned chief engineer, after assessing the storage in the project and the inflows, 
submits a proposal suggesting the date for release of water and then the government issues the orders. At 
the meso and micro-levels, operational practices are on an ad hoc pattern, and obviously many extraneous 
factors come into play in this. 
 
The above three factors are very relevant in the NSLC area. 
 
In the Krishna Delta irrigation system, since it is at the end of the river system, the ground situation is 
quite different; essentially it is a “water-surplus system” and the entire area is covered with the rice crop 
in the first season (kharif). The only problem faced has been that the transplantation period gets delayed  125 
 
by 6 to 8 weeks, as one proceeds to the tail-end areas of the main distributories. In other words, this 
delayed planting has its effect on the crop yields and generally yields are lower by 300 to 500 kgs per 
acre, as compared to head-reach areas. 
 
Demographic and Socio-economics of the Systems 
The command area of the NSLC covers portions of three adjacent districts i.e., eastern part of the 
Nalgonda district, south, southeastern part of Khammam, and north, northeastern part of Krishna. 
The Krishna delta area extends in the central and south, southeastern parts of Krishna district and 
eastern part of Guntur district. A small extent in the northern part of Prakasam also gets irrigation under 
the delta. 
The overall demographic pattern in these commands is given in table 3.2.6. 
 




















2. Density  Sq.km  250  416 













5. Landholding  Pattern 
Landless 
Marginal- (<1.0 ha) 
Small- (1.0 to 2.0 ha) 
















Source: Compiled from the database / statistical abstract of AP 2000, Government of Andhra Pradesh. 
 
In the command area of the NSLC the red soil is the predominant type of soil and occupy around 72 
percent of the project area. Black soil is in the extent of 28 percent, mostly concentrated in the lower 
reaches of the central and eastern part of the command. However, the Krishna delta is predominantly 
alluvial, around 95 percent, with few patches of black soil spread out in the upper reaches of the 
command. 
The soil in the three reaches of the sample minors is mainly red soil (Alfisols), with a small batch 
of black soil in the lower reaches of the tail-end minor. In the Krishna area the soil in sample minors is all 
alluvial. 
Cropping Patterns  and Productivity 
Under irrigation sources the main crop during kharif season is rice. In the rabi season also, rice again 
forms the predominant crop with oil seeds (groundnut), and pulses (green gram and black gram). In the 
sample villages the same cropping pattern  is observed.  126 
 
 Average productivity of rice in the NSLC has been 2,748 kgs/ha. While in the Krishna delta it is 
5550 kgs/ha. 
 
Salient features of the selected systems are presented in table 3.2.7. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
Table 3.2.7.  Salient features of the selected irrigation systems. 
 
Sl Details  Units  Andhra  Pradesh  Madhya  Pradesh 
1.  Name of the irrigation system    Nagarjuna  Sagar  Left 
Canal – NSLC 
Krishna Delta 
System – KDS 
Halali Harsi 
2.  Nature of the Project    Reservoir   Delta  -  - 
3.  Year of construction    1955  1852  1973  1925 
4.  Year of commissioning    1967-68  -  1978  1935 
5.  Length of main canals  Km  298  20-92  3.24  70 
6.  Command area (designed)  ha.  397,000  526,000  37,500  68,000 
7.  Command area (actual)  ha.  397,000  526,000  37,000  68,000 
8. Irrigated  area  ha  246,000  508,000  23,500  41,500 
9. Average  Rainfall  Mm 750  900  1050  850 
10. Rural  Population    3,200,000  5,100,000  970,000  1,410,000 
11. %ofpopulationin agricultural 
sector 
% 78  72  80  70 
12. Average  farm  size  ha  3.03  1.31  2.9  2.1 
13. Soils    Sandy  Loams  with 















15. Cropping  intensity  %  80-90  160  135  85 





Reddla Repaka is one of the selected sample villages, which belongs to the Valigonda Mandal of 
Nalgonda district, and gives representation to the non-command area of the Nagarjuna Sagar Left Canal 
(NSLC). The selected non-command area village is about 80 kms away from the state headquarters, and is 
situated on the Medak to Chityal state highway. 
The geographical area of this village is about 8.8 square kilometres. According to the latest 
Census of India, 2001, the population of this village is around 16,600, and are living in 310 households. 
Of these, about 60 percent of households are agricultural and the  rest are dependent on non-agricultural 
activities for their livelihoods. The population, according to the caste groups prevalent, has indicated that 
shepherd, toddy tappers, and muslims are the major castes depending on agriculture for their survival.  
Among others, harijans are largely dependent on non-agricultural activities for their livelihood. 
A large extent of the crop cultivation in this village is brought under rainfed conditions.  As per 
the latest minor irrigation statistics, the village has a minor irrigation tank and about 150 bore wells in 
order to provide an assured water supply for crop cultivation,which mostly belongs to the toddy tapper 
community farmers.  127 
 
The availability of groundwater in this village is at 200 feet depth.  During a dry spell majority of 
the bore wells dry up, groundwater level falls down further and the discharges  come down from 3 to 1
1/2 
inches.  
Paddy is extensively cultivated under bore wells, mostly during first crop season.  Castor, cotton 
and jowar crops are cultivated under rainfed conditions. Following are the key features of the control site: 
 
•  Larger extent of crop-cultivated areas is under rainfed conditions. 
•  Availability of water resources are inadequate (one irrigation tank, and 150 agricultural bore wells) 
•  Groundwater table level is below 200 feet depth. 
•  The only surface water resource i.e., irrigation tank, is kept out of use in the past 10 years due to lack 
of inflows into the tank bed. 
•  Migration is a common feature in this village. During off-season period, agricultural households 
migrate to the nearby command area villages (Krishna Delta) and non-agricultural households 
migrate to the urban area (Hyderabad) in search of livelihood. 
•  For all the agricultural business activities, the farmers belonging to this village are forced to visit the 
mandal headquarters which is about 6 kms from the village. 
•  Agricultural extension services are poor. 
•  Daily wages paid to the men and women both for agricultural and non-agricultural activities are much 
below the prescribed minimum wages in the act. 
 
Gopavarapugudem is a non-command area village for the Krishna Delta system. The total population of 
the village is 1,650, of which 75 percent are farmers and the balance 25 percent are non-farmers. The 
literacy rate is 63 percent, majority (38%) of them educated up to primary level. 19 percent and 8 percent 
have studied up to matric and above matric, respectively. 
Majority (55%) of the landholdings are less than 1 acre, 37 percent are between 1 to 5 acres and 
the rest 8 percent are between 5 to 12.5 acres. About 77 percent of the farmers cultivate their own farms 
and the remaining 33 percent in addition to cultivating their own farms have leased in land at a fixed rent 
of Rs. 3000/- per acre per annum. 
Trends in landlessness increased during last ten years. About 35 percent of farmers become non-
farmers due to dependency on rainfed cultivation, high cost agricultural inputs and poor economic returns 
from crop cultivation. The non-farming activities taken up by these farmers are vegetable selling, dairy 
development activity and agricultural labor work in orchards. The average wage rates for males and 
females are Rs. 50/- and 30/- per day, respectively in both agriculture and non-agriculture. Around 50 
percent of the area is under orchards. The other crops are paddy (18%), vegetables (12%), groundnut 
(8%), red gram (7%), and guinea grass (5%). The major problem expressed by the farmers is delay in 
rainfall. Poverty analysis through PRAs suggests that 68 percent are poor, of which 40 percent are always 
poor, 28 percent are sometimes poor. Poverty is associated with inadequate water availability, poor crop 
returns and landlessness. 
A WUA is constituted in the village. Further probing revealed that the village actually falls in the 
tail-end of the command area. But it has not been receiving any water for the past 20 years. The WUA has 
received maintenance grant and spent it for improvement of the physical system. However, there is still 
no water supply in the main canal system, which has made the WUA dysfunctional for all practical 
purposes.  128 
 
It is perceived that an increase in the quantity of water (through construction of a Lift Irrigation 
Scheme) would reduce poverty, as agriculture households would have assured water and non-agriculture 
households can seek employment in agricultural operations and also initiate secondary economic 
activities. 
 
Selected Systems in Madhya Pradesh 
One of the selected systems is in the Gwalior district called the Harsi Irrigation System. The map in 
Annexure 3 shows the location of the Harsi dam in Gwalior district. Table 3.2.8 gives the details of 
agriculture and irrigation in the Gwalior district.  
 
 
Table 3.2.8. Area irrigated – Harsi system (hectares).       
 






Gwalior 290470  268792  137530  120163 
 
 
District Net  irrigated 
Area 
Sources of irrigation (ha) 
    Canal  Tube wells  Dug wells  Other 
sources 
Total 
Gwalior 120163  64642 3952  43355  8214  120163 
 
Table 3.2.9 shows the cropping pattern in the Harsi Irrigation System. 
 
Table 3.2.9. Cropping pattern – Harsi system. 
 
Crops Area  sown 
(hectares) 
% of Total sown 
area 
Rice 13632  4.69 
Jowar 16482  5.67 
Wheat 99731  34.33 
Gram 30050  10.35 
Sugarcane 3148  1.08 
Pulses 21704  7.47 
others   5917  2.04 
Total food crops  190664  65.64 
Mustard 79332  27.31 
Fodder 5762  1.98 
Other non food crops  14712  5.06 
Total non food crops  99806  34.36 
Total sown area  290470  100.00 
    
 
Area sown and area irrigated in the Harsi Command 
In the Harsi system, the gross command area is 68,000 hectares. out of which the irrigated command area 
is 53,000 hectares. The net sown area is 44,000-hectares. The broad cropping pattern in the command area  129 
 
is shown in table 3.2.10 (the area under different crops are approximate. The area under irrigation is the 
actual figures from the department of irrigation).  
 
Table. 3.2.10. Area under irrigation – Harsi command (ha). 
 
Crops  Area sown  Area irrigated (from canal) 
Kharif    
Rice 20,000 15,900 
Jowar   10,000         Nil 
Pulses    5,000         Nil 
Others    3,000        430 
Fodder    1,000         Nil 
Rabi    
Wheat 30,000  26610 
Gram     7500       850 
Sugarcane     2200     2200 
Mustard     2000   
Others       500       Nil 
 
The other system selected for the study is the Halali Irrigation System in the Vidisha district. The map in 
Annexure 4 shows the location of the Halali Dam in the Vidisha district. Most of the command area 
(close to 90%) falls in the Vidisha district. The remaining area falls in the Raisen district.  Table 3.2.11. 
gives the details of agriculture and irrigation in the Vidisha district. 
 
Table 3.2.11. Area irrigated – Halali system (ha). 
  




Net Irrigated area 
Vidisha 581133  523812 86562  86562 
    
 
Sources Of irrigation (ha)  District Net  irrigated 
area  Canals Tube 
wells 
Dug wells  Other 
sources  
Total 
Vidisha 86562 29324  8545  15329  33364  86562 
 
Table 3.2.12 shows the cropping pattern in the Halali Irrigation System. 
 
                        Table 3.2.12. Cropping Pattern – Halali system.   
 
Crops Area  sown 
(hectares) 
% of total sown 
area 
Rice 1129  0.19 
Jowar 28429  4.89 
Maize 7071  1.22 
Wheat 328176 56.47
Gram 137247  23.62 
Other pulses   64760  11.14 
Sugarcane       314  0.05 
others 84307  14.51 
Total food crops  482819  83.08 
Total non food crops     98314  16.92 
Total Sown area    581133   100 
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In the Halali command, the gross command area is 37,000 hectares, out of which the irrigated command 
area is 26,000 hectares. The net sown area is 26,000 hectares. (The area under different crops are 
approximate. The area under irrigation is the actual figures from the department of irrigation).  
 
Sample Selection 
A total of 938 households were sampled within the command areas of the four irrigation systems selected. 
In each irrigation system a head, middle and tail-end canal branch was chosen, along which 3 minimum 
villages were selected. Again, villages were selected according to their location on the canal branch, 
distinguishing villages in the head, middle and tail reaches.  Selection of villages in the four irrigation 
systems is shown in table 3.2.13. 
 
Table 3.2.13. Selection criteria of villages selected for study. 
 
  Head-end village   Middle-end village  Tail-end village 
Head-branch canal  Head branch, head village  Head-branch, middle 
village 
Head branch, tail village 
Middle-branch canal  Middle branch, head 
village 
Middle branch, middle 
village 
Middle branch, tail village 
Tail-branch canal  Tail branch, head village  Tail branch, middle village  Tail branch, tail village 
 
However, in Madhya Pradesh more number of villages were selected as the population size was 
not adequate (minimum 30 households on a circular random basis) in some of the villages selected. For 
control sites two villages each adjacent to the two irrigated commands were taken up for the study. 
The study areas in MP and AP come under a similar agro-climatic zone (semi-arid) of the country 
and with rivers fed by rain water. The irrigation projects selected were constructed at different points of 
time starting from early 19
th century to early 21
st century. The command areas of the irrigation projects 
vary from 526 thousand hectares to 37 thousand hectares each, in their extent. The soil and other physical 
and cultural factors vary within each command and as a whole are representative of a greater part of the 
country. Other major considerations that prompted our selection of these states are the existence of the 
PIM programs, receptivity of government decision makers and irrigation departments. 
Care was taken to involve the concerned government departments in selecting the projects and 
villages for the study. While the primary data at household level emanated from the household- level 
surveys, PRA exercises and in depth interviews, and secondary data was collected from official 
documents and published material. For selecting the sample of households the first step followed was 
collection of all households as published in the electoral rolls arranged in a serial order, and the total 
number in each village was divided by 30 and then households were selected through random sampling. 
For example, if the number of households in a village are 263, this is divided by 30. Thus, every ninth 
household was selected for interview. The questionnaire was pre-tested, administered to the head of the 
respective household. The survey data was coded and transferred to excel sheets to facilitate computer 
analysis. The detailed sample selection in AP and MP is as follows: 
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Sample Selection in AP 
Under the Nagarjuna Sagar Left Command (NSLC) command area, three distributaries were taken, first in 
the 1/3 length of the main canal (Block 6), the second in the middle length (Block 19), and the third one 
in the tail-end reach (Block 21/9). In the Krishna Delta System (KDS) also, a similar approach in the 
selection of distributaries was adopted on one of the long canals on the right flank (Bandar Canal). There 
are 66 distributaries in the NSLC command area and there are 13 distributaries in the KDS area. 
The selection of the villages and households along with the identified distributaries / blocks was 
done as follows: 
 
i)  Each of the distributary was divided once again into three equal zones—head, middle and the tail 
reaches. 
 
ii)  The head zone, in the first sample distributary, the middle zone in the second sample distributary 
and the tail zone in the third sample distributory constituted the study areas. 
 
iii)  In each zone, a long minor on the irrigation system was identified and villages falling within the 
area were marked. Among these villages, one in the head reach of the minor, one in the middle and 
one in the tail reach were selected for the study. Thus, three villages located on each of the sample 
distributary at head, middle and tail reaches – in all 9 villages in the command area – were identified 
for the study. Further, one village each, outside both the irrigation systems selected, were also 
surveyed for ‘control’ purpose.  132 
 
 
Table 3.2.14. Household sampling in irrigation systems in Andhra Pradesh. 
 
Distributary system  Villages  Name of the 
project 
Canal 
system/reach  Name of 
major 




A. COMMAND AREA 
HH 1.  Utlapally  33 
HM 2.  Kalvapally  33 
Head(H) Mulkalkalva 
HT 3.  Yadgarpally  34 
MH 4.  Bhanapuram  34 
MM 5.  Kamalapuram  33 
Middle(M) Mangapuram 
MT 6.  Naraspuram  33 
TH 7.  Kanchikacherala  34 




Tail (T)  Mullapadu 
TT 9.  Bathinapadu  33 
HH 10.  Prodduturu  26 
HM 11.  Konatanpadu  27 
Head (H)  Podduturu 
HT 12.  Kolavennu  27 
MH 13.  Kosuru  26 
MM 14.  V.Rudravanam  27 
Middle (M)  Bheemandi 
MT 15.  Ghantasala  27 
TH 16.  Kollapalem  26 
TM 17.  Paddarayudu  Tota  27 
Krishna Delta 
System (KDS) 
Tail (T)  Manager Codu 
TT 18.  Polavarm  27 
Total Command Area  540 
B. NON-COMMAND AREA 
NSLC 19.  Redla  Repaka  30 
KDS 20.  Gopavarapugudem  30 
Total Non-Command Area  60 
GRAND TOTAL  600 

















Figure 3.2.2. Schematic map showing the selected major and minor distributaries in the Krishna Delta System 
(KDS). 
Krishna River  
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Sample Selection in MP  
 
The sample selection was done in accordance with the methodology decided at the partner’s meeting in 
Hyderabad. At the meeting, it was decided that a total of eight villages and 240 households for household 
survey will be selected in each system. Two villages each, from head, middle, and tail respectively, will 
be selected. Two villages from outside the area were to be selected as control sites. There were some 
modifications made to incorporate local conditions. These are as follows: 
 
•   Instead of two villages, three villages each were selected from head, middle, and tail. This was done 
to ensure a larger diversity in the sample. 
•   One additional village was selected from the tail area to give a better representation to tail-end 
problems. 
•   Whenever a small village (less than 100 households) was selected, another adjacent village was 
selected, for better representation of the area.  
 
The total number of households selected remained around 240 in each system. The following 
section gives the details of the sample selection in each of the two systems. Total sample size for both 




In the Halali system the main canal divides into the LBC and the RBC. Another branch canal, Sahodara, 
also comes out from the LBC a little further downstream. The entire stretch was divided into three zones 
– head, middle, and tail. The division was done in the following manner. 
 
Head: Stretch of the main canal and LBC, RBC, and SBC till these divide into distributaries.  
Middle: Upper reaches of D1, D4 on SBC; D2, D3 on LBC; and D1, D2, and D3 on RBC.  
Tail: Lower reaches of all the distributaries. 
Three villages each were selected from each of the three zones. From the tail zone, an additional 
village was selected to understand the tail-end problems better. However, in each of the three zones, an 
additional village was selected at the time of doing the survey as one of the selected village in each of the 
zones turned out to be a very small village.  
The system is a funnel-shaped system. There are more villages in the tail than in the head. In view 
of the particular system characteristics, it was decided to take more tail villages, so that a better sample as 
well as understanding of the problems of the tail area is reached. 
Harsi System 
The main canal is a contour canal and all distributaries branch off from it (on the left side, if we face the 
dam). The main canal was divided into three stretches – head, middle, and tail. In terms of distributaries, 
the division into stretches is as shown below: 
Head: D1 to D3, only upper to middle portions of D3 
Middle: D4 to D10 
Tail: D11 to D17  
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The only exception to the above division was made for the tail villages of D3A. These were 
included in the middle reach. This was done as D3A is a very long distributory, 35 kms long and water 
availability at the tail is more like the conditions prevailing in the middle reaches.   
It was decided to select three villages each from head, middle, and tail. Twenty households were 
to be selected from each of these three villages, thus yielding a total sample size of 180 for the system. An 
additional village was selected from the tail reaches to give a higher representation to tail end and 
understand better the conditions prevalent there. The villages were selected at random from the list of 
villages. In head reaches, an additional village Lohri  was selected.  
 
Table 3.2.15. Sample size for selected systems in MP. 
 
  Halali Harsi Total 
  No. of 
villages 
Sample size  No. of 
villages 
Sample size  No. of 
villages 
Sample size 
Head  4 60 4 64 8  124 
Middle 4 69 3 65 7  134 
Tail  5 88 4 76 9  164 
Control  2 32 2 38 4 70 
Total       492 
 
Table 3.2.16. Household sampling in irrigation systems in Madhya Pradesh. 
 
System Village  Sample  Households  Location 
Halali 
1 Khejda  Sultan  21  190  Head 
2 Sayar  12  180  Head 
3 Billori  17  120  Head 
4 GhatKhedi  11  75  Head 
5 ChirKheda  26  255  Middle 
6 Kararia  21  210  Middle 
7 Kotra  14  140  Middle 
8 Nama  Khedi  8  75  Middle 
9 Neem  Kheda  22  155  Tail 
10 Paloh  19  105  Tail 
11 Gajar  10  55  Tail 
12 Haru  Khedi  19  105  Tail 
13 KheruaHaat  20  200  Tail 
14 Salaiya  (control)  20  235  Control 
15 Suakhedi  (control)  12  45  Control 
  Total 252   
Harsi 
1 Jaura  23  190  Head 
2 Kathod  11  60  Head 
3 Lodhi  10  54  Head 
4 Chireta  20  112  Head 
5 Jhadoli  23  260  Middle 
6 Ekhara  20  120  Middle 
7 Kishorgadh  22  145  Middle 
8 Khediparasar  17  91  Tail  
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9 Chetupada  21  130  Tail 
10 Ananth  Peth  15  48  Tail 
11 Nibi  20  140  Tail 
12 Bamrol  (control)  20  105  Control 
13 Saaketpura  (control)  18  18  Control 
  TOTAL 240    
 
The same questionnaire, as for the systems in AP, was used for data collection in MP systems with only 
minor modifications to the local conditions. The questionnaire was pre-tested and administered to the 




1.  The study is concerned only with irrigated areas served by the canal systems of major and medium 
irrigation projects. Thus, irrigated areas by tanks and other minor irrigation projects and ground water 
are not under the purview of the study. 
 
2.  Irrigation statistics at micro level like quantum of water supply (in MP), or quantum of irrigation 
revenue collected at village level (in AP), are not available. Hence, data analysis in some instances 
had to be resorted to at aggregated level only (system level).  
 
3.  Sophisticated methods like GIS maps were not used in selection of sites; thus direct relationship to 
water scarcity could not be established before hand. 
 
4.  Attention was not given to other factors (socio-cultural–caste), market embededness, etc., in the study 








3.3.  POVERTY IN IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE: SPATIAL DIMENSIONS 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part provides an overview of the socio-economic features 
of the selected systems and specific sites based on primary field-level data. The second part provides 
quantitative estimates of poverty in the selected systems, irrigation – poverty linkages, and spatial 
dimensions of poverty in the studied systems. 
3.3A. Socio-economic Features of the Selected Systems 
It is common sight to see more kutcha (not firm, thatched, mud walls and roofs etc.) houses more in 
control villages, where access to canal water is lacking, than in irrigated areas. Among the old irrigation 
project areas the number of pakka houses (concrete/tiled houses) are more compared to those areas of 
newly constructed irrigation projects. Table 3.3.1 shows the distribution of the type of houses in different 
irrigation projects. 
 
Table 3.3.1. Types of houses in different project areas. 
 
% of households  Canal 


























(* The figures in brackets are those of corresponding households in control villages) 
 
Average number of members of a household differ from one to another in the four different irrigation 
command areas studied. In the KDS area, while the average household size is 4 members, in the NSLC 
area it is 5. In MP, Halali has an average family size of 7 whereas in Harsi it is 8. Interestingly, the 
corresponding control villages did not show any variation in household size with those in the nearby 
command area. A simple inference that can be drawn here is regarding the levels of overall prosperity 
among different command areas studied. This is also indicated by the possession of household facilities 
like drinking water sources within the house premises, provision of electricity and toilets. Table 3.3.2 
shows the availability or otherwise of such amenities among household premises in different irrigation 
project areas.  
 138
Table 3.3.2. Facilities in housing premises in project areas. 
 
% of houses having facilities  Canal 

































                 (* The figures in brackets are those of corresponding households in control villages) 
 
In the following pages, four sets of tables are presented for the irrigated command studies to portray the 
socio-economic features of the study areas. The tables present a comparison of net landholdings, annual 
expenditure of household income from agriculture, non-agricultural activities and other variables among 
the households at head, middle and tail reaches. These irrigated areas are also compared with the control 
villages where there is no canal irrigation. 
 
Halali Command Area  
In the Halali irrigation command in MP, it can be observed table 3.3.3 that the average landholding size 
of the head and middle-reach households is about 2.18 hectares. whereas at tail ends it is 3.82 hectares. 
The table also shows that the income from the crops at head reach is less compared to the tail end. The 
reasons for this could be higher irrigation intensities and water logging at head reaches, unlike controlled 
water supply at tail ends, and also comparatively larger landholding sizes and hence higher incomes from 
crops. Further, the non-farm income is also high for the tail-end households. The average household 
expenditure of the tail-end households is also higher because of larger landholding sizes. In Halali 
command, the head of the household received four to five years of education on an average. The number 
of household members is 8 compared to the national average of 5.3. It is interesting to note that 
institutional credit available is more to the head-reach farmers compared to middle and tail-reach 
households. Since the total annual income is higher in the tail-end households and the family size is same 
in all the three categories of households in different reaches, the per capita income of the tail-end 
households is higher. 
The standard deviation and the co-efficient of variation for households in all the four categories 
presented in the tables explain the percentage variation among the sample size. This gives an idea as to 
how the variables are behaving in the head reach, middle and tail-end households. The data from the 
control villages do not throw up any significant difference from the households in irrigated command – 
especially in net land holding, annual expenditure, education of the respondent (family head) and family 
size. As expected, the crop income as well as the non-crop income in control villages is less compared to 
those in irrigated areas. The same trend is reflected in the per capita income of the households. However, 
the availability of credit, both institutional and non-institutional, is greater in control villages. This is due 










Unlike the Halali command area, the average landholding size of the farm households in Harsi command 
table 3.3.4 is larger in middle reaches, with correspondingly higher annual expenditure. However, the tail 
and head-reach households receive more income from sources other than crops. Non-institutional 
borrowing is more in all the reaches compared to the institutional credit in head and middle reaches, 
whereas the tail-end households seem to avail more institutional credit. The sample from the control 
villages shows that the land holding size of the households is more and yet, the annual income from crops 
as well as other sources is comparatively less. The value of durables in the households clearly shows an 
upward trend in irrigated areas compared to the control villages, with the highest values in head, middle 
and tail, in that order. In both Halali and Harsi commands, the head reach households enjoy more valuable 
durables. 
 
Table 3.3.4. Harsi System – Madhya Pradesh. 
 



















1.98  1.76 88.8  2.22  2.14 96.3  2.05  1.72 83.9  3.11  3.31 106.4 
Annual 
Expenditure 
27352  20833 76.1  28458  21315 74.9 26365  14311 54.3  22510  17185 76.3 
Respondent 
Education 
4.01  4.44 110.7  4.27  3.87 90.6  4.24  4.04 95.2  4.39  4.05 92.2 
Family Size  7.59  3.69 48.6  8.63  4.29 49.7  7.86  3.36 42.7  6.81  3.50 51.3 
Income from 
crop 
19470  21267 109.2  22607  23487 138.9  19313  20537 106.3  13581  16085 118.4 



















2.17  3.41 157.1 2.18  2.44 111.9  3.82  7.91 207.1  2.61  2.60 99.6 
Annual 
Expenditure 
23842.9  20942.5 87.8  25717.9  18640.7 72.4  27032.1  23930.9 88.5  24179  14211 58.8 
Respondent 
Education 
3.70  3.88 104.8 4.18  4.44 106.2  5.24  5.41 103.2  3.81  4.45 116.8 
Family Size 
7.36  3.732 51.1  7.46  3.77 50.5  7.77  5.46  70.2 
  7.56  3.04 40.2 
Income from 
crop 
15159.1  24431 161.1  16597.9  21337.9 128.5 24138.9  46950.2 194.5  11759.5  11098.9 94.4 
Non crop 
income 
9877.87  5228.87 52.9  11508  8771.05 76.2  12742.8  13825.1 108.5  9860.94  6252 63.4 
Value of 
durables 
61800.9  208088 336.7  122017  458245 315.5  69514.4  150830 216.9 168418  601982 78.3 
Credit from 
Institutions 




5124.59  10630.8 207.4  34562.3  24094.6 69.7  11356.7  28824.8 253.8  18515.6  70498.2 380.7 
Per capita 
income 









461016 330.6  65970  118034 178.9 83062  329487 396.7  14907  28819 193.3 
Credit from 
Institutions 
13237  51872 391.8  7953  11682 146.9  17615  61982 351.8  4494  12290 273.5 
Credit from 
noninstitutions 
42453  220517 519.4  15707  48888 311.2  20853  46244 221.7  10973  15264 139.1 
Per capita 
income 
4599  2824 61.4  4927  3542 71.9  4931  2966 60.1  3678  3015 81.9 
 
Nagarjuna Sagar Left Command 
 
The net average landholdings of households in NSLC in AP are less table 3.3.5 compared to the 
landholding sizes in MP irrigation commands. But the average annual expenditure is higher. This is 
mainly due to the inputs and farming costs. The education levels of the heads of households show a 
downward trend with about 3 years of education, on an average. Interestingly, all of the respondents from 
the control village are found to be illiterate. The average number of members in the households is 4. The 
income from agricultural crops is higher compared to the irrigated commands in MP. The average 
household crop income is higher at head and tail ends compared to middle reaches. The per capita income 
correspondingly shows higher values at head reach and tail ends. The value of durables in the households 
is almost the same in the middle reaches but a gradual decline is shown from head to tail ends, and more 
strikingly, in the control village. Borrowings of different households also show a similar trend. 
 

























1.14  2.75 241.2  0.75  1.41 188.0  0.97  1.91 196.9  0.56  1.05 187.5 
Annual 
Expenditure 
41723.4  63044.2 151.1 33812.9  32190.5 95.2  37157.1  34124.5 91.8 18966.8  18370.6 96.8 
Respondent 
Education 
3.80  4.41 116  3.47  4.31 124.2  3  4.09 136.3  Nil  Nil - 
Family Size  4.3  1.61 37.4  4.74  1.57 33.1  4.85  2.21 45.5  4.33  1.44 25.6 
Income 
from crop 
51866.9  161375 311.1 25158.6  43822.1 174.1 29896.1  72851.5 243.6  2092.79  4882.57 233.3 
Non-crop 
income 
19249.6  161375 838.3 18696  24031.4 128.5 13296.1  14425.7 108.5  18487.7  25036.5 135.4 
Value of 
durables 
32955.5  81936 248.6  7902.68  25379.9 321.1 13147.9  53275.7 405.2  1552  3594.31 231.5 
Credit from 
Institutions 




8202.97  15267 18.6 7474.75  11635.9 155.6 8010  10723.8 133.8  2800  5054.19 180.5 
Per capita 
income 
9214.48  12536 136.0  5637.1  4143.63 73.5  5845.41  9732.04 166.5  2701.89  5879.25 217.7  
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Krishna Delta System 
 
The Krishna Delta is the oldest of all the irrigated areas studied. The average landholding size (table 
3.3.6) in head and middle reaches is less than a hectare but the monetary value of the land is highest. In 
KDS the tail ends have more average land holding size (a little over a hectare) and the annual expenditure 
per house is higher. Likewise, the tail ends show higher annual expenditure followed by middle and head 
reach households. Because of the higher non-crop income in head reaches the per capita income is also 
higher. The average family size is lowest among all the systems studied, but the education level of the 
heads of the households show a poor trend. Except in the head reaches the dominant sources of 
borrowings are from institutional sources. 
Thus the four systems studied form a gradational continuum in all the indicators, starting highest 
from KDS followed by the NSLC, Harsi and Halali. 
 
Table 3.3.6. Krishna Delta System – Andhra Pradesh. 
 





















0.62  0.899 145  0.42  0.779 185.47  0.49  1.25 255.1  0.61  0.78 127.86 
Annual 
Expenditure 
33200.3  24740.3 74.51 27466.7  12631.5 45.98  32086.9  29237.1 91.11  28359.5  12429.5 43.82 
Respondent 
Education 
3.65  4.72 129.31  3.8  3.9 102.63  3.88  4.44 114.43  3.63  4.55 125.34 
Family Size  4.33  1.78 41.1  4.07  1.14 28 4.16  1.52 36.53  4.53  1.61 35.54 
Income 
from crop 
41775.6  76949.1 184.19  26742.9  64157.4 239.9  31447.8  78346.2 249.13 16723.2  21395.3 127.93 
Non-crop 
income 
22152.7  36424.4 164.42  14891.1  12413.9 83.36  17693.7  12928.3 73.06  14578.8  12955 88.86 
Value of 
durables 
8594.19  14836.6 172.62  4973.3  19073.6 383.51  5668.15  9326.08 164.53 2348.67  2275.86 96.89 
Credit from 
Institutions 




6141.03  11794.5 192.06  5962.98  8084.62 135.58  5074.07  8092.86 159.49 6766.67  8580.99 126.81 
Per capita 
income 
11441.9  19266.6 168.38  6978.27  6470.54 
 





Agricultural farming and labor constitute major employment for the rural population. The irrigated areas 
in MP seem to provide employment for non-agricultural, unskilled and skilled laborers and also for 
service employment and trade; the irrigated commands show preponderance of employment in farming 





   Table 3.3.7. Employment pattern in the four irrigation systems. 
 

































































3.3B.  POVERTY IN SELECTED SYSTEMS: LINKAGES AND SPATIAL 
DIMENSIONS 
This part focuses on the first two research hypotheses and elaborates on how poverty and irrigation are 
linked in the four systems selected. After defining poverty, we first analyze who the poor are and to what 
extent poverty and irrigation are related. Then, we further analyze how irrigation affects household 
income and how the location of households in the system affects poverty levels. Finally, we look at the 
distribution of benefits from irrigation, and the extent to which small, marginal and poor households 
receive benefits from irrigation.  
 
Definition of Poverty  
 
In our study poverty has been defined as income poverty, poor households being those households that 
earn less than Rs. 3,155 per capita per year (the officially defined poverty line in AP), or less than Rs.  
3,736 per capita per year (the official figure for MP). Different indicators of poverty have been used to 
measure income poverty (table 3.3.8). The head count index simply represents the number of households 
below the poverty line as a percentage of total households. The poverty gap is an indicator of the depth of 
poverty and measures the difference between household income and the poverty line; if households are 
just below the poverty line, this indicator will be rather small. Finally, the squared poverty gap gives extra 
weight to the poorest households. This indicator is thus a measure of the severity of poverty, a large 
squared poverty gap indicating that some households are very poor. 
 
Table 3.3.8.  Income poverty indicators for the four systems. 
 
  NSLC KDS Halali  Harsi 
 Command  Control  Command  Control  Command  Control  Command  Control 
Headcount (%)  33  63  16  23  73  75  62  71 
Poverty gap  0.11  0.23  0.04  0.07  0.44  0.25  0.30  0.22 
Squared PG  0.05  0.11  0.01  0.03  0.34  0.21  0.23  0.09 
 
The first impression is that poverty is much greater in MP than in AP. This is in accordance with the 
official poverty figures, which are much higher for MP. While in AP, only 11 percent of the population is 
below the poverty line, in MP 37 percent of the population is below the poverty line.  Poverty is higher in 
non-irrigated villages than it is in the command area of the selected irrigation systems. This is in 
accordance with our hypothesis that access to irrigation reduces poverty. Within the two states, poverty is 
markedly lower in KDS than in NSLC, and more in the Harsi irrigation system as compared with Halali. 
The reason for this will be an important focus for our analysis, but one explanation could be the period 
over which irrigation water has been available to households over time: KDS and Harsi were both 
established before NSLC and Halali, which seems to have triggered a broader development of the 
regional economy too.   
In general, the poverty figures for the four systems are rather high, (table 3.3.9) especially, when 




    Table 3.3.9.  Official poverty figures for Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh (%). 
 
AP MP   
1983-1984 1993-1994 1999-2000 1986-1987 1993-1994 1999-2000 
Rural 26.53 15.92 11.05  36.6  N.A  37.06 
Urban 36.30 38.33 26.63  37.2  N.A. 38.44 
     Source: Planning Commission, GOI(2002) – National Human Development Report. 
 
The explanation for these differences lies in the definition of poverty. The Indian government uses 
expenditure instead of income data. The rationale behind this is that households often understate their 
income. Expenditure data on the other hand have the disadvantage of underestimating poverty, as 
households often overstate the amount of money spent.  To be able to compare the poverty figures of 
systems studied with the official figures for AP and MP, we have also calculated poverty figures using 
expenditure data (table 3.3.10). The consumption of own farm production has been valued at market 
prices. Credit and debts have not been taken into account.    
 
Table 3.3.10. Expenditure poverty indicators for the four systems. 
 
  NSLC KDS  Halali Harsi 
  Command  Control Command  Control Command Control Command  Control 
Headcount 0.10  0.27 0.04  0  0.30  0.26 0.18  0.68 
Poverty  gap  0.03  0.05 0.008  0  0.22  0.21 0.20  0.22 
Squared  PG  0.01  0.01 0.003  0  0.09  0.08 0.08  0.09 
 
These numbers are obviously much more in accordance with the state poverty figures of the two states. 
While the figures for NSLC are largely in accordance with the state poverty figures (although the head 
reach is doing better), in KDS, the poverty figures are much lower. The figures for the control village of 
KDS are particularly low: the reason for this is that in this village large expenditures were made for 
marriages and other investments (Rs. 20,000 – Rs. 30,000). This also reveals the weakness of using 
expenditure data; if data cannot be corrected for credit taken and longer term investment, expenditure 
poverty will give a distorted picture of actual poverty levels.  
Although the use of income data to measure poverty levels clearly has its disadvantages, we will 
use income poverty as in the definition of the study this indicator was emphasized. The rationale behind 
this is that although income poverty might overestimate actual poverty levels, expenditure data will give 
an underestimate. In the end, the difference between income and expenditure poverty is mainly an issue of 
measurement; whether households spent less than Rs. 3,155 per capita or whether they earn less than Rs. 
3,155 per capita a year, in both cases the calories or goods they can purchase is not sufficient to sustain 
their livelihood. This is what poverty is all about, and although measured in different ways, the 










Table 3.3.11. Who are the poor in NSLC and KDS? 
 
NSLC KDS 
Poor  Non-poor  Poor  Non-poor  Indicator 












% of total households  18%  12%  31%  39%  12%  3%  49%  36% 
Average income per capita per 
year (Rs.) 
2202 1779  7892  10878  2514  1994  7011  14457 
Years of education  2.66  3.79  2.94  4.10  2.97  5.56  3.11  4.79 
Family  size  4.85 5.08  3.92  4.97 4.87  5.89  3.79  4.29 
 
Although landless households are more strongly represented among the poor than landholding 
households, surprisingly, among the poor, the poorest are those with land. As in both NSLC and KDS’ 
‘non-farm income is an important source of income. These results can be understood as follows: whereas 
landless households can spend all their time on off-farm employment, households with land can only 
spent some of their time. If conditions for agricultural production are poor, total income will consequently 
be lower. Family size of poor households is generally larger than that of non-poor households, and 
although some differences in education exist (in KDS the less educated seem to be better-off) the main 
difference is that between landless and landed households: on an average 1-2 years.  
For Madhya Pradesh the picture is different. Not only are most of the poor landless, among the 
poor, landless households are the poorest too. One reason for this could be that there are many fewer 
opportunities for off-farm employment in MP than in AP. Thus, the households that are landless have 
very few options apart from working as agricultural wage labor. Interestingly, in Harsi, which is double-
cropped, the average per capita income of the landless poor is 35 percent more than that in the Halali, and 
also, the income gap between the landless poor and the landed non-poor is much less than in Halali as can 
be seen in table 3.3.12 below. 
 
Table 3.3.12. Who are the poor in Halali and Harsi?  
. 
Halali Harsi 















% of total household  24%  48%  3%  26%  10%  45%  3%  42% 
Average income per 
capita per year (Rs) 
2,082 2,623  5,362 7,720  2,749  3,302  3,352  6,023 
Years of education  3.1  3.9  2.6  6.0  2.7  3.7  3.8  3.9 
Family  size  6.6 7.6  3.4 8.0  5.2  7.9  6.5  7.9 
 
The next question is what is the differences between poor and non-poor households’ landholding?  Do 
poor households on average own less land than non-poor households? Do they have less access to water 
(canal or groundwater)? Are there any differences with regard to farming skills? If so, this will help us 







Table 3.3.13 Poor vs non-poor land holding households in NSLC and KDS. 
 
NSLC KDS  Indicator 
Poor   Non-poor   Poor   Non-poor 
Net Produced Value per cultivated area (ha)  2,177  12,357  4,662  13,848 
Net Produced Value per household area (ha)  1,308  15,443  9,328  23,536 
Average land holding (ha)  1.32  2.18  0.63  1.38 
Average area cultivated (ha)  0.78  2.70  1.48  2.31 
Years of farming experience  14.9  18.7  10.6  13.4 
Income farm/total income (%)  44  90  90  90 
% households that received water for Kharif crop  32  66  100 80 
% households that received water for Rabi crop   11  15  33  17 
% households with access to groundwater  11  12  0  16 
 
Poverty in NSLC seems much to do with access to water: whereas, 66 percent of the non-poor 
households received water during the kharif season, of the poor households only 30 percent received 
water. Consequently, the cultivated area of poor households is less than one-quarter of the area cultivated 
by non-poor households and the net present value produced is lower as well. Water scarcity and  probably 
the scarcity of other inputs, has resulted in a situation where poor households in NSLC cultivate even less 
then the plot of land they own: on average only 60% of the land owned is cultivated, whereas non-poor 
households cultivate 125 percent of their land (double-cropping). The relatively high value per cultivated 
area for poor households in NSLC can be explained by the type of crops grown: many households grow 
non-cereal crops like chillies, grams and cotton, on small plots of land.   
In KDS, the story is different. Both poor and non-poor households receive water during kharif  
(poor households even more than non-poor households) and the income from farm income is similar for 
both categories. The productivity of poor households is much lower than that of non-poor households, 
non-poor households producing three times more output than the poor. Why is this the case the analysis 
does not show, even though water availability for both types of households is the same. Access to 
groundwater could be a factor, although, with good water availability during kharif, water scarcity does 
not seem to be the major constraint. The relative low number of poor households might play a role too: of 
the 11 poor households, 3 did not produce and 1 had negative production because of failed crops.  
Besides landholding, education and access to water, other factors play a role in determining 
poverty levels as well. Especially between villages in the NSLC irrigation system, the difference in 
poverty levels between villages was large. Although some of these differences could be explained by the 
location of the village in the irrigation system and other factors relating to land and water use, some of the 
differences were not so easily understood. In KDS, the variation between villages was less evident, but 
even here some villages were more poor than the other villages involved. The main factor explaining the 
different poverty levels was the importance of other income sources: of the two non-typical villages in 
KDS, in one village mandal headquarters was located and the other village constituted a relatively rich 
handicraft town. In NSLC, the village with exceptionally high poverty levels turned out to be a tribal 
village where palmistry was still an important source of income, while in the other non-typical village 
mandal headquarters was located and a relatively large number of people depended on trade and 
transportation for their livelihood.  
In both Harsi and Halali, lack of access to water seems to be an important reason for poverty. In 
the Halali system, the difference in average household income between the poor and non-poor households  
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is over 7 times, while in the Harsi system it is over 4.8 times. The reason why the difference is more in 
Halali is probably because it is mainly a single-cropped area, while in Harsi it is a double-cropped area, 
generating more opportunities for wage labor.  
 
Table 3.3.14. Poor vs non-poor landholding households in Halali  
 
Halali   Poor  Non-poor 
Average household income (in Rs.)  8,595  60,555 
Average landholding size (in ha)  0.83  6.16 
Years  of farming experience  12.5  17.6 
Income farm/total income (%)  38  86 
Household receiving water in Kharif (%)  Not Applicable  Not Applicable 
Household receiving water in Rabi( %)  45  72 
% households with access to groundwater  Not Applicable  Not Applicable 
 
In terms of access to irrigation, there was a considerable difference among the poor and the non-poor. In 
Halali system for instance in the rabi season, while 45 percent of the poor households received irrigation, 
72 percent of the non-poor households received irrigation. In Harsi, which is a double-cropped area, the 
difference between the poor and the non-poor households in terms of access to irrigation ranges from 20 
percent to 50 percent in rabi, and between 35 percent and 60 percent, in kharif. Access to irrigation is one 
of the most significant causes along with land holding for poverty.  
 
Table 3.3.15. Poor vs Non-poor landholding households in Harsi.  
 
Harsi Poor  Non  poor 
Average household income  10,533  50,782 
Average landholding size (in Ha)  1.22  2.76 
Income farm/total income (%)  59  88 
Household receiving water in Kharif  (%)  35  60 
Household receiving water in Rabi (%)  20  50 
% households with access to groundwater  38  33 
 
In terms of land holding, the difference between the poor households and the non-poor 
households is significant. Especially in Halali where while an average poor household owns 1.3 hectares 
of land an average non-poor household owns 6.4 hectares. In Harsi too the landholding of the average 
non-poor household is almost double that of the poor households. A large proportion of the poor 
household are either landless or have small land holding. In Halali, the data collected from the sample 
households suggests that while 33 percent of the poor households are landless, 44 percent are small 
marginal farmers. In Harsi, 10 percent of the poor households are landless and 55 percent are small 
marginal farmers. 
In addition to land holding and access to irrigation, a critical factor that affects poverty in MP is 
caste. With some exceptions, the lower caste people are the "poor" in the rural areas. These conditions 
have changed to a large extent in the urban areas, and in some states, in the rural areas too. However, 
these customs are still quite strong in rural MP and, more specifically, in the project sites visited as part of  
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the field study. In both the systems it was found that the poor households mostly belong to Scheduled 
Castes/ Tribes (SC/ST) and other castes that are considered low on the social hierarchy. They are either 
landless or have small landholdings. There are some exceptions, however.  
The proportion of SC/ST in poor households is higher than the other castes. Of the households 
surveyed in Halali, 60 percent of the poor households belong to either SC or ST. The proportion of upper 
caste poor household is 22 percent. In Harsi, 49 percent poor households belong to either SC or ST 
communities. The proportion of upper caste poor households is 16 percent.  
To understand the correlation between caste and poverty and landholding and poverty, a 
correlation coefficient was calculated using Karl Pearson’s formula and its significance tested. The 
summary is presented in the table below: 
 
Table 3.3.16. Correlation between different variables and poverty per capita (Halali). 
 
  Land Caste 
Correlation coefficient (r)  0.677  0.281 
True population coefficient (ρ) +0.58<  ρ <+0.75  +0.18< ρ <0.41 
Statistical significance  Yes  Yes 
 
Table 3.3.17. Correlation between different variables and poverty per capita (Harsi). 
 
  Land Caste 
Correlation coefficient (r)  0.664  0.401 
True population coefficient (ρ) +0.58<  ρ <+0.74  +0.28< ρ <+0.52 
Statistical significance  Yes  Yes 
 
Table 3.3.17 clearly brings out a significant correlation between poverty and landholding and poverty and 
caste in both the systems, although the coefficient values remain higher for landholding than for caste. 
 
Ground water Irrigation  
 
Access to irrigation water does not only depend on the functioning of the irrigation system, it depends on 
the availability of groundwater as well. Whereas in the Halali command area households have no access 
to groundwater irrigation, in the other three systems (supplemental) ground water irrigation is being used 
to a certain extent. In NSLC, groundwater availability is mainly confined to the head and middle reach of 
the command area, with on an average 15-20 percent of the households in the middle reach having access 
to groundwater irrigation. In KDS, groundwater irrigation is confined to the head and middle branch as 
well, with on an average 5-15 percent of the sampled households located on the head and middle branch 
having access to groundwater. In the command area of Harsi a much higher percentage of households has 
access to groundwater: 36 percent of households in the head reach, 14 percent of households in the middle 
reach and 32 percent of households in the tail use groundwater for (supplementary) irrigation. However, 
in most cases, the aquifers are shallow and the discharge is low. Although the focus of the study was not 
on groundwater, PRA data suggest that an average tube well irrigates only 3-4 hectares of land while an 
average dug well irrigates 2 hectares. This is the reason why despite having access to ground water, the 
actual irrigation with groundwater is not so significant.  
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Location of Villages in the Irrigation System 
 
The general assumption of the first research hypothesis is that head end villages receive more irrigation 
water than tail-end villages and thus, tail-end villages are expected to be poorer than head end villages. 
Defining head, middle and tail end villages by their geographical location in the irrigation scheme, head-
end villages are those village located at the head end of the different branch canals and tail-end villages 
are those which are located in the tail ends of the different irrigation canals. Besides, the different 
irrigation branches have been picked based on their location in the overall irrigation system as well (a 
head branch, middle and tail-end branch). The assumption behind this is that as head-end canals receive 
more water at an earlier point in time, villages located in the head branches of the irrigation system are 
expected to be better-off than villages located in tail end branches.  
 
Table 3.3.18. Distribution of poverty in NSLC and KDS.  
. 
  Head branch  Middle branch  Tail branch 
NSLC  
Head Count Ratio  0.21  0.34  0.40 
Poverty gap  0.06  0.11  0.19 
Squared poverty gap  0.03  0.05  0.13 
KDS  
Head Count Ratio  0.19  0.14  0.14 
Poverty gap  0.05  0.03  0.02 
Squared poverty gap  0.02  0.01  0.01 
 
Table 3.3.19. Distribution of poverty in Halali and Harsi. 
 
  Head branch  Middle branch  Tail branch 
Halali  
Head Count Ratio  0.73  0.68  0.77 
Poverty gap  0.45  0.35  0.71 
Squared poverty gap  0.33  0.25  0.64 
Harsi  
Head Count Ratio  0.62  0.46  0.65 
Poverty gap  0.38  0.27  0.35 
Squared poverty gap  0.37  0.18  0.26 
 
Villages located in parts of the system with sufficient access to water were less poor than villages located 
in the tail end of the system, a conclusion which seemed to show the first research hypothesis (‘Command 
areas of specific canal reaches receiving less irrigation water per ha have lower productivity and a higher 
incidence of poverty’) to be true. Although the specific location of villages did not seem to matter much 
(in the head, middle of tail reach of the specific branch canal), especially in the case of water scarcity the 
location of the branch canal in the total irrigation system proved important. For water scarce NSLC, 
poverty is higher in the tail as compared to the head branch. For KDS, the results are different, but as 
water is not scarce in KDS this does not change our conclusions with regard to the first research 
hypothesis. In fact, the higher poverty levels in the head branch of KDS are explained by the fact that less 
off-farm employment opportunities are available; as the percentage of landless households in the head 
branch of KDS is relatively high, lack of off-farm employment opportunities affects poverty more then 
water availability in this branch.    
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In MP, the first research hypothesis could be confirmed as well; poverty in the tail-end reaches 
being much higher then in the middle reaches because of lack of water availability. Higher figures in the 
head reach could be explained by different factors, among which is the over-use of water, resulting in 
lower productivity of certain crops.  
 
Agricultural Production and Irrigation Performance 
 
Although crop choice and cropping patterns in the two states differed, the general trend in the two states 
was the same: when water is securely available, farmers will plant water-intensive, high-value crops. 
Differences in crop choice and cropping patterns were directly reflected in farm income, although high -
value crops usually demand high-value inputs too. Actually, especially in MP, small farmers seemed less 
able to use the available water in an optimal way, as lack of access to credit and other services put a 
constraint on crop choice from the point of input costs. 
 
Table 3.3.20. Agricultural production and farm income in NSLC. 
 
NSLC Head  Middle  Tail 
Main crop (%)  Paddy  (100%)  Paddy (70%)  Cotton (35%) 
Cropping  intensity  1.47 0.66 0.94 
Productivity  (Kg/ha)  4,340 6,492 3,172 
Average net crop income (Rs./ha)  11,826  17,373  4,894 
Agricultural wages Rs./day  50  45  40 
 
Average crop income of landholding households actually gives a better picture of irrigation benefits than 
the net value produced per hectare; especially in the middle branch, farmers have started growing chillies 
on small plots of land, as the water available for paddy and other crops is not sufficient.  
 
Table 3.3.21. Agricultural production and farm income in KDS. 
 
KDS Head  Middle  Tail 
Main crop (%)  Paddy (45%)  Paddy (55%)  Paddy (80%) 
Cropping  intensity  1.07 1.31 1.43 
Productivity  (Kg/ha)  5,161 5,645 4,129 
Average net crop income (Rs./ha)  17,131  17,616  6,957 
Agricultural wages Rs./day  65  70  65 
 
 
Table 3.3.22. Agricultural production and farm income in Halali. 
 
Halali Head  Middle  Tail 




Local wheat (45%)  
Cropping  intensity  1.64 1.61 1.41 
Productivity (kgs. /ha/wheat)  1,008  900  740 
Average net farm income (Rs. /ha/year)  3,400   2,800  1,750 







Table 3.3.23.  Agricultural production and farm income in Harsi. 
 
Harsi Head  Middle  Tail 
Main crop (%)  Paddy (90%)  Paddy (60%)  Sorghum, Maize (80%) 
Cropping  intensity  1.78 1.56 1.56 
Productivity  (kgs/ha/paddy)  1,400 1,600 1,200 
Average net farm income (Rs. /ha/year)  4,600  5,300  3,300 
Agricultural wages Rs. /day  70  65  90 
 
From our analysis of the irrigation performance with regard to rural poverty in the four irrigation systems 
in Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, we can conclude that access to irrigation reduces poverty in a 
significant way. Overall, poverty in irrigated areas is lower than in rainfed areas. The main impact 
irrigation has on household income is through increased agricultural productivity, higher cropping 
intensity and the production of high-value crops.  
Distribution of benefits from irrigation 
In both Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, the second research hypothesis: ‘under existing conditions, 
small, marginal and poor farmers receive less benefits from irrigation than large and non-poor farmers,’ 
was more difficult to prove. However, in the water scarce irrigation systems a relationship between 
landholding size and access to irrigation seemed to exist.  
 
Table 3.3.24. Distribution of landholding size over the irrigation system. 
  
% of respondents  Category 
NSLC KDS  Halali  Harsi 
Landless 51  60  27  12 
Marginal farmers (0-1 ha)  23  22  20  26 
Small farmers (1-2 ha)  10  7  22  24 
Large farmers (2 ha and above)  16  11  31  38 
 
Size of landholding basically increases when moving from head to tail, together with the percentage of 
landlessness, which, especially in the tail-end of water scarce systems, is relatively high. Although this 
might indicate that small holders have actually received less benefits from irrigation and have been forced 
to leave their lands, in the short term the differences in income cannot be explained by landholding size 
alone. Clearly, marginal landholders in water-abundant systems are better-off than marginal landholders 
in water-scarce systems: the benefits that can be derived from a small plot of land with secure access to 
water are clearly higher than the benefits from lands with no water security.  
 
Table 3.3.25. Socio-economic indicators for marginal, small, large farmers in NSLC. 
 
NSLC  Marginal farmers  Small farmers   Large farmers 
Poverty levels (HCI (PG/ SGP))  32% (0.14/ 0.08)  26% (0.10/ 0.05)  17 % (0.08/ 0.05)
Net value produced per household area (rs/ha)  12,792 13,178  10,738
Net value produced per cultivated area (rs/ha)  13,334 11,911  12,724
Output per unit of Labor (Rs./days)  321.1 428.8  684.9
Family labor/total labor (%)  14.6 17.3  12.9
Income from farm prod/total income (%)  0.5 0.9  1.0 
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In NSLC, poverty and landholding size are related, the larger the landholding size, the lower the 
poverty levels. The direction of this relation is another question however, as is the extent to which small 
landholding have less access to the benefits of irrigation.  
From the productivity figures however, an important result follows from the difference between 
household and cultivated area for the different landholding sizes: Whereas marginal households have a 
higher productivity per cultivated area, large landowners have a higher productivity per household area. 
This, in fact, reflects the cropping intensity of agricultural productivity; large landowners apparently 
having more often a successful second crop than small and marginal landowners. Although, theoretically, 
this could be related to the availability of other agricultural inputs too, the most important factor for 
double-cropping is access to water. Thus, large farmers seem to have better access to irrigation water than 
small and marginal farmers, regardless of their location in the irrigation system. Irrigation benefits in 
NSLC thus, seem related to landholding size, large landowners having higher productivity per household 
area and because of more intensive cropping rates.  
The labor productivity of small and marginal farmers is lower than that of large farmers (< 2 ha) 
as well, but this can be explained by the higher percentage of family labor employed. Small farmers do 
have some other sources of income, but its less than marginal farmers (0-1 ha) who only get 50 percent of 
their income from farming.  The higher value produced per cultivated area is related to crop choice too: 
some of the small and marginal landowners to grow high-value, non-cereal crops like chillies, that have a 
high value per hectare, but are in effect grown only on very small plots of land. 
 
Table 3.3.26. Socio-economic indicators for marginal, small, large farmers in KDS. 
 
KDS  Marginal farmers  Small farmers  Large 
farmers 
Poverty levels (HCI (PG/SPG))  13% (0.05/0.03) 12% (2 HH only)  0
Net value produced per household area (Rs./ha)  11738 12375  14099
Net value produced per cultivated area (Rs./ha)  18374 22264  24319
Output per unit of Labour (Rs./days)  451.0 476.7  551.3
Family labor/total labor (%)  17.0 19.4  17.0
Income from farm prod/total income (%)  0.8 1.0  1.1
 
For the Krishna Delta, the picture that emerges is different: here, for all categories, net value produced per 
household area is larger than the value produced per cultivated area; all types of households on average 
produce more than one crop. Interestingly, marginal farmers are most productive, even with a lower 
output per unit of labor. Again, small farmers use relatively more labor, and even marginal farmers gain 
most of their income from agriculture. The fact that large farmers receive more then 100 percent of their 
income from agriculture reflects a measurement error, households probably having underestimated the 












Poor  Non- 
poor  Poor  Non- 
poor 
Average landholding size (in ha)  0.83  6.16  1.22  2.76 
Average household income (in Rs.)  5,547  41,957  7,872  30,507 
Farm income as a percentage of household income  33.0  77.0  39.0  59.0 
Labor income as a percentage of household income  50.6  11.8  31.3  6.9 
Other sources of income as a percentage of household income  11.4  2.2  9.7  5.6 
 
Other benefits recorded in Madhya Pradesh as related to the benefits from irrigation were that neither in 
the Halali nor Harsi system, significant outward migration has been reported. Comparison of investment 
in health and education for the command area as compared with the control area also give a picture of the 
benefits from irrigation: table 3.3.28 below shows that command areas have higher expenditure in both 
these vital social areas.  
 
Table 3.3.28. Average household expenditure on medicines and education in Halali and Harsi. 
 
  Halali Harsi 
  System Control  System  Control 
Medical 1673  1272  2094  2695 
Education 1703  1290  1878  579 





Although small landowners are generally poorer than larger landowners, this does not necessarily link 
their poverty to less access to the benefits of irrigation. However, in NSLC, landholding does seem to 
influence the access of farm households to irrigation water, as double-cropping is mainly confined to the 
larger landholdings.  Looking at the distribution of landholdings over the irrigation system, the size of 
landholding basically increases when moving from head to tail, together with the percentage of 
landlessness, which, especially in the tail end of water-scarce systems, is relatively high. Although this 
might be an indication of small holders having been forced to leave their lands as they did not receive 
sufficient irrigation water to make farming on these small plots economically feasible, in the short term, 
differences in income cannot be explained by landholding size alone. Clearly, marginal landholders in 
water-abundant systems are better-off than marginal landholders in water-scarce systems: the benefits that 
can be derived from a small plot of land with secure access to water are clearly higher then the benefits 
with no water security. Whether irrigation benefits are more linked to the size of landholding or the 
location of the village in the irrigation system, cannot be concluded from this analysis; what is known is 
only that in water-scarce systems location and land size do have an effect. 
Poverty is less intense and less widely spread in long established irrigated areas than in new ones. 
Halali is a relatively smaller system and only around 22-years-old. As a result, the difference in water 
availability between the head and the middle branch is minimal, and the differences in poverty levels 
between these branches are small. The Harsi system is bigger, older (75 years) and more degraded. In this  
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system, the head reaches get excess water (but unreliable), while the tail reaches hardly receives any 
water. In Andhra Pradesh, the age of the irrigation system also seems to play a role in the broader socio-
economic development of the region. Non-agricultural income opportunities were, for example, much 
better in the Krishna Delta Irrigation System, established 150 years ago, than in the Nagarjuna Sagar and 
in both Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh wages were higher in the established irrigation system than 
in the more recently established systems. The long-term effects of irrigation system performance on 
poverty levels might thus be broader than the effects through agricultural productivity alone. Although 
these effects have not been explicitly analyzed, their importance in explaining poverty has been felt.   
An important factor that affects both poor and marginal farmers unequally in all the four 
irrigation systems is the unreliability of irrigation water supply. Not only do study results indicate that 
larger farmers sometimes have access to alternative sources of irrigation, which small and marginal 
farmers do not, small landholdings without secure water are simply not economically feasible and without 
a reliable supply of water, marginal farmers often lose out and have to sell their land. Besides, secure 
access to water, allows farmers to grow higher value, water intensive crops (rice) and to have two crops a 
year. Households can thus derive a larger part of their income from agriculture, which proved an 





3.4.  DETERMINANTS OF POVERTY IN IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE 
For the four systems studied, estimates of poverty were presented in the previous chapter. In this chapter, 
we analyze key determinants of poverty, and test the significance of various factors influencing poverty, 




We model poverty as a function of demographic variables, crop productivity/income, non-crop and non-
farm income, landholdings, and availability/access to water. The specified models are estimated using 
Logit regression specification, with the dependent variable being a dichotomous variable of whether a 
household is poor or non-poor. The explanatory variables used are family size, education of household 
head, gross value of product per hectare, non-crop and no-farm income, value of household assets, and 
size of landholdings. Dummy variables are used to capture differential impact of availability and access to 
water on poverty. Locational differences within irrigation systems are estimated using locational 
dummies. The estimated coefficients indicate the significance of variables affecting the probability of 
households being poor. Negative sign on estimated coefficient of a variable indicates that that variable 
contributes to poverty alleviation. A number of Logit models are estimated. The first model, in addition to 
testing the significance of other than irrigation variables, tests whether differences in poverty across 
irrigated and non-irrigated areas are significant, and whether there are differences in poverty across 











log  = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP   
+ β6 VALA  + β7 DS + β8 DI + e .............................................................  (1) 
 
where: 
Poverty  Poor = 1; Non-poor = 0 (According to national poverty line) 
FSIZE Family  size 
EDU  Number of years at school 
AOWN  Area own (ha) 
GVPPHA  GVP per hectare (,000 Rs.) 
INNCRP  Non-crop income (,000 Rs.) 
VALA  Value of assets (,000 Rs.) 
DS  Dummy for System (NSLC = 1; KDS = 0) 
DI  Dummy for irrigation (Irrigated = 1; Non-irrigated = 0) 
e Error  term 
  
The results of the analysis are presented in table 3.4.1. Coefficients of all the specified variables carry 
expected signs and are significant (except for education variable). Coefficient of family size has a positive 
sign and is significant, indicating that the greater the number of family members, the higher is the 
probability of that household remaining poor, compared to a household with smaller number of family 
members. Coefficient of education variable, though negative, is not significant. Coefficients for 
landholding size, crop productivity, non-crop income and non-land assets, all carry a negative sign and 
are significant, indicating that these variables have a significant influence on household poverty. The 
higher the value of these variables, the lower is the incidence of poverty. Negative marginal effect on the  
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probability of a household being poor is highest for gross value of production variable. Negative 
significant coefficient on area dummy indicates that there are significant differences in incidence of 
poverty in irrigation systems and adjoining rainfed areas. Poverty incidence is significantly less in 
irrigation systems than in rainfed areas, suggesting that irrigation has a  significant impact on poverty 
alleviation. Positive significant coefficient for system dummy indicate that there are differences in 
incidence of poverty across KDS and NSLC, with poverty significantly higher in water-short NSLC 
system than in water-adequate KDS system. 
 
Table 3.4.1.  Effect of irrigation on poverty in two systems (irrigated compared with non-irrigated in both 
systems). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant -0.7947  -0.1535  -1.991 
FSIZE 0.2723  0.0561  4.529 
EDU -0.0005  -0.0001  -0.364 
AOWN -0.1035  -0.0199  -1.170 
GVPPHA   -0.0293  -0.0057  -4.673 
INNCRP -0.0223  -0.0043  -5.014 
VALA -0.0042  -0.0008  -1.277 
DS 0.8452  0.1633  4.138 
DI -1.1356  -0.2194  -3.675 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations    =  600 
Log likelihood ratio    =  -319.16 
Base categories      =  KDS system, Rainfed 
 
Next, we test whether differences in poverty incidence across head, middle and tail reaches of the 
irrigation systems and rainfed areas are significant. The specified model with head, middle and tail-












log = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP   
+ β6 VALA  + β7 DS  + β8 DLH  + β9 DLM  + β10 DLT + e .................... (2) 
 
where all variables are defined as above and  
 
DS  Dummy for System (NSLC = 1; KDS = 0) 
DLH  Dummy for location Head (DLH = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLM  Dummy for location Middle (DLM = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLT  Dummy for location Tail (DLT = 1; 0 otherwise) 
e Error  term 
 
The results of the estimated equation 2 are presented in table 3.4.2. Signs and significance of all other 
than locational dummies are similar as for equation 1. Coefficients of the three dummy variables are 
negative and significant. These indicate that poverty incidence at head, middle and tail reaches is 
significantly less as compared to that in rainfed areas. Although, negative marginal effect on probability  
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of a household being poor varies across head, middle and tail reaches, the results suggest that irrigation 
has a significant impact on poverty when compared with rainfed areas.  
 
Table 3.4.2.  Effect of irrigation on poverty in two systems (head, middle and tail of both systems 
compared with non-irrigated). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant -0.7908  -0.1520  -1.975 
FSIZE 0.2699  0.0519  4.455 
EDU -0.0006  -0.0001  -0.461 
AOWN -0.1111  -0.0214  -1.241 
GVPPHA   -0.0286  -0.0055  -4.545 
INNCRP -0.0228  -0.0044  -5.076 
VALA -0.0040  -0.0008  -1.251 
DS 0.8688  0.1669  4.231 
DLH -1.1697  -0.2248  -3.418 
DLM -1.4142  -0.2718  -3.050 
DLT -0.8842  -0.1699  -2.624 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations  =  600 
Log likelihood ratio  =  -316.92 
Base categories    =  KDS system, Rainfed 
 
Further, we test whether differences in poverty incidence across head, middle and tail reaches within a 
system are significant. This has an important implication for equity in water distribution. The specified 
model with head and middle dummies (with tail as a base category) is specified as follows:  










log = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP   
 + β6 VALA  + β7 β7 DS  + β8 DLH  + β9 DLM  + e   .................................... (3) 
 
where all variables are defined as above and 
 
DLH  Dummy for location Head (DLH = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLM  Dummy for location Middle (DLM = 1; 0 otherwise) 
e Error  term 
 
The results of estimated equation 3 are presented in table 3.4.3. Signs and significance of all other than 
locational dummies are similar as for equation 1 and 2 above. Coefficients of head and middle location 
dummies carry negative signs, indicating less incidence of poverty at head and middle location compared 
to tail locations. Significant negative coefficient of middle location dummy indicates that a negative 
marginal effect on the probability of a household being poor at middle location is significant. However, 
coefficient of head location dummy indicates that this effect is not significant for households at head 
location when compared to tail location. The results imply that poverty incidence is significantly less at 
middle reaches where productivity is high. While poverty is higher at tail reaches, difference in poverty 
across head and tail reaches is not significant. Contrary to common perceptions, poverty is not necessarily 
lower at locations closer to the source of water (i.e. head reaches).   
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Table 3.4.3.  Effect of irrigation on poverty in two systems (head and middle of both systems compared 
with tail). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant -1.6436  -0.2954  -4.766 
FSIZE 0.2981  0.0536  4.564 
EDU -0.0008  -0.0002  -0.608 
AOWN -0.1604  -0.0288  -1.232 
GVPPHA   -0.0289  -0.0052  -3.927 
INNCRP -0.0223  -0.0040  -5.042 
VALA -0.0117  -0.0021  -1.951 
DS 0.6996  0.1257  8.178 
DLH -0.2337  -0.0419  -0.929 
DLM -0.5022  -0.0903  -1.990 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations  =  540 
Log likelihood ratio    =  -279.91 
Base categories    =  KDS system, Tail 
 
We gain further insights by estimating equations for each system separately. Specified equations and 
estimation results are presented in the Appendix-1 of this chapter (tables A1-A6). Results from 
disaggregated analysis further indicate that though poverty incidence is lower in irrigated areas compared 
to rainfed areas in both systems, the difference is significant and stronger in NSLC than in the KDS 
system. Similarly, differences in poverty incidence across reaches (head, middle and tail) and rainfed 
areas are significant and more pronounced for NSLC than for KDS. Comparison of poverty across 
reaches in individual systems indicates that poverty in NSLC is significantly low at both head and middle 
locations compared to tail location. In KDS, while poverty is significantly lower at middle location, 







As for Andhra Pradesh, we estimated the same equation separately for Madhya Pradesh. The results of the 
analysis are presented in table 3.4.4. Coefficients of all the specified variables carry expected signs and 
are significant (except for education variable). Coefficient of family size has a positive sign and is 
significant, indicating that the greater the number of family members, the higher is the probability of that 
household remaining poor compared to a household with smaller number of family members. Coefficients 
for landholding size, crop productivity, non-crop income and non-land assts, all carry a negative sign and 
are significant, indicating that these variables have significant influence on household poverty. The higher 
the value of these variables, the lower is the incidence of poverty. Negative marginal effect on the 
probability of a household being poor is highest for a  non-crop income variable. Negative significant 
coefficient on area dummy indicates that there are significant differences in incidence of poverty in 
irrigation systems and adjoining rainfed areas. Poverty incidence is significantly less in irrigation systems 
than in rainfed areas, suggesting that irrigation has a significant impact on poverty alleviation. Positive 
significant coefficient for system dummy indicates that there are differences in incidence of poverty 











log  = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP   
   + β6 VALA  + β7 DS + β8 DI + e .............................................................  (4) 
 
where: 
Poverty  Poor = 1; Non-poor = 0 (According to national poverty line) 
FSIZE Family  size 
EDU  Number of years at school 
AOWN  Area own (ha) 
GVPPHA  GVP per hectare (‘,00 Rs.) 
INNCRP  Non-crop income (,000 Rs.) 
VALA  Value of assets (,000 Rs.) 
DS  Dummy for System (Halali = 1; Harsi = 0) 
DI  Dummy for irrigation (Irrigated = 1; Non-irrigated = 0) 
e Error  term 
  
Table 3.4.4. Effect of irrigation on poverty in two systems (irrigated compared with non-irrigated in both 
systems). 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant  3.2214 0.7533 4.3700 
FSIZE  0.8821 0.2063 8.6460 
EDU  -0.0227 -0.0053 -0.6400 
AOWN  -1.5526 -0.3630 -9.8410 
GVPPHA   -0.0828 -0.0194 -3.7380 
INNCRP  -0.2152 -0.0503 -7.9470 
VALA  -0.0069 -0.0016 -3.4390 
DS  0.5878 0.1375 1.6740 
DI  -2.5933 -0.6064 -4.0930 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations  =  492 
Log likelihood ratio    =  -135.58 
Base categories    =  Harsi system, Rainfed 
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Next, we test whether differences in poverty incidence across head, middle and tail reaches of the 
irrigation systems and rainfed areas are significant. The specified model with head, middle and tail 











log = β0 + β1 FSIZE + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP   
  + β6 VALA  + β7 DS  + β8 DLH  + β9 DLM  + β10 DLT + e .................... (5) 
 
where all variables are defined as above and 
 
DS  Dummy for System (Halali= 1; Harsi = 0) 
DLH  Dummy for location Head (DLH = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLM  Dummy for location Middle (DLM = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLT  Dummy for location Tail (DLT = 1; 0 otherwise) 
e Error  term 
 
The results of estimated equation 5 are presented in table 3.4.5. Signs and significance of all other than 
locational dummies are similar as for equation 4. Coefficients of three dummy variables are negative and 
significant. These indicate that poverty incidence at head, middle and tail reaches is significantly less as 
compared to that in rainfed areas. Although, a negative marginal effect on the probability of a household 
being poor varies across head, middle and tail reaches, the results suggest that irrigation has a significant 
impact on poverty when compared with rainfed areas.  
 
Table 3.4.5. Effect of irrigation on poverty in two systems (head, middle and tail of both systems 
compared with non-irrigated). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant 3.2172  0.7568  4.3490 
FSIZE 0.8915  0.2097  8.6510 
EDU -0.0239  -0.0056  -0.6690 
AOWN -1.5520  -0.3651  -9.7280 
GVPPHA   -0.0898  -0.0211  -3.8260 
INNCRP -0.2140  -0.0503  -7.8910 
VALA -0.0068  -0.0016  -3.4210 
DS 0.6197  0.1458  1.7450 
DLH -2.1954  -0.5165  -3.2270 
DLM -2.7250  -0.6411  -3.9210 
DLT -2.7437  -0.6454  -4.1560 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations  =  492 
Log likelihood ratio    =  -134.51 
Base categories    =  Harsi system, Rainfed  
 
Further, we test whether differences in poverty incidence across head, middle and tail reaches within a 
system are significant. This has an important implication for equity in water distribution. The specified 













log = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP   
 + β6 VALA  + β7 β7 DS  + β8 DLH  + β9 DLM  + e   .................................... (6) 
 
where all variables are defined as above and  
 
DS  Dummy for System (Halali = 1; Harsi = 0) 
DLH  Dummy for location Head (DLH = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLM  Dummy for location Middle (DLM = 1; 0 otherwise) 
e Error  term 
 
The results of estimated equation 6 are presented in table 3.4.6. Signs and significance of all, other than 
locational dummies are similar as for equation 4 and 5 above. Coefficient of head dummy is positive and 
coefficient of middle dummy is negative, however, both are insignificant. The results indicate that there 
are no significant differences in poverty across head and middle locations when compared with tail 
locations. Similar results are obtained from analysis of each system, separately(Appendix- 2). 
 
Table 3.4.6.  Effect of irrigation on poverty in two systems (head and middle of both systems compared 
with tail). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant 0.5942  0.1182  0.9370 
FSIZE 0.8934  0.1777  7.5230 
EDU -0.0213  -0.0042  -0.5740 
AOWN -1.6091  -0.3201  -9.1820 
GVPPHA   -0.0849  -0.0169  -3.3950 
INNCRP -0.2197  -0.0437  -7.8890 
VALA -0.0069  -0.0014  -3.1430 
DS 0.5495  0.1093  1.4170 
DLH 0.4988  0.0992  1.1740 
DLM -0.0042  -0.0008  -0.0100 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations  =  422 
Log likelihood ratio    =  -199.98 

















APPENDIX – 1 
 












log = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP   
+ β6 VALA  + β7 DI  + e .........................................................................(1) 
 
where: 
Poverty  Poor = 1; Non-poor = 0 (According to national poverty line) 
FSIZE Family  size 
EDU  Number of years at school 
AOWN  Area own (ha) 
GVPPHA  GVP per hectare (,000 Rs.) 
INNCRP  Non-crop income (,000 Rs.) 
VALA  Value of assets (,000 Rs.) 
DI  Dummy for irrigation (Irrigated = 1; Non-irrigated = 0) 
e Error  term 
 
Table A1.1. Effect of irrigation on poverty in NSLC (irrigated compared with non-irrigated). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant 1.2940  0.3014  2.215 
FSIZE 0.2179  0.0508  2.988 
EDU -0.0011  -0.0003  -0.750 
AOWN -0.0791  -0.0184  -0.798 
GVPPHA   -0.0430  -0.0100  -4.478 
INNCRP -0.0229  -0.0053  -3.743 
VALA -0.0052  -0.0012  -1.478 
DI -2.0895  -0.4868  -4.146 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations  =  330 
Log likelihood ratio  =  -191.89 












log = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP  
+ β6 VALA + β7 DLH  + β8 DLM  + β9 DLT + e ....................................... (2) 
where: 
Poverty  Poor = 1; Non-poor = 0 (According to national poverty line) 
FSIZE Family  size 
EDU  Number of years at school 
AOWN  Area own (ha) 
GVPPHA  GVP per hectare (,000 Rs.) 
INNCRP  Non-crop income (,000 Rs.) 
VALA  Value of assets (,000 Rs.) 
DLH  Dummy for location Head (DLH = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLM  Dummy for location Middle (DLM = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLT  Dummy for location Tail (DLT = 1; 0 otherwise) 
e Error  term  
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Table A1.2. Effect of irrigation on poverty in NSLC (head, middle and tail compared with non-irrigated). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant 1.3715  0.3187  2.332 
FSIZE 0.2005  0.0466  2.694 
EDU -0.0012  -0.0001  -0.854 
AOWN -0.0907  -0.0211  -0.891 
GVPPHA   -0.0432  -0.0054  -4.499 
INNCRP -0.0231  -0.0010  -3.725 
VALA -0.0043  -0.0021  -1.275 
DLH -2.3925  -0.5561  -4.450 
DLM -2.2209  -0.5162  -4.067 
DLT -1.6785  -0.3902  -3.162 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations  =  330 
Log likelihood ratio  =  -189.13 












log = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP   
+ β6 VALA  + β7 DLH  + β8 DLM  + e   ................................................... (3) 
   
 
where: 
Poverty  Poor = 1; Non-poor = 0 (According to national poverty line) 
FSIZE Family  size 
EDU  Number of years at school 
AOWN  Area own (ha) 
GVPPHA  GVP per hectare (,000 Rs.) 
INNCRP  Non-crop income (,000 Rs.) 
VALA  Value of assets (,000 Rs.) 
DLH  Dummy for location Head (DLH = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLM  Dummy for location Middle (DLM = 1; 0 otherwise) 
e  Error term 
 
Table A1.3. Effect of irrigation on poverty in NSLC (head and middle compared with tail). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant 0.0749  0.0175  0.196 
FSIZE 0.1577  0.0369  2.199 
EDU -0.0009  -0.0002  -0.624 
AOWN -0.0284  -0.0066  -0.314 
GVPPHA   -0.0378  -0.0089  -4.111 
INNCRP -0.0199  -0.0047  -3.429 
VALA -0.0036  -0.0008  -1.091 
DLH -1.0368  -0.2424  -3.418 
DLM -0.8288  -0.1938  -2.759 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations  =  330 
Log likelihood ratio  =  -194.71 














log = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP  
 + β6 VALA  + β7 DI  + e ......................................................................... (4) 
 
where: 
Poverty  Poor = 1; Non-poor = 0 (According to national poverty line) 
FSIZE Family  size 
EDU  Number of years at school 
AOWN  Area own (ha) 
GVPPHA  GVP per hectare (,000 Rs.) 
INNCRP  Non-crop income (,000 Rs.) 
VALA  Value of assets (,000 Rs.) 
DI  Dummy for irrigation (Irrigated = 1; Non-irrigated = 0) 
e Error  term 
 
Table A1.4. Effect of irrigation on poverty in KDS (irrigated compared with non-irrigated). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant -2.6488  -0.3098  -3.439 
FSIZE 0.4722  0.0552  3.596 
EDU -0.0467  -0.0055  1.324 
AOWN -0.4797  -0.0561  -1.647 
GVPPHA   -0.0209  -0.0024  -2.753 
INNCRP -0.0228  -0.0027  -3.158 
VALA -0.0105  -0.0012  0.872 
DI -0.2877  -0.0336  -0.572 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations  =  270 
Log likelihood ratio  =  -117.88 












log = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP   
+ β6 VALA  + β7 DLH  + β8 DLM  + β9 DLT + e ....................................... (5) 
 
where: 
Poverty  Poor = 1; Non-poor = 0 (According to national poverty line) 
FSIZE Family  size 
EDU  Number of years at school 
AOWN  Area own (ha) 
GVPPHA  GVP per hectare (,000 Rs.) 
INNCRP  Non-crop income (,000 Rs.) 
VALA  Value of assets (,000 Rs.) 
DLH  Dummy for location Head (DLH = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLM  Dummy for location Middle (DLM = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLT  Dummy for location Tail (DLT = 1; 0 otherwise) 





Table A1.5. Effect of irrigation on poverty in KDS (head, middle and tail compared with non-irrigated). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant -2.6062  -0.2895  -3.315 
FSIZE 0.4651  0.0516  3.452 
EDU   0.0546  0.0061  1.586 
AOWN -0.5669  -0.0629  -1.937 
GVPPHA   -0.0204  -0.0023  -2.706 
INNCRP -0.0231  -0.0026  -3.249 
VALA 0.0101  0.0011  0.763 
DLH 0.0973  0.0108  0.176 
DLM -0.8468  -0.0941  -1.420 
DLT -0.2440  -0.0271  -0.439 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations  =  270 
Log likelihood ratio  =  -115.71 












log = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP  
 + β6 VALA  + β7 DLH  + β8 DLM  + e   ................................................... (6) 
 
where: 
Poverty  Poor = 1; Non-poor = 0 (According to national poverty line) 
FSIZE Family  size 
EDU  Number of years at school 
AOWN  Area own (ha) 
GVPPHA  GVP per hectare (,000 Rs.) 
INNCRP  Non-crop income (,000 Rs.) 
VALA  Value of assets (,000 Rs.) 
DLH  Dummy for location Head (DLH = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLM  Dummy for location Middle (DLM = 1; 0 otherwise) 
e Error  term 
 
 
Table A1.6. Effect of irrigation on poverty in KDS (head and middle compared with tail). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant -2.8038  -0.3119  -4.276 
FSIZE 0.4664  0.0519  3.457 
EDU 0.0552  0.0061  1.615 
AOWN -0.5477  -0.0609  -1.886 
GVPPHA   -0.0202  -0.0022  -2.669 
INNCRP -0.0227  -0.0025  -3.229 
VALA 0.0095  0.0011  0.710 
DLH 0.2749  0.0306  0.718 
DLM -0.6654  -0.0740  -1.533 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations  =  270 
Log likelihood ratio  =  -115.81 
Base categories    =  Tail  
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APPENDIX – 2 
 













log = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP   
  + β6 VALA  + β7 DI  + e ......................................................................... (1) 
where: 
Poverty  Poor = 1; Non-poor = 0 (According to national poverty line) 
FSIZE Family  size 
EDU  Number of years at school 
AOWN  Area own (ha) 
GVPPHA  GVP per hectare (,000 Rs.) 
INNCRP  Non-crop income (,000 Rs.) 
VALA  Value of assets (,000 Rs.) 
DI  Dummy for irrigation (Irrigated = 1; Non-irrigated = 0) 
e Error  term 
 
Table A2.1. Effect of irrigation on poverty in Halali (irrigated compared with non-irrigated). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant  5.4799 1.3031 3.5590 
FSIZE  1.5122 0.3596 5.3110 
EDU  0.0301 0.0072 0.4850 
AOWN  -2.5386 -0.6037 -6.2990 
GVPPHA   -0.1545 -0.0367 -2.5370 
INNCRP  -0.4140 -0.0984 -5.0270 
VALA  -0.0059 -0.0014 -1.5780 
DI  -3.9214 -0.9325 -3.0340 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations  =  252 
Log likelihood ratio  =  -44.62 











log = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP  
  + β6 VALA + β7 DLH  + β8 DLM  + β9 DLT + e ....................................... (2) 
 
where: 
Poverty  Poor = 1; Non-poor = 0 (According to national poverty line) 
FSIZE Family  size 
EDU  Number of years at school 
AOWN  Area own (ha) 
GVPPHA  GVP per hectare (,000 Rs.) 
INNCRP  Non-crop income (,000 Rs.) 
VALA  Value of assets (,000 Rs.) 
DLH  Dummy for location Head (DLH = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLM  Dummy for location Middle (DLM = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLT  Dummy for location Tail (DLT = 1; 0 otherwise) 
e Error  term  
 167
Table A2.2. Effect of irrigation on poverty in Halali (head, middle and tail compared with non-irrigated). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant  5.5492 1.3193 3.5770 
FSIZE  1.5287 0.3634 5.2560 
EDU  0.0304 0.0072 0.4900 
AOWN  -2.5691 -0.6108 -6.2050 
GVPPHA   -0.1616 -0.0384 -2.5780 
INNCRP  -0.4209 -0.1001 -5.0170 
VALA  -0.0055 -0.0013 -1.4560 
DLH  -4.0393 -0.9603 -2.9200 
DLM  -3.6240 -0.8616 -2.6600 
DLT  -4.0305 -0.9582 -3.0090 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations  =  252 
Log likelihood ratio  =  -44.40 
Base categories    =  Rainfed 
 











log = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP   
 + β6 VALA  + β7 DLH  + β8 DLM  + e   ................................................... (3) 
   
where: 
Poverty  Poor = 1; Non-poor = 0 (According to national poverty line) 
FSIZE Family  size 
EDU  Number of years at school 
AOWN  Area own (ha) 
GVPPHA  GVP per hectare (,000 Rs.) 
INNCRP  Non-crop income (,000 Rs.) 
VALA  Value of assets (,000 Rs.) 
DLH  Dummy for location Head (DLH = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLM  Dummy for location Middle (DLM = 1; 0 otherwise) 
e Error  term 
 
Table A2.3. Effect of irrigation on poverty in Halali (head and middle compared with tail). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant  1.6348 0.2754 1.5490 
FSIZE  1.5997 0.2695 3.4950 
EDU  0.0207 0.0035 0.3190 
AOWN  -2.7292 -0.4598 -4.1450 
GVPPHA   -0.1572 -0.0265 -2.0850 
INNCRP  -0.4481 -0.0755 -3.8730 
VALA  -0.0059 -0.0010 -1.2180 
DLH  -0.0415 -0.0070 -0.0560 
DLM  0.3901 0.0657 0.5270 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations  =  220 
Log likelihood ratio  =  -38.90 
Base categories    =  Tail  
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log = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP  
   + β6 VALA  + β7 DI  + e ......................................................................... (4) 
 
where: 
Poverty  Poor = 1; Non-poor = 0 (According to national poverty line) 
FSIZE Family  size 
EDU  Number of years at school 
AOWN  Area own (ha) 
GVPPHA  GVP per hectare (,000 Rs.) 
INNCRP  Non-crop income (,000 Rs.) 
VALA  Value of assets (,000 Rs.) 
DI  Dummy for irrigation (Irrigated = 1; Non-irrigated = 0) 
e Error  term 
 
Table A2.4.  Effect of irrigation on poverty in Harsi (irrigated compared with non-irrigated). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant  2.7834 0.6061 3.2130 
FSIZE  0.7201 0.1568 6.5080 
EDU  -0.0385 -0.0084 -0.8210 
AOWN  -1.2061 -0.2626 -6.0110 
GVPPHA   -0.0758 -0.0165 -3.1120 
INNCRP  -0.1754 -0.0382 -6.3110 
VALA  -0.0097 -0.0021 -2.9830 
DI  -1.9439 -0.4232 -2.6240 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations  =  240 
Log likelihood ratio  =  -83.29 
















log = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP   
  + β6 VALA  + β7 DLH  + β8 DLM  + β9 DLT + e ....................................... (5) 
 
where: 
Poverty  Poor = 1; Non-poor = 0 (According to national poverty line) 
FSIZE Family  size 
EDU  Number of years at school 
AOWN  Area own (ha) 
GVPPHA  GVP per hectare (,000 Rs.) 
INNCRP  Non-crop income (,000 Rs.) 
VALA  Value of assets (,000 Rs.) 
DLH  Dummy for location Head (DLH = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLM  Dummy for location Middle (DLM = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLT  Dummy for location Tail (DLT = 1; 0 otherwise) 
e Error  term 
 
 
Table A2.5. Effect of irrigation on poverty in KDS (head, middle and tail compared with non-irrigated). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant  2.8593 0.6183 3.2320 
FSIZE  0.7610 0.1646 6.5550 
EDU  -0.0448 -0.0097 -0.9310 
AOWN  -1.2224 -0.2643 -5.9140 
GVPPHA   -0.0968 -0.0209 -3.4620 
INNCRP  -0.1770 -0.0383 -6.3860 
VALA  -0.0103 -0.0022 -3.0490 
DLH  -1.1525 -0.2492 -1.4070 
DLM  -2.1510 -0.4651 -2.5390 
DLT  -2.2713 -0.4911 -2.8560 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations    =  240 
Log likelihood ratio    =  -80.82 






















log = β0 + β1 FSIZE  + β2 EDU  + β3 AOWN  + β4 GVPPHA  + β5 INNCRP  
 + β6 VALA  + β7 DLH  + β8 DLM  + e   ................................................... (6) 
 
where: 
Poverty  Poor = 1; Non-poor = 0 (According to national poverty line) 
FSIZE Family  size 
EDU  Number of years at school 
AOWN  Area own (ha) 
GVPPHA  GVP per hectare (,000 Rs.) 
INNCRP  Non-crop income (,000 Rs.) 
VALA  Value of assets (,000 Rs.) 
DLH  Dummy for location Head (DLH = 1; 0 otherwise) 
DLM  Dummy for location Middle (DLM = 1; 0 otherwise) 
e Error  term 
 
 
Table A2.6. Effect of irrigation on poverty in Harsi (head and middle compared with tail). 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect on 
probability of (Y=1) 
b/St.Er. 
Constant  0.6288 0.1192 0.8400 
FSIZE  0.7255 0.1375 5.9310 
EDU  -0.0297 -0.0056 -0.5930 
AOWN  -1.2352 -0.2341 -5.1290 
GVPPHA   -0.0911 -0.0173 -3.2030 
INNCRP  -0.1731 -0.0328 -6.2110 
VALA  -0.0089 -0.0017 -2.7480 
DLH  1.0389 0.1969 1.8650 
DLM  0.0971 0.0184 0.1780 
Dependent Variable    =  poverty (1 = poor and 0 = non-poor) 
Number of observations    =  202 
Log likelihood ratio    =  -72.48 






3.5.  IRRIGATION SYSTEM PERFORMANCE AND ASSOCIATED IMPACTS ON 
POVERTY 
In this section an attempt is made to provide an account of the level of irrigation performance of the 
systems studied, in order to understand the reasons for their poor performance and thereby their impacts 
on the poor. Irrigation system is a nested system (Small and S Vendsen 1992) within irrigated agriculture, 
which in turn, is an integral part of the wider agricultural economic system. Thus viewed from the 
systems viewpoint, the impacts of subsystems and the holistic system can be seen in terms of economic, 
social, hydrological and environmental standpoints. They can be quantified by using standard economic 
and environmental approaches to facilitate assessment of the level of each system performance per se, and 
in comparison with other irrigation systems studied. This being a very complex task (holistic modeling 
approach) literature on irrigation performance dealt in general with two simple system performance 
assessment approaches – which are based on endogenous and exogenous criteria, respectively — to the 
irrigation systems. 
International Water Management Institute (IWMI), has made significant research in evaluating 
system performance in several agro-climatic zones globally. Nine indicators were developed by IWMI to 
facilitate analysis of performance across irrigation systems. Among them the first set of four indicators, 
namely, – production per unit cropped area, production per unit command, production per unit irrigation 
supply and production per unit water consumed – concern with output to unit land and water, which 
provide the basis for comparison of irrigated agriculture. The next set of five indicators are meant to 
characterize the individual system with respect to water supplies and economics and finances (Molden et 
al. 1998). In this, the hydrological indicators are ratios of relative water supply (RWS), relative irrigation 
supply (RIS) and water delivery capacity. The financial indicator is financial self-sufficiency (revenue 
from irrigation / total O&M cost) and the economic indicator is the standard gross value of production / 
cost of irrigation infrastructure – a percentage of gross returns on investment. 
Thus, all these indicators are aimed at serving specific purposes as they relate to processes 
generated and operate outside the system. They allow identifying different attributes that led to better 
performance of irrigated agriculture (over a period of time) and facilitated cross-comparison of different 
irrigation systems. The analysis would be useful to policy makers and managers making long-term 
strategic decisions and for researchers in developing strategic options. However, performance is mostly 
assessed through several processes originating within the system, with the objective of improving the 
management of a particular irrigation system. The indicators in this context are related to management 
targets like timing, duration and flow rate of water, area irrigated and cropping patterns. The main 
purpose of such an analysis is to aid the manager to improve the water delivery performance and 
irrigation management (Murry-Rust and Snellen 1993). 
In this study, several performance indicators are taken to understand their implications to poverty 
in irrigated agriculture. Regrouping the IWMI indicators mentioned above along with others, all the 
indicators are arranged under three broad headings – 1) productivity, equity and water supply 2) 
economic/financial, environmental and infrastructure sustainability and 3) institutional/organizational and 
management effectiveness. Thus, these indicators are inter-dependent representing output, process or 
impact. However, all the indicators could not be worked out for all the four irrigation systems studied 
alike, because of data lags or non-availability of authentic information. While for the projects in AP we 
could work out reach-wise analysis, for MP only system-level analysis could be made. Likewise, the data  
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on WUA level water cess collection is not available in AP, whereas such details are available in MP. In 
totality, the analysis will inform the performance and poverty linkages and provide pointers for strategic 
interventions. 
The analysis is done in two parts.  The first part looks at each of the three sets of indicators in 
terms of the overall performance of the four systems in a comparative perspective.  The second part deals 
with the two systems in AP viz., NSLC and KDC, by a three-way disaggregation of each system on the 
basis of the reach of each system. 
 
Productivity, Equity and Water Supply Indicators 
The Four Systems 
About 13 indicators, as listed in table 3.5.1, are identified as the ones that would show the performance of 
each irrigation system in terms of its productivity, equity and water supply to crops.  Irrigation intensity 
shows the extent of actual area covered under irrigation in relation to the command area designed. Both 
the systems in AP show a very high performance in this regard, but KDS with 92 percent achievement is 
much better than NSLC with 82 percent.  On the contrary, both the systems in MP show only two-third of 
reach compared to what is designed for, although the older system Harsi is marginally better at 68 percent 
compared to 63 percent of Halali. Cropping intensity of more that 100 percent indicates the extent of 
double-cropping.  Many of the modern irrigation systems are designed explicitly for single crop and more 
so for irrigated dry crops, so as to spread the benefits of irrigation to a larger area and more farmers. 
Therefore, double-cropping doesn’t automatically suggest better performance.  Nonetheless, in the four 
systems under study, double-cropping could be taken as indicating better performance. The results show 
that while the older system in AP, KDS, has considerable double-cropping, the older system in MP viz., 
Harsi shows much less than the relatively recent Halali.  The low performance of Harsi is to be seen in 
terms of poor system maintenance.  In terms of land productivity in the command area in AP, KDS shows 
a higher output (5,357 Kg) per hectare than that of NSLC (4,291 Kg per ha).  But in MP, the productivity 
level reported is much higher to be realistic.  True, the output for MP normally is in terms of wheat, 
whereas for AP it is assumed to be rice.  Still, output level is 50 to 100 percent more than rice but not 
beyond that.   
 
Table 3.5.1. Productivity, equity and water supply indicators (aggregate) for four irrigation systems. 
 
Indicators Unit  NSLC  KDS  Halali  Harsi 
Irrigation Intensity  Ratio  1:0.82  1:0.92  1:0.63  1:0.68 
Cropping intensity  Ratio  1:0.89  1:1.27  1:1.12  1:0.68 
Output per unit command area (GVP)  Rs/ha  25749  31283  15846  11341 
Total production in command area  Rs.millions  774.23  467.66  412.00  499.00 
Output per unit of diverted irrigation water  Kg/m
3  0.419 0.508     
Output per unit of consumed water  Kg/m
3 0.512  0.521    
Output per unit of labor  Rs/days  122.60  128.55  432.00  212.00 
Head-Tail equity ratio in output  Ratio  1:1.90  1:1.29  -  - 
Relative water supply (RWS)  Ratio  1:1.70  1:1.52  1:0.84  1:1.75 
Relative irrigation supply (RIS)  Ratio  1:1.22  1:1.02  1:1.78  1:2.64 
Water delivery performance  Ratio  1:0.7  1:0.83  1:0.56  1:0.38 
Overall system efficiency  Ratio  1:0.81  1:0.97  1:1.2  1:0.57 
Head -Tail Equity  Ratio  1:3.00  1:2.68  Skewed  Skewed  
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The performance in terms of a unit of water is higher in KDC compared to NSLC, both in terms of a unit 
of diverted irrigation water and consumed irrigation water.  There is no information on this count for 
Halali and Harsi.  Head-tail equity ratio both in terms of irrigated area and consequent output is much 
worse in NSLC than in KDC.  While both the systems show inequity of water not reaching in the same 
ratio to the tail end, the wastage at the head reaches, as seen in terms of high head-tail ratio is much 
higher leaving less water for the tail-end particularly, for marginal and small farmers, may be one of the 
contributing factors for the relatively higher poverty in NSLC than in KDS.  There is no adequate 
information on the equity count for Halali and Harsi, though a skewed state is reported.  In terms of 
relative water supply and irrigation supply, the use of water is much more efficient in the case of KDS 
than NSLC.  Similarly, the older system Harsi is better than Halali.  Though, in terms of water delivery 
performance, all the four systems show that actual water delivered is less than targeted the overall system 
efficiency shows that KDS gets 97 percent of crop water requirement where as NSLC gets 81 percent.  
Halali shows that the water flow in the canal is 120 percent of the crop requirement and hence the 
wastage. But Harsi ends up with only 57 percent of the crop water needs.  Thus, the high levels of poverty 
in MP in Halali appear to be due to wastage of water while in Harsi it is due to shortage of water — 
which in turn may be due to maintenance failure. 
 
Reach-wise Two Systems of AP 
 
For reach-wise analysis, there is no information for the MP irrigation systems and therefore, the analysis 
is confined to AP (table 3.5.2). Continuing with the ‘productivity, equity and water supply’ indicators, the 
irrigation intensity declines from 92 percent in the head-reach to 65 percent in the middle, and rises again 
to 91 percent in the tail end.  The latter may be because of ground water supplementary irrigation, which 
in turn seems to be associated with large farmers, leaving marginal-small farmers without much irrigation 
and hence a relatively higher level of poverty.  In the case of KDS there doesn’t appear to be much 
difference between head and middle reaches, which have very high irrigation intensity of 92 percent to 98 
percent. But the tail end appears to be left high and dry with only 44 percent of irrigation.  [Here, low 
poverty for tail end, high for head-reach makes any reference to poverty rather tenuous.] As expected, 
productivity levels decline as we move from head-reaches to the tail ends in both the systems, but the 
decline is more in the case of NSLC.  Performance in terms of a unit of water shows not much difference 
between head and middle reaches in KDS but a steep decline for tail end. The results of lower yield per 
unit of water in head-reach than the middle and tail ends in NSLC is rather incongruous.  One reason may 
be that there is too much of wastage of water in the head-reaches, due to inundation. This may be credible 
seen in the light of better performance of head-reach compared to middle and tail reaches, in terms of a 
unit of water consumed in NSLC. This is also shown in terms of overall system inefficiency of head-reach 
of NSLC. In terms of the other remaining indicators of water like water supply, irrigation supply, etc., the 
head reaches do better than the tail, and overall, KDS does better than NSLC. 
 
Table 3.5.2. Productivity, equity and water supply indicators in Andhra Pradesh (reach-wise). 
 
Indicators Unit  NSLC  KDS 
   Head Middle  Tail  Head  Middle  Tail 
Irrigation  Intensity  Ratio  1:0.92 1:0.65 1:0.91  1:0.92  1:0.98 1:0.44  
 174
Cropping  intensity  Ratio  1:1.47 1:0.65 1:0.91  1:1.07  1:1.31 1:1.42 
Output per unit command area  Kg/ha  5,864  5,625  3,080  5,930  5,560  4,580 
Total production in command 
area 
Rs.million 208.57 264.19 301.46  83.96  356.39 41.40 
Output per unit of diverted 
irrigation water 
Kg/m
3  0.248 0.541 0.576  0.528  0.553 0.353 
Output per unit of consumed 
water 
Kg/m
3  0.652 0.684 0.374  0.528  0.553 0.353 
Output per unit of labor  Rs/days  140.75  135.00  136.95  142.30  133.45  109.90 
Head-tail equity ratio in 
output 
Ratio 1:1.903  1:1.29 
Relative water supply (RWS)  Ratio  1:3.07  1:1.75  1:1.14  1:1.59  1:1.47  1:1.76 
Relative irrigation supply 
(RIS) 
Ratio  1:2.61 1:1.26 1:0.65  1:1.09  1:0.9  1:1.26 
Water delivery performance  Ratio  1:1.50  1:0.56  1:0.50  1:0.90  1:0.87  1:0.33 
Overall system efficiency  Ratio  1:0.38  1:0.79  1:1.53  1:0.91  1:1.02  1:0.79 
Head -tail Equity  Ratio  1:3.00  1:2.684 
 
Economic / Financial, Environmental and Infrastructure Indicators 
 
The Four Systems 
 
The second group of irrigation system performance indicators include economic, financial, environmental 
and infrastructure sustainability.  Table 3.5.3 lists as many as 12 indicators and provides information for 
the four irrigation systems.  Gross value of production under KDS is higher than under NSLC.  But the 
net value of output per hectare under KDS is almost double that of NSLC.  But in the case of MP the 
older system Harsi records much less gross productivity and net productivity, compared to Halali.  This 
may be the reason for high poverty under both the systems.  The share of farm income at almost 80 
percent of the household income in NSLC area is much higher than 67 percent in KDS.  Similarly, the 
share of farm income in the household income in Halali is higher than in Harsi.  The evolving of non-farm 
diversification of household economic activity appears to take a considerable time even after extension of 
irrigation facilities.  Non-farm diversification of household activity may also contribute to reduction of 
poverty in the region.  
The more emphatic indicator of financial performance of an irrigation system could be seen in 
terms of irrigation benefit and system level profitability. ‘Irrigation benefit’ shows the difference between 
the value of output of irrigated area and the rainfed area.  In AP, KDS shows a very high irrigation benefit 
of Rs. 9,505 per hectare compared to Rs. 7,130 of NSLC. For MP, Harsi shows a higher value than 
Halali, but compared to AP both systems have a relatively very low value of Rs. 1,823 and Rs. 1,738, 
respectively.  Water charges collection performance, an area of considerable political pressure, shows that 
projects in AP do better than those in MP. On system financials self-sufficient KDS with 94 percent is in 
a much better position than NSLC with 77 percent. Perhaps, the performance of an irrigation system 
depends on the resources for operation and management.  The relatively consistent better performance of 
KDS may be due to a very low O&M financing gap of just 5 percent compared to 94 percent gap of 
NSLC.  There is no water logging in the case of NSLC but a small proportion of 1.25 percent of the KDS 
area is affected.  The number of infrastructures are marginally higher in NSLC. But on all these important 





Table 3.5.3. Economic/financial, environmental and infrastructure sustainability indicators (aggregate) 
for four irrigation systems. 
 
Indicators Unit  NSLC  KDS  Halali  Harsi 
Gross value production  Rs./ha  25,749  31,283  15,846  11,340 
Net value of production per unit area  Rs./ha  8,474  16,725  6,538  6,068 
Net value of farm production as percent of total 
household income 
% 79.18  66.97  63.00  54.00 
Irrigation benefit per unit area  Rs./ha  7,130  9,505  1,738  1,823 
System level profitability  Ratio  1:7.53  1:10.04  1:1.6  1:2.5 
Water charges collection performance  %  40-50  30-82  33  21 
System financial self-sufficiency  Ratio  1:0.77  1:0.94     
O&M financing gap  Ratio  1:0.94  1:0.05     
Percent of command affected by water logging & 
salinity 
% 0  1.25  NA  NA 







No. of infrastructures  Nos.  406  388  -  - 
No. of control structures per 1000 ha  Nos.  12  31  7  2 
 
Reach-wise Two Systems of AP 
 
Turning to reach-wise performance in terms of economic and financial indicators, no information is 
available for MP systems and the analysis is confined to AP. Table 3.5.4 gives reach-wise data for NSLC 
and KDS for the ‘economic-financial’ indicators.  Although productivity in terms of gross value of output 
per hectare shows that NSLC performance is as good or even better compared to KDS, the emphatic 
superiority of performance of KDS is seen in terms of net value of output per hectare.  This indicates that 
the costs of cultivation in NSLC are higher than in KDS, which may add to the poverty of marginal-small 
farmers.  In both the systems, however, the net value of output per hectare come down as we move from 
head-reach to tail end.  The contribution of non-farm income to total household income is much less in 
NSLC than in KDS.  Almost half of the household income in the head-reaches of KDS is from non-farm 
sources.  The irrigation benefit, indicating the additional benefit due to switch-over from rainfed to 
irrigated agriculture, is much higher in KDS, and the usual sliding down in the benefits from head to tail-
reach movement is also observed.  But the only aberration noticed is in NSLC where there is a jump in 
the irrigation benefit in the middle-reach and a slide-down again with the tail end.  System profitability is 
higher in NSLC for each of the three reaches, compared to KDS. This appears somewhat counter-
intuitive, given the fact that KDS is a well-established diversion system in contrast to the huge storage 
system of NSLC. The infrastructure on control structures do not show any consistent trend with the 
reaches in KDS, but in NSLC the control structures decline with head to tail-reach.  The ground water 
levels are in the decline, with the highest decline being in the tail reaches of both the systems, which 
indicates growing supplementary ground water irrigation in the tail ends. particularly by the large farms.  
This development has left small-marginal farmers more vulnerable to irrigation failure.  On the collection 
of water charges, financial self sufficiency and O-&M finance gap, only aggregate information is 




Table 3.5.4.  Economic/financial, environmental and infrastructure sustainability indicators – in Andhra 
Pradesh (reach-wise) 
 
Indicators Unit  NSLC  KDS 
   Head  Middle  Tail  Head  Middle  Tail 
Gross  value  production  Rs/ha 35185 33750  18480  30969  33867 24780 
Net value of production per unit area  Rs/ha  15861  13750  5980  19330  17610  13230 
Net value of farm production as 
percent of total household income 
%  76.74 86.99  79.08  53.16  83.54 70.46 
Irrigation benefit per unit area  Rs/ha  4,517  12,406  4,636  12,110  10,390  6,010 
System-level  profitability  Ratio 1:14.96  1:13.11 1:4.90  1:12.80  1:10.98  1:6.35 
Water charges collection 
performance 
% 40-50      30-82     
System financial self- sufficiency  Ratio  1:0.77  1:0.94 
O&M financing gap  Ratio  1:0.94  1:0.05 
Percent of command affected by 
water logging & salinity 
% 0  1.25 2.5  -  -  - 
















No. of infrastructures  Nos.  99  157  150  149  188  51 
No. of control structures per 1000 ha  Nos.  25  13  8  59  21  47 
 
Institutional, Organizational and Management Indicators 
 
The Four systems and Reach-wise systems in AP 
 
Table 3.5.5 gives information on some of the indicators relating to O&M and PIM for the four systems.  
The number of irrigation employers per thousand hectares is the highest (27) in Harsi and lowest in Halali 
(2). In NSLC and KDS, these numbers are 5 and 8, respectively.  But Halali has a top-heavy 14 O&M 
employees per 1,000 hectares, and even 9 for Harsi is on the highside compared to 4 and 3 for NSLC and 
KDC, respectively.  The PIM in Halali and Harsi appears to be stabilized, whereas NSLC and KDC show 
a considerable number, particularly, at the secondary and tertiary level Water Users’ Associations.   
 
Table 3.5.5.  Institutional/organizational/management effectiveness indicators (aggregate) for four 
irrigation systems. 
 
Indicators  Unit NSLC  KDS  Halali Harsi 
No. of irrigation agency employees per 1000 ha  Nos.  5  8  2  27 
No. of irrigation agency employees per 1000 ha 
for O&M 
Nos.  4 3 14  9 
Users participation 
Primary 
Secondary – DCs 


















Gender performance indicator    Minimum  Minimum  V.poor  V.poor 
 
Table 3.5.6 shows that WUAs at the secondary and tertiary levels are fairly well spread out across all the 
reaches of these two systems, although the number is higher in the case of NSLC.  The impact of these 





Table 3.5.6.  Institutional/organizational/management effectiveness indicators in Andhra Pradesh 
       (reach-wise). 
 
Indicators Unit  NSLC  KDS 
   Head  Middle  Tail  Head  Middle  Tail 
No. of irrigation agency employees 
per 1000 ha 
Nos. 5  8 
No. of irrigation agency employees 
per 1000 ha for O&M 
Nos. 4  3 
Users participation 
Primary 
Secondary – DCs 





























Gender performance indicator    Minimum  Minimum 
 
Two of the hypotheses set for this research are tested under this section. One of the hypothesis 
states that the greater the degree of O&M cost recovery, the better the performance. The other states 
effective implementation of PIM/IMT leads to improved irrigation system performance, which in turn 
reduces poverty. Since both these are related directly to the management of irrigation systems, they are 
examined together against irrigation system performance. 
The water charges collection performance shows that for the systems in MP, the collection is one-
third and less, while that in AP it is over 50 percent. This has reflections on the system’s financial self-
sufficiency. Halali and Harsi are low at 10 percent and 7 percent, financial self-sufficiency, respectively. 
This has widened the O&M financing gap significantly, with as much as over 80 percent in both the 
systems in MP. In AP, this gap is around 50 percent. 
It is to be noted here that in both the states (for that matter in the country as a whole), there is no 
direct link between irrigation system performance and collection of water charges. In MP, the water 
charges are collected by the irrigation department and deposited in the state exchequer. The O&M budget 
is sanctioned at the state level every year, irrespective of the amount recovered. The O&M budget is 
approved by the state, which has little to do with the amount received from irrigators. In AP, the 
assessment and collection of water charges is the function of the revenue department. The village clerks 
and revenue officials assess and collect the water charges. Like in MP the budget sanctions are made 
annually by the government. With the formation of WUAs in AP the work of assessment of water cess is 
brought under joint ajmaish (joint supervision) of both the department and WUAs. However, water 
charges are still being collected by the revenue department and up till the last season the WUAs in AP 
were neither given this responsibility nor the WUAs relished the idea. The social sensitivities involved in 
collection and enforcement of water charges by WUAs directly, deter them from taking up this function 
directly. 
The ten-year pattern of collection of water charges by the AP government at state level is 
presented in (table 3.5.7). Collection details at WUA level are not yet available in AP. As pointed, only 
from the last season (after the research survey work) it is learnt that the record of collection of water 
charges is maintained at WUA level. In MP however, this data is available as the government started 






Table 3.5.7.  Water charges and collection in AP (Rs. million). 
 
Year Demand  Collection  Collection  (%) 
1991 – 1992  1458.33  452.41  31.0 
1992 – 1993  1364.16  639.08  46.8 
1993 – 1994  2097.30  624.20  29.8 
1994 – 1995  1880.40  600.40  31.9 
1995 – 1996  1734.10  441.70  25.5 
1996 – 1997  2451.41  697.99  28.5 
1997 – 1998  2912.43  700.70  24.1 
1998 – 1999  3370.43  931.63  27.6 
1999 – 2000  3607.02  1057.34  29.3 
2000 – 2001  2994.61  1185.97  39.6 
2001 – 2002  2924.16  586.71  20.1 
 
Source: Draft Water Vision - Volume 2, Mission Support Unit, Water Conservation Mission, GoAP. 
 
The other issue, which is of critical importance, is that at present there is no relationship between the 
O&M requirement and the water charges levied in both the states. For example, the annual O&M 
expenditure in Halali and Harsi systems currently are Rs.29 million and Rs.31 million, respectively. Most 
of this however goes into salaries and overheads. Even if 100 percent of the water charges are collected, it 
will amount to only about 25 percent of the O&M costs. Moreover, currently only Rs. 50 per hectare is 
actually spent on the O&M work in the canals. If a more reasonable amount (Rs. 500/ha/year) is spent on 
O&M, which is as per the engineers’ minimum amount needed, given the current state of the canals, the 
current revenue from water charges as a proportion to the O&M requirement becomes even more 
insignificant. In AP, irrigation prices commission as an institutional arrangement has been constituted to 
review the irrigation charge periodically. Water charges just before the introduction of irrigation 
management transfer in 1997 were revised upward by a three-fold increase. It is hoped that gradually the 
charges would meet the required O&M expenditure. 
Earlier failures in water management are attributed to water pricing policy by the states in the 
country. The considerations to keep them low are more due to political reasons rather than the criterion of 
farmers’ non-affordability. Though it cannot be implemented immediately the water charges could be 
recovered from the WUAs eventually on a volumetric basis (GoAP 2003).  
It is seen that in both MP and AP the systems, which are more efficient in terms of reach 
(proportion of area irrigated to total area) and timely delivery of water, had better cost recovery rates and 
also good administration system. Although this could prove the research hypothesis to be true, the causal 
relationship in fact seems to be reverse, better system performance inducing farmers to pay: since water 
charges are the same irrespective of the amount of water a farmer gets, farmers who get little water are 
reluctant to pay the water charges. To improve the performance of the irrigation system involved, initial 
investment in system operation and maintenance might need to be made to induce farmers to contribute to 
the costs. Although the issue resembles the discussion of the chicken and the egg, addressing the critical 
threshold level for cost recovery and system performance will be vital to address system performance 
issues in a structural way.  
The introduction of PIM in both the states (although AP has completed five years) is relatively 
new, and as such, it is perhaps too early to assess its impact on the irrigation system performance. 
However, the data gathered from the field does indicate that introduction of PIM did have a positive  
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impact on the irrigation system performance. Data from both the states suggests that after the introduction 
of PIM water flows faster to the lower reaches and covers an increased area. In AP the initial three years 
with World Bank funds saw maintenance and repairs undertaken by WUAs, which had a positive impact 
on water flowing to the lower reaches, further
23The time usually taken for a tail ender in KDS to receive 
water used to be around two to three months for transplantation after the head-end farmers received 
irrigation. Now, the water is available within one to one and a half months for transplantation after the 
head-reach farmers. 
During 2001-2002 nearly 90 percent of the transplantation was completed in the month of July 
and the rest was completed in the first week of August. In the year under reference there was no change in 
the cropping pattern but the perception of WUA office bearers and also farmers was that the improved 
drainage and timely irrigation helped improve the production as follows (table 3.5.8). 
 
 
Table 3.5.8.  Crop productivity before and after PIM – Andhra Pradesh (crop productivity – Kg per ha). 
 
Crop  Prior to the PIM 
(1997-1998) 
After the PIM 
(2000-2001) 
Remarks 
Paddy  4631.25  5557.5  +926.25 (early transplantation) 
Sugarcane  111150  123500  +2470 (assured water supply) 
Maize  6300  7410  +1235 (reliable water supplies) 
 
The following (table 3.5.9) shows the qualitative assessment of the impact of PIM in different irrigation 
systems. 
 
Table 3.5.9. Assessment of impact of PIM. 
 
 Halali  Harsi  NSLC  KDS 
Awareness of WUA among 
farmers 
40% 40%  60%  70% 
O&M works 
a)  Spread 
b)  Quality 

































Area under irrigation  Improved  Improved  Improved  Improved 
Water delivery to lower reaches  Reduced time  Reduced time  Reduced time  Reduced time 
Availability of required number 
of waterings 
NA NA  Adequate  Adequate 
Participation of farmers in 
selection and execution of O&M 
works. 
Fair Fair  Good  Good 
 
 
In MP, farmers have strategically elected large and powerful farmers as presidents from tail end 
reaches to ensure that water reaches the tail end. In MP, the choice of generally large and influential 
people as presidents was driven by the desire of farmers to have someone strong enough to negotiate with 
                                                 
23 World Bank assistance provided an amount of Rs.1,336 per ha to support the program from 1977 to 2000. From 
February 2001, 50% share of water tax collected is made available from the  government for farmers’ organizations  
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the irrigation agency and the outside world. Further, such people are believed to have the capacity to 
spend money for organizing meetings, receiving outside people and also making travels to represent 
farmers’ concerns to the authorities. 
The other critical thing on which farmers were more or less unanimous was the improved quality 
of O&M works and their cost-effectiveness. Farmers broadly agreed that the selection and execution of 
physical work has been much better under the WUAs. Data from PRA exercises suggests that in both 
selection and execution of works, there has been a good amount of participation among farmers, which 
was totally missing before PIM was introduced. Unlike in AP, the relationships between the farmers and 
irrigation officials is not very cordial. Though the signs of improvement are clearly perceptible in 
relations between officials of the irrigation department and WUA presidents, the control of the irrigation 
agency is still strong. Without proper sanctioning of the competent authority (an engineer from irrigation 
department) no physical work can be undertaken. Thus, the relationship between the WUA and the 
irrigation official becomes critical. In Harsi system for instance, due to lack of good relationship between 
a number of WUA presidents and irrigation engineers, more than 50 percent of the sanctioned budget for 




Of the four irrigation systems, as shown earlier, the two older systems KDS in AP and Harsi in MP are 
with a more stabilized ayacut and a longer period over which the farming communities have gained more 
experience in adjusting to the irrigated agriculture. The expectation is that poverty in these command 
areas is likely to be less than the relatively recent command areas like NSLC in AP and Halali in MP. But 
there is also a possibility that if the irrigation system is not efficiently maintained because of neglect or 
lack of resources and other institutional deficiencies, a result of which is the instability in irrigation 
supply and higher risk for marginal and small farmers, poverty may still persist at higher levels. The 
overall picture that emerges from the two older systems shows that KDS in AP reflects positive features 
of longer experience, while Harsi in MP appears to have experienced more neglect and decay due to 
inadequate resource mobilization for O&M. A detailed examination of these four systems in terms of 
certain irrigation performance indicators is done here to assess the impact of irrigation in mitigating 
poverty under the four irrigation systems. Cost recovery, so far, was not directly linked to O&M of the 
systems yet, it clearly shows that better maintenance of systems leads to a better collection of fees. The 
initial impact of IMT has shown encouraging results. Further research in this area is availed as the 




3.6.  ANALYSIS OF WATER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE POOR 
Irrigation-related Institutions and Water Rights at Operational Level 
The focus of this section is to develop an understanding of existing irrigation-related institutions (both 
formal and informal) in operation, their linkages, strengths and weaknesses, implementation effectiveness 
and their impact on the poor. Special emphasis is made on understanding the constraints and opportunities 
of these institutions in order to identify the type of interventions that will make them sensitive to the 
needs of the poor. 
Historically, the degree of devolution of government’s role shaped the evolution and development 
of specific institutions in relation to water resources.  In contrast to many other countries in the West and 
Asia, the government in India seems to have played a prominent and direct role in planning, construction 
and allocation of irrigation water from major and medium irrigation sources.  The choice of such projects 
and the approach of government was determined by several factors – agro-climate conditions as well as 
technology of water control available and several socio-economic factors available at those points of time 
– all in the backdrop of the compelling need to increase agricultural production.  Planning, construction 
and allocation of water has been in the domain of state governments and the union according to the 
provisions of the constitution.  Elaborate network of organizations and institutions were provided because 
of total intervention of the state in the construction of physical works like dams, canals, field channels and 
structures.  Management of operations for water deliveries and maintenance of the systems has been all 
along with the government (Vaidyanathan 99). 
A paradigm shift occurred after the initiation of irrigation sector reforms in the country where 
PIM and IMT have become integral parts of these reforms.  Having created an elaborate infrastructure 
ever since independence, the issue of rehabilitation of the systems now figure prominently along with the 
required O&M in many states including AP and MP.  There have been no special pro-poor programs in 
irrigated areas.  However, measures like rotational water distribution at the field level (Warabandi), canal 
rotations at the system level and restricting water intensive crops at certain places (localization), were 
introduced to help the poor in getting adequate irrigation to their fields.  These measures were met with 
varying degrees of success.  Except in north Indian states, Warabandi could not be implemented 
successfully.  The reason was that identification of land ownership for water allocation timings and turns 
posed a big problem and warabandi was viewed more as an administrative solution in its implementation, 
than as a solution carrying social importance.  In south Indian systems, the prescribed localization method 
whereby water intensive crops are restricted between upper reaches and lower reaches could not be 
implemented at any point of time.  The implementation of PIM/IMT is now seen as a new institutional 
mechanism to bring equity in water distribution, better cost recovery and O&M in the irrigated areas.  
This has provided the key institutional interventions, norms and procedures in the management and 
operation of irrigation systems at the field level, project level and also state level. Institutions related to 
inter-state sharing of rivers, decisions on construction of new projects and all other technical aspects 
involving a high order of technical competence are retained under the control of central and state 




At the project level for allocation of water, the operation plan based on its entitlement, agro, soil, 
characteristics and cropping pattern will be prepared by the competent authority and has to be approved 
by the project-level committee, according to the provisions of the new enactments.  However, project-
level committees are not formed so far in both the states. Thus, the gap persists between farmers’ 
organizations and policy-making levels.  Though envisaged under the acts, the project committees are 
either viewed as threatening to the power structures both in politics as well as bureaucracy, or cannot 
handle the complex task of management at that level.  In KDS in AP, where the political awareness is 
higher, WUA presidents formed a federation-like organization – an association of the presidents and 
handled issues of WUA and appointed a president and vice president to negotiate with the government for 
water allocations and other policy interactions.  This informal body was successful in conducting 
meetings with DC presidents ranging from money payments to WUAs by the government, maintenance 
works including rehabilitation of the Krishna river barrage, water planning at the project level, to 
demanding the formation of project-level committee for farmers’ organizations. The federation is an 
informal organization networking with different actors within the project and outside.  For the farmers 
and officials in the delta it was immaterial whether the association was constituted as per the letter of law 
or not.  In early 2002, the federation co-sponsored an all India meeting of WUAs in Vijayawada and 
successfully negotiated with DC presidents of lower reaches of a branch canal, and adjusted the then 
experienced water deficit in the adjacent Godavari System by augmenting supplies from a branch canal of 
the tail-end of the Krishna system.  This involved not only the acceptance from tail-end farmers of the 
Krishna system but also the irrigation officials of the two different irrigation projects (Sivamohan, Scott 
2002). 
Water distribution from a distributary level is now brought under the purview of farmers’ 
organizations.  However, the distribution schedules follow the old institutional approaches.  The 
competent authority, an irrigation official from the government, at the DC level prepares the schedule 
depending on the releases from reservoirs into the canals in the particular year.  The acts provide for 
information dissemination widely to farmers regarding the supply position at different branch (minor) 
canal off-takes, well before the beginning of the season.  The opening and closure of the canals is 
expected to be intimated well in advance so that WUAs will prepare for their farming activities.  The 
operation of branch canals and distributaries is continuous in both AP and MP.  In the rabi season they are 
rotated in AP.  Elaborate rules have been formed in the Acts this regard under the headings “operation 
plan and water budgeting” and ‘water regulation’.  However, there is no evidence in the field indicating 
the adoption of these rules.  As the entire exercise requires a certain level of technical knowledge, the 
designated competent authority along with the assistance of the irrigation department has to prepare water 
budgeting for farmers’ organizations and advise and assist on water regulation based on water supplies 
and seasonal conditions.  It is anticipated that simultaneously the capacities of the WUAs are also built in 
this regard.  It is not sufficient conducting training programs alone, but the irrigation officials also have to 
work with the WUAs to provide them hands-on guidance. 
It is observed that the training programs conducted in AP are in the nature of repeat lectures.  
None of the field-level officials have experience with management at field level.  
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It is seen in all the irrigation systems studied, nearly 90 percent of the WUAs do not have any 
operation plan or even records in relation to water supplies.  In the absence of required data and records, it 
is hard for any one to plan and improve the working of a system. 
Water distribution is affected by the poor condition of the state of canals, distributaries and 
minors of the irrigation systems.  The drainage canals were not maintained for years before.  In KDS, the 
initial work of the DCs on drainage canals (weed removal, desilting bunds, repair, etc.) for the three initial 
years was undertaken with World Bank assistance. Minor repairs on water channels and structures were 
undertaken by WUAs simultaneously, spreading extensively in the entire project.  This has vastly 
improved water deliveries in the canals.  Such works were not taken up by WUAs in MP in a concerted 
manner and the condition of canals is bad at several places of the irrigation network. 
For the distribution of water from the outlet to individual farms, the WUAs are given the 
responsibility of developing the rotational water supply (Warabandi) schedules and implementing them to 
ensure equity.  The field observations as well as discussions with the farmers in all the irrigations systems 
show the following: 
 
1.  The head-end farmers take the water first and only when their requirement is complete do the 
farmers below get the water. 
2.  The irrigation is by field to field in all the irrigation systems. By practicing ‘warm and cold’ 
irrigation -  a term used for this practice in MP -  a good amount of water is wasted as it flows to the 
drains from the fields at the beginning of the agricultural season. Apart from the principle of first-
farmer-first, the influence or the power of farmer also often determines the priorities in irrigation 
intake.  There are some instances reported in MP (especially when water is scarce) that large 
farmerstake water first. However, in old systems like KDS, the practices are clearly standardized, 
size of landholding or influence of a particular farmer makes little difference. 
3.  The crop varieties chosen by almost all farmers in AP are high-yielding varieties of paddy (HYV), 
and there is no variation in the number of watering required from field to field.  In MP, the head -
end farmers grow HYV wheat varieties locally called the Mexican varieties, that require five 
waterings in the Halali project, whereas the tail ends usually grow local varieties of wheat and gram 
which require only one to two waterings.  Scarcity of water prompts them to choose crops like 
gram, jower, and pulses. etc. 
4.  Some sort of dependency relationship exists for the small farmer with the large farmers in the 
villages. In MP, the small farmers and their family members work on the agricultural fields of the 
large farmers who provide subsistence wages or small parts of latters’ land for cultivation.  In such 
situations, the large farmer helps the small farmer in getting irrigation not as a matter of right but as 
a favor.  The concept of sharing of available water is not internalized by the farmers. 
5.  In MP, among villages which are homogenous (landholding-wise) there is greater equity in the 
sharing of water. 
 
In water allocation as Mollinga
24 (2002) observes, at all these levels the emphasis is on bureaucratic 
allocation (legal and administrative decision reserving X,Y, and Z qualities of water for different sub-
                                                 
24 Peter P. Mollinga (2002), Power in Motion: A Critical assessment of Canal Irrigation Reform in India.  In Hooja,   
G. Pangare, and KV Raju :Users in Water Management, Rawat Publications, New Delhi. 
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systems and sectors).  Allocation does not straight forwardly translate into distribution, and allocation 
mechanisms have given very little protection to tail-enders”.  And allocations do not conform to the 
designed quantities.  As the rotational scheduling like Warabandi is not practiced in AP there are no 
codified procedures for managing drought hence, there is no predictability of supplies and equitable 
distribution to each outlet. 
From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that some of the water allocation institutions 
addressed to the advantage and betterment of tail enders and poor, though are in place, are not 
implemented due to a variety of reasons—not only because of gross inequity by the head-end farmers but 





The results of the study shows that in the old stabilized irrigation systems a better and accepted water 
distribution pattern and in-built equity seems to exist.  In KDS as well as the Halali systems the 
intervention of some DC leaders facilitated solving (by negotiations) head and tail-end water distribution 
issues.  This is mainly by instilling mutual cooperation and agreement by the contending parties in 
sharing water.  This is not the case always.  The WUA leaders in all the irrigation systems opined that on 
an average there was a reduction in disputes (mainly related to water distribution to the fields) to an extent 
of 15 percent only.  Many of the small farmers felt that after the IMT, some forum is now available for 
redressal, if required.  However, the acts have not stipulated any appellate jurisdiction in the framework 





The relevance of water rights in canal irrigation is well appreciated not only by the researchers but also 
the farmers.  But, there is hardly any right to deal with real situations in the canal irrigation sector. The 
difficulty comes in changing the legal provisions based on historical developments and values, and also 
any attempts in that direction calls for a whole hog change of laws uniformly in all the states confirming 
to legal principles.  Further, it is not sufficient to attempt a change in one sector, namely irrigation, and in 
one sphere, but it has to be attempted in a host of sectors and spheres.  This has become difficult in the 
socio-political context of India.  All the irrigation acts reiterate the nature of state’s rights over the natural 
water.  Arbitrary control by state though is not possible, its right to regulate irrigation waters is paramount 
and sovereign in character; the laws enacted in the states are in the nature of institutionalizing several 
customary and informal rights developed based on the situations in time and space.  The fishing rights, for 
example, are vested with some sections of the population and even after the formation of the WUA cannot 
be brought under their purview.  However, several of the customary rules thus developed had performed 
well even in a heterogeneous society of a given power structure and with unequal access to means of 
production. 
The PIM Acts in general, are silent on water rights; starting with the AP legislation handing over 
some rights to the farmers in the management of irrigation systems, several state governments followed 
suit.  These legislations legalize water as property of land owners only, excluding the landless.  The Acts  
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are silent on the issue of individual water rights.  It is not clear if the agreement the irrigation department 
enters with farmers at the beginning of the season constitutes the right of the farmer to water, and whether 
the irrigation department is bound to provide the agreed amount of water.  In practice, however, the 
agreements are few and water allocation has little to do with it.  In farmers’ view the purpose of the 
agreement is not very clear and its efficacy in ensuring enforcement, rights, and water allocation is 
questionable. 
Farmers believe that the aim of the PIM is to ensure that everybody gets sufficient water.  The 
farmers are not yet home with the issue of conserving water and using water prudently.  Those WUA 
presidents are considered good who use their influence to keep the minors open all the time.  Thus, WUA 
presidents instead of meeting together and deciding on who should get how much water based on 
available water in the reservoir, try to divert as much water as possible into their own WUA territory.  
DCs are not yet influential enough to prevail upon the WUA presidents to provide water to the tail-end 
WUAs.  The coordination mechanisms are not yet developed.  Moreover, the DCs have no teeth in this 
matter.  They cannot enforce norms or penalize the defaulting WUA president. 
The negative contribution of the institutionalized caste system in Indian society is well-known.  
While its influence prevails in all activities, irrigation is gradually coming out of its grip.  This is not to 
say that its influence is totally disappearing.  This is not considered as a big issue as it was thirty years 
ago.  Yet, in some of the pockets along the irrigation network in MP, the big farmers not only over-
irrigate at the cost of the downstream poor farmer, but also would not allow water to flow until the 
farmer’s fields are completely irrigated.  Some farmers expressed concern that the old social structure 
would reinforce itself with the formation of the WUA.  In the Halali project, the ST and SC farmers even 
opposed IMT in its initial stages.  The other side of the perception was that the influential local leader can 
effectively negotiate with government authorities for more water to their fields.  For many of the office 
bearers this is a spring board for political progression. 
 
Institutional performance of PIM 
 
The effective way of realizing the goals of WUAs mainly depends on their working, the process of 
sharing information with all the water users and the transparency shown in their activities.  One of the key 
indicators of judging performance of a WUA can be an assessment through the frequency of meetings of 
general body and managing committee (MC) of the WUA.  The guidelines according to the acts are that, 
the general body shall meet at least twice in a year, once before the rabi season; likewise, at least once in 
every month the managing committee should meet to take care of mainly day-to-day issues.  The 
meetings of general bodies organized are only  60 percent in both the states in a 4-year-period, though the 
meetings of the managing committees were more frequent.  It is observed from the minutes kept by the 
WUA and also in the PRA exercises, that the main focus of discussions during the general body meetings 
was centered around maintenance activities. Issues related to water regulation hardly took 20 percent of 
time in the general body meetings. Issues related to crop production, financial matters, social audit, etc., 
consumed only around 10 percent of the time in the meetings. The management committees utilized 
approximately 45 percent of their time on maintenance with issues of water regulation figures for only 
approximately 15 percent of the time. This shows that both the general bodies and MCs are focusing their 




The other indicators though could not be quantified are reflected in the PRA exercises.  None of 
the WUAs could generate additional funds from the water users than the funds given by the government, 
except in KDS. The tail-end villages (WUAs)  and some DCs were said to have collected money to 
supplement government allocations for the clearing of drains in the early phases of IMT implementation.  
Though empowered, no WUA has taken penal actions against erring and defaulting members. It is already 
pointed out that activities like allocation plans, water budgeting and efforts to use water efficiently and 
equitably were totally missing in the functions of the WUAs.  It is also opined that some of the WUA 
presidents and DC presidents are operating more like contractors, forming an unholy nexus with irrigation 
officials  
Clearly defined water allocation and distribution procedures give rise to the need for developing 
water rights (formal or informal).  Lack of such institutional arrangements and flow of transparent 
information regarding their rights affect the efficiency in water management. More so, the poor are 
adversely affected in such a situation than the non-poor farmers. 
 
Decision-making and Viability 
 
Though the information regarding the existence of the WUAs spread to the members incrementally in the 
four years of functioning of PIM in AP, information regarding WUAs management is still not available to 
the members. In MP, though the awareness spread quickly regarding the constitution of WUAs among 
members, the ambit of WUA and its functions are not clear to them.  The Acts do not provide for 
reservation of poor farmers and women representatives on the management bodies (MC).  High caste 
domination is shown among MCs of WUAs both in AP and MP. Further, the representation of poor 
farmers is marginal in both states.  This reinforces the observation of earlier studies (Barbara Van Koppen  
et al. 2002, Jasveen Jairath 2001)
25 that the small and marginal farmers are by and large excluded from 
decision-making and the opportunity of negotiations with the leaders.  The consensus candidates were 
encouraged by the AP Government by providing financial incentives to the respective WUAs choosing 
them.  Promoting contest through elections is more rewarding as a democratic process and also the 
context of devolving powers at grass-root level. The poor farmers will have a chance to exercise their 




Positive contribution of P&M 
 
The minor repairs undertaken by WUAs in both the states and also the drainage works in KDS no doubt 
have resulted in availability of more water to the tail ends which in itself is a pro-poor contribution.  In 
KDS, the WUAs are convinced that less irrigation water to paddy fields give more production.  Last 
year’s drought and the effects of the leaders of farmers in convincing the farmers showed that even less 
number of waterings to the rice fields (about 4) can yield better outputs.  The growing awareness or belief 
                                                 
25 Barbara Van Koppen, R. Parthasarathy and Constantina Safillow (2002):Poverty Dimension of Irrigation 
management Transfer in Large Scale Canal Irrigation in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, India, IWMI, Colombo; 
26  Javeen Jairath (2001):Water Users Associations in Andhra Pradesh - Initial Feedback. CESS, Hyderabad. 
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among farmers would also certainly help improve water deliveries to the tail ends giving rise to the 
evolution of new institutions.  Successful learning experiences of farmers spread the message faster than 
the usual extension methods. 
Small farmers mostly rely on canal water which is less costly compared to other sources, for their 
agricultural production.  The O&M works undertaken after the implementation of PIM generally 
benefited small land holders than the large farmers by creating more opportunities for agricultural wage 
earning.  Gradually, when more representations on MCs for small farmers materialize, in the long run 
PIM is certainly likely to benefit the poor more than the rich. 
 
Towards Pro-poor Strategic Interventions in Irrigated Agriculture in India 
 
The analysis made in this report throws up some common and divergent scenarios for initiating strategic 
interventions at different levels with a pro-poor slant. Ever since the planned effort, the government of 
India and the state governments have been carving out several interventions from time to time with an 
aim to alleviate poverty in rural areas.  The area development programs, several employment generation 
programs and those aimed at target population along with subsidized food gain distribution, education and 
health improvement programs – all have contributed effectively to the reduction in rural poverty.  Though 
it took twenty years initially after the planning, rural poverty has been coming down impressively.  Yet, 
the absolute poverty and the phenomenon of poverty in plenty still haunts the Indian scene. 
Special pro-poor programs or interventions by far, are few in irrigated areas.  One of the reasons 
for this may be the policy makers’ long-held belief that increased agricultural production in irrigated 
commands would automatically decrease poverty in those areas.  Among the irrigation projects studied, 
KDS in AP in the oldest commissioned in 1852 followed by the Harsi in 1935, NSLC in 1968 and Halali 
in 1978.  These projects show varying degrees of irrigation performance and implications for poverty.  
While the older systems like KDS show more deterioration, the others are also showing signs of 
considerable decay in the physical infrastructure.   
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3.7. SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Income poverty is taken into account in this report to facilitate six country comparisons, eventually. 
However, expenditure poverty is also analyzed for a comparison as the official poverty figures in India 
are based on expenditure. 
Households in irrigated areas in general, show a striking contrast to those located in non-irrigated 
areas.  The poverty in the rain-fed villages outside the NSLC is twice the ratio.  While the contribution of 
canal irrigation can be clearly seen in all the systems studied, the extent of non-farm income, land holding 
size and ground water use obliviate poverty levels to an extent in rain-fed areas.  The main impact of 
irrigation on household income is through increased agricultural productivity, longer periods of 
employment with higher wages, higher cropping intensity and choice of high value food crops (HYV) as 
against the traditional varieties in rainfed areas.  Though poverty is all-pervasive to some of the 
households namely, marginal-small and landless categories, the poorest of the poor are found in non-
irrigated areas. Thus, the study confirms to the findings of numerous research studies conducted earlier. 
Poverty in canal-irrigated areas is one of the crucial issues the report dealt with. The 
characteristics of the poor households in AP and MP are different. In AP, though landless households 
prominently figure among the poor, surprisingly, the poorest among the poor are those with some land.  
Both in NSLC and KDS, non-farm income constitutes a considerable share in income. Landless 
households spend all their time in wage earning whereas households with land spend only part of their 
time on off-farm employment.  In MP, not many options exist for off-farm employment like in AP, and 
the landless households who are mostly poor are poorest too.  The contribution of agricultural labor is 
also significant in the income for the landless households.  In the Harsi system which is double-cropped, 
the average per capita income of the poor landless is 35 percent more than in Halali, and the income 
between landless-poor and landed non-poor is much less compared to Halali.  The other socio-economic 
features of the poor and non-poor households can be captured by the type of their dwelling places, 
education of the head of the household and number of members constituting the household.  Kutcha 
houses (not firm, thatched, mudwall and roofs) are more in villages with no access to water and the pucca 
(concrete/tiled) houses are more in irrigated areas.  Further, in areas of established irrigation projects like 
KDS and also with the non-poor landed households (in all the irrigation systems), pucca houses are of 
common sight.  The average household size is 4 in KDS, 5 in NSLC, and 7 in MP.  However, the number 
of members in poor landless households is comparatively higher.  Difference in education levels of the 
heads of households is marginal.  The heads of landless households however, spent one or two years less 
in schools in MP than their counter parts in AP. 
Poverty in NSLC seems to be linked to the accessibility of water.  Of the non-poor households 66 
percent received water during the Kharif, whereas the 30 percent of poor households obtained irrigation 
during the season.  As a result, the cultivated area of poor is less than one-third cultivated by the non-poor 
and also, the net present value produced is lower in KDS. The poor as well as non-poor received water in 
Kharif(poor households more, than non-poor households) and the income is similar in both the categories.  
The productivity of non-poor households in KDS is three times more to that of poor households. In 
Halali, the difference in average household income between the poor and non-poor is over 7 times and in 
Harsi it is 4.8 times. The difference is due to the double crop and consequent generation of more 
employment opportunities in Harsi.  Looking at access to irrigation we find considerable differences 
among the poor and non-poor. In Halali, 45 percent of the poor households received irrigation, 72 percent  
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of the non-poor obtained irrigation in Rabi.  In Harsi, the difference between the poor and non-poor in 
accessibility for irrigation ranges from 20 percent to 50 percent in Rabi, and between 35 percent and 60 
percent in Kharif. In the Halali command area, ground water is not used, whereas, in all the other three 
systems ground water is used conjunctively, to an extent.  More ground water usage is seen in Harsi (36% 
of households in head reach, 14% in the middle and 32% at the tail-end). Only 10-15 percent of 
households use ground water in AP at head and middle reaches. 
It is clearly seen that villages located in parts of the canal system with sufficient access to 
irrigation are less poor compared to others.  Thus, poverty in tail-end-reaches is more compared to the 
middle reaches of the canals because of lack of availability of water. 
An important determinant influencing poverty in irrigated agriculture is the landholding size.  
Historically, measures like zamindari (intermediate tenant between state and farmer) abolition, land-
ceiling legislations, and various tenancy acts have in several states redistributed land resources. In fact, 
the first signs of poverty reduction were seen during those times. The disparity in land holdings however 
is not wide now as it used to be at one time in AP or MP.  However, several benani (factious) holdings, 
partitions on paper and other methods circumvent the law. Even the reported landholding pattern shows 
differences between the poor and non-poor households.  In Halali whereas an average poor household 
landholding is 1.3 hectares for the non-poor it is 6.4 hectares. In other systems the non-poor 
approximately own double the size of average landholding ranging from 1.38 hectares to 2.85 hectares. 
The average size of the landholding increases in all the systems from head to tail ends of the 
canals, along with the percentage of the landless also generally increasing more in water-scarce systems 
like NSLC and Halali.  This may point to the natural settlement pattern of the poor moving to less- 
productive and water-scarce reaches.  The incomes, however, cannot be explained by landholding size 
alone.  The marginal farmers in water-abundant systems like KDS and Harsi are better off compared to 
those in water-deficit systems.  In water-deficit systems like NSLC, the percentage of lands left 
uncultivated is more to the percentage of land under a second crop. 
Land productivity and crop choices have a bearing on poverty.  In both the states in reaches 
where water is abundantly available all farmers irrespective of land holding size cultivate water-intensive 
crops.  In AP, rice (HYV), is grown during Kharif and minor crops like black gram, groundnut pulses are 
grown in Rabi. In NSLC, rice crop is preferred in Rabi, also wherever water is available and is 
supplemented by ground water.  In MP, high-yielding wheat (called Mexican variety) is grown in Rabi to 
an extent of 65-70 percent in both head and middle reaches of Halali. In Harsi, paddy is the main crop 
(ranging from 90% to 60%) in head and middle reaches. While the tail ends in Halali grew local varieties 
of wheat, in Harsi, jowar and maize are grown.  High value (HYV) crops in both the states yield high 
monetary returns to the farmers though farm-input costs are also correspondingly high. This once again 
shows that poor farmers have to contend with local varieties and coarse grains, mainly due to lack of 
adequate irrigation to their fields.  In MP, small farmers are also constrained to use available land in an 
optimal way, as access to adequate credit and other inputs is lacking.  The crop choices of farmers thus 
fall on crops requiring less expensive inputs. 
An important aspect which affects both the poor and marginal farmers in all the projects is the 
quality of water supply.  The unreliable and delayed availability of water for crops adversely affect the 
output.  While large farmers can look for an alternate source of irrigation, small and marginal farmers 
solely depend on canal water. Until the formation of WUAs minor repairs were undertaken by them and 
water used to reach the tail-end of the main canals in the KDS system after 2 to 3 months of time, after  
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the  release at the head-ends; though the time duration varied from project to project, all the tail-ends in 
the irrigation canals experience delays and short supplies. 
Levy and collection of sufficient water fees from the users is another crucial and long neglected 
issue in Indian irrigation systems.  The supply-side nature of canal irrigation with heavy subsides in all 
agricultural inputs including water for increased food grains production, deteriorated government revenue 
collections even for undertaking O&M activities in the irrigation projects. The Vaidyanathan Committee 
appointed by the Planning Commission in 1992 examined the issue and while endorsing the commonly-
held view that the revision in water pricing should cover the O&M costs and a modest amount of the 
capital costs incurred, it held the view that water pricing should in the long run aim at covering all the 
recurring and capital costs fully. 
Our findings show that the collection of water charges in MP is 33 percent in Halali and 21 
percent in Harsi.  The corresponding figurers for KDS in AP is 55 percent.  For NSLC figures are not 
available.  This reflects on the system’s poor financial self-sufficiency and wide O&M financing gap 
based on recovery.  However, in both the states (in the country as a whole), there is no direct link between 
irrigation performance and water fee recoveries.  Budget allocations are made at the state levels every 
year, irrespective of quantum of water fee charged and collected.  The collections made by the revenue 
department (AP) or irrigation agency (MP) go directly to the government’s exchequer general pool.  Yet 
another related aspect to the issue of water fee is lack of relationship between the O&M requirements and 
the decision of amount of water tax to be collected.  For example, the annual O&M expenditure in Halali 
and Harsi are Rs. 29 and Rs. 31 million, respectively. Most of this however goes into payments of salaries 
and overheads.  Even if 100 percent of present water taxes are collected it would meet only 25 percent of 
the O&M costs.  Political considerations perpetuate the downward levels of pricing.  The introduction of 
PIM envisaged collection for water charges by WUAs.  But the WUAs have not yet started this function 
in both states.  However, the work on assessment of water charges under joint ajmaish (joint supervision) 
of both the irrigation department and WUAs in AP, has been initiated.  The complete responsibility of 
assessment and collection is neither handed over to WUAs nor the WUAs accept them willingly because 
of the social sensitivities involved in collection and enforcement. 
It is well known that if proper institutions are in place it would improve the performance of the 
irrigation systems and also the lot of poor by many times, than attempting improvements merely in 
physical systems. 
The earlier interventions through CAD programs and irrigation modernization programs were 
seen as administrative and technical solutions to the problems.  A major intervention strategy attempted, 
starting with AP in 1997 and MP in 1999, was the introduction of PIM and handing over management of 
irrigation to the farmers’ organizations.  This was part of the overall sectoral reforms the country was 
engaged in.  This has brought in a ‘paradigm shift’ in the irrigation sector, introducing new institutional 
arrangements.  The institutions hitherto had been ‘control’ oriented by the government.  Water allocation 
and distribution are worked out at the top and their implementation are worked out at the top and their 
implementation was in the hands of irrigation agencies of the government.  The IMT is expected to bring 
about changes in several customs, norms and rules hitherto governing irrigation management. 
Institutional measures like ‘warabandi’ (rotational water supply method) in north India and 
localization (restriction of water-intensive crops in designated areas from head to tail end, prohibiting 
cultivation in some zones etc.) were devised to ensure equity in water distribution in some areas. Laws 
were also enacted, but their implementation (in MP and AP, respectively) remained difficult.    
 191
Localization in name of equity tended to introduce inequity of another kind.  Warabandi as an 
administrative measure became target oriented and lost the social importance it was supposed to carry.  
Other methods like rotation of canals and permission of second crops in the command area, though are 
successful, could not bring about the expected equity. One of the objectives of IMT is to enable the 
farmers to evolve equitable distribution practices and their implementation.  The WUAs in both the states 
have not yet addressed these issues of water planning, budgeting and equitable distribution.  Their 
functions during the last 4-5 years have centered around construction and repair activities; and water 
management is yet to figure as an important activity they have to attend upon.  The PIM Acts in general, 
are silent on ‘water rights’.  Though several customary rights have performed well before, the need for 
evolving water rights still remain.  The IMT can be seen as a first step in creating “group water rights”; 
yet, the landless are out of the purview and poor landholders are not represented in the decision-making 
bodies like management committees. 
The role of caste institutions almost working like “bonded labor” are still operative in some areas 
in MP.  Sharing of irrigation water has to a great extent come out of the clutches of the caste system in 
AP.  While on one side the farmers feared reinforcement of old social structures at the beginning of IMT 
in MP, the overall feeling of WUAs in AP and in MP in electing rich landlords or coincidentally 
influential high-caste farmers as presidents was backed by prudence.  The farmers opined that such a 
person would be able to carry weight and can negotiate better with the government and members. Project-
level committees in both the states have not yet been formed leaving a wide gap in planning and 
implementation.  The experience of IMT as seen from the empirical data calls for institutional learning 
and capacity building among all stakeholders backed up by several amendments in the Acts.  These and 
other interventions will be further discussed in the following sections. 
 
Findings of generic importance 
The report brings home several findings of generic importance which call for strategic interventions at 
government/policy (macro), project (meso) and field/operational (micro) levels.  While initiating these 
interventions it should be ensured that all of them are connected and have a logical linkage from policy to 
operational levels.  These interventions triggered simultaneously would achieve more than the piece-meal 
approaches.  In the past, the government in its wisdom encouraged macro economic growth, human 
capital development and also provided safety nets for the poor.  At times the trade -ff proved very 
favorable and also unfavorable.  In this wider context the following are some of the findings of generic 
importance in irrigated agriculture as reflected in the study. 
 
1.  Tail reaches of the irrigation canals have low productivity levels causing high poverty incidence.  
Head reaches consume more water and the conveyance systems are incapable of delivering 
water/required water to the tail-ends.  The main reasons for this are, a) excess drawls and over-use of 
water by head-end farmers; b) glaring design and planning deficiencies in the irrigation systems.  In 
NSLC for example, earlier studies showed in the original project, proper estimates of command area 
and water supply were over-estimated by 36 percent and still the construction of canals is continuing 
in spite of deficits at the tail-ends.  In the same project, it was estimated that in different places of 
head and middle reaches at least 12mm of water is lost daily on account of deep percolation in paddy  
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fields.  The localization specifications are flouted by the users and the changes acquired legitimacy; c) 
at the time of design of projects there were many lacune like non-availability of sufficient and reliable 
information, operation of pressure to confirm to the technical and financial criteria of appraisals, and 
compulsions to include extensive areas in the project.  This is an important cause which led to several 
inconsistencies.  In addition to the questions of planning and implementation, the question of equity 
comes to the fore. The interventions thus needed are policy, economic, financial, legal and 
institutional-oriented at all levels. 
2.  The performance of established (old) irrigation projects is better compared to the new projects 
constructed after independence, showing a ‘stabilization’ effect on the economy of households.  In 
both the older projects, KDS and Harsi, poverty levels are less when compared to the overall poverty 
of the respective states.  The hegemony of castes and landholding sizes is relatively less compared to 
the other projects in the respective states.  There has been a quick adaptation to change (farmers 
management) and attempts were made to adapt to the new initiatives through required institutional 
arrangements (formation of federation of water users’ associations, initiatives to prepare water 
allocation plans and budget, good cooperative functioning of the irrigation department and farmers’ 
organizations, etc.). In KDS, the initiatives of the DC president to arrange releases of water to the tail-
end worked out agreements between head and lower-reach WUAs. Among the old irrigation systems 
better equity in distribution, higher per hectare output at tail ends, employment of labor for long 
periods, higher wage rates can be seen.  The trend can be explained because of the existence of better 
institutional development and functioning. 
3.  Irrigation yields are comparably low in the water-scarce reaches of the projects.  This was to an extent 
due to the crop choice of farmers in the head reaches.  In all irrigation areas rice is the preferred crop 
of the farmer.  Absence of water regulation and farmers preference for rice cultivation is also the 
basis for inequity in sharing water among farmers.  Sustained efforts to wean farmers away from rice 
cultivation are lacking. 
4.  There is no encouragement for diversification of crop from policy to operational level.  The farmer’s 
preference in the case of rice cultivation to an extent is also conditioned by externalities of rice 
cultivation itself, in the neighboring ‘field, especially for the downstream farms.’ 
5.  Fixation of water charges and the basis for fixation remained top-down.  The collection mechanisms 
have not changed even after IMT.  This is an issue well discussed in India.  While in AP the 
institutional structure has been created to revise water rates periodically, the procedure for fixing and 
collection are still ambiguous.  In the changing scenario after the introduction of IMT the poor service 
mode remains.  There are no clear-cut water delivery schedules, no volumetric devices, no definite 
water allocation plans prior to the agricultural season.  Further, there is no farmer involvement in any 
of these issues. While fixation of rates is one aspect that can be used effectively in policy 
development in favor of the poor, collection of water taxes is an ‘important’ issue that calls for 
attention in view of the misappropriations inherent, and also mounting dues pending from the users.  
Water tax collection has been very poor in both the states, but better recoveries are evident in systems 
(KDS) where irrigation performance is better.  The issue of water charges is also linked to the 
question of its viability being related to land and crop. 
6.  The management change in irrigation sector calls for a great deal of institutional learning and capacity 
building of the actors involved.  The capacity building involves not only training of irrigation officials 
and farmers but also both of them working together in evolving plans and implementation strategies.   
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The irrigation agency has a major role in providing ‘hands-on’ guidance to the WUA leaders in the 
management of irrigation.  Though the IMT has successfully created farmer collectives and focal 
officer (competent authority) from the irrigation department, it has not devised institutional 
mechanisms for capacity building among the different actors.  These findings have implications for 
evolving and developing institutions at operational level with appropriate policy support. 
7.  Though waterlogging and salinity were not reported in the study area, the degradation of land (non-
research resource) is on the increase in irrigated areas in India.  Signs of water logging are seen at 
KDS and Harsi in the head reaches.  These externalities have to be addressed both at policy-level and 
WUA-level. 
8.  The gender participation in WUA management is meagre in MP and AP. In AP, except for a few 
elected women representatives, many of them were brought into the management bodies as proxies 
for their husbands or as a strategy to get financial support from the government.  A few women 
representatives, however, made an excellent imprint on the functioning of the WUAs. This is an issue 
which has to be addressed at operational level. 
9. Farmers’ Participation and IMT:  By far, the IMT is the major step which ushered in several 
institutional changes which in turn showed positive results.  Yet, the law is silent on many aspects 
affecting the poor and the landless.  Several other institutions are to be evolved and nurtured by both 













Annexure – 1 
 
Nagarjuna Sagar Left Canal Project – Andhra Pradesh.  
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Annexure – 2 
 
Krishna Delta System – Andhra Pradesh. 
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Annexure – 3 
 






Annexure – 4 
 










Assessment Performance of the Irrigation System 
 
 
         Net Irrigated Area (NIA) 
 
1. Irrigation Intensity = ----------------------------------------- 
         Designed Command Area (DCA) 
 
 
         Gross Cultivated Area (GCA) 
 
 
2. Cropping Intensity = ----------------------------------------- 
         Designed Command Area (DCA) 
 
 
     Total  Production  (TP) 
 
 
3. Output per unit of command area = ------------------------- 




4. Total production in Command Area = Output in command area in value terms for different 
crops 
      
 




5. Output per Unit of Diverted Irrigation Water = --------------------------------------- 
                      Diverted Irrigation Water (DIW) 
 
 







6. Output per Unit of Consumed Water = --------------------------------------------------- 
 
                   Volume of Water Consumed by ET (WET) 
 




7. Output per Unit of Labor = --------------------------------------------------- 
            Total number of person days in cultivation 
 
 




8. Head-Tail Equity Ratio in Output = ----------------------------------------------------- 









9. Relative Water Supply = -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
            Crop Demand (CD= Potential Crop ET) 
 
 
           




10. Relative Irrigation Supply = --------------------------------------------------------------------- 















11. Water Delivery Capacity = --------------------------------------------------------- 
    Peak  Consumptive  Demand  (PCD) 
 
(PCD-the peak crop irrigation requirements for a monthly period expressed as a flow rate at the 
head of the irrigation system) 
 





12. Water Delivery Performance = --------------------------------------------- 
                 Targeted Volume of Water delivered 
 
 
         





13. Overall System Efficiency = -------------------------------------- 




      Average Delivery Performance at Head Reach 
 
 
14. Head Tail Equity = ------------------------------------------------------ 
      Average Delivery Performance at Tail Reach        
 
 












15. Gross Value of Farm Production = --------------------------------------------------------- 
      Per Unit Area                        Area 
 
 










   
 
 
17. Net Value of Farm Production as Percentage of Total Household Income 
 
        Net Value of Farm Production 
=       --------------------------------------- 
















19. System Level Profitability = ------------------------------------------------- 
             Total Irrigation Expenses per unit of area 
 
 






20. Water Charge Collection Performance = ------------------------------------------------------ 
                            Maximum Collectable Irrigation Water Charge 
 
 





21. System Financial self-sufficiency = ------------------------------------------------------ 
                   Actual Total Annual O&M Expenditure 
 
 




22. O&M Financing Gap = ------------------------------------------------------------------ 





















n = Total size of population 
 
q = Number of poor people below poverty line 
 
Z = Poverty line (in rural Andhra Pradesh poverty line = Rs.262.94 per capita per month and in 
Madhya Pradesh = Rs. 311.34 per capita per month) 
 
yi = Income of the people below poverty line 
 






Head Count Index: is defined as the share or proportion of the population, which is poor or whose income 
is below the specified poverty line. This is a measure of incidence of poverty. 
 
 
Poverty Gap Index: is defined as the mean distance separating the population from the poverty line. This 
can be interpreted as a measure of depth of poverty.  
 
The poverty gap can also be defined as the product of the head count index ration and the income gap 
ratio. 
 
Squared Poverty Gap Index: is a measure of the severity of poverty. The poverty gap takes into account 
the distance separating the poor from the poverty line, while the squared poverty gap (PG) takes into 
account the square of the distance. This gives more weight to the poor, by taking into account the 
inequality among the poor.  
 204
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